


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HOW THE WORLD VOTES

THE STORY OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN ELECTIONS



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HOW THE WORLD VOTES

The Story of Democratic Development in Elections

BY

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HOW THE WORLD VOTES

CHAPTER XIX

GERMAN LIBERALISM UP TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PRUSSIAN HEGEMONY

THE electoral question in Germany has been the core of the century-long contest between the party of absolutism and individualism on the one hand and that of liberalism on the other. The tide of liberalism has ebbed and flowed, through the era of black repression under Metternich, rising after his fall in 1848 only to be ruthlessly scotched by Bismarck, and since 1871 growing irresistibly in volume until the party of autocracy has been forced to listen to it in the Great War. Since 1815 the desire for a liberal franchise and a parliamentary government has remained for Germany, as a whole, a hope deferred.

In overrunning Germany Napoleon had done far more than to reduce the number of States which had composed the Holy Roman Empire and to replace that venerable relic by parchment confederations of his own. The states of the South in particular had been permeated by French revolutionary ideas. Saxe Weimar already boasted a constitution. Even in Prussia the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg had created municipal councils and local administrations in the *Kreise*, and had abolished serfdom and the official organization of society into the three estates.

The rationalist traditions of Voltaire and the *Social Contract* were still the creed of a brilliant group of young Liberals of whom Arndt and Fichte, Goethe and Schiller were the leaders. They hoped for freedom of speech and the press, for a national parliament. The exaltation of the glorious War of Liberation had heartened them to expect as its reward a united Germany which might efface the humiliations of the past.

The crushing disappointment which the end of the Napoleonic epoch brought to these idealists was due to two causes, one intellectual, the other political. While in the rest of Europe the romantic movement changed literary and artistic fashions only, in Germany historians of the school of Ranke and Savigny and Niebuhr were reviving interest in the Middle Ages, not only as a romantic historical picture, but as a political ideal. They proposed the reconstitution of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany. Adam Muller cursed all "constitutional folly." Haller wrote in answer to the *Contrat Social* that the state was the private domain of the prince, the officials his personal domestics and the peasants were the property of their landlords. The German tradition of absolute princely power, of the Elector of Brandenburg who first placed the iron crown on his own head, was revived and exerted a decisive influence on Frederick William III and his successor. The latter said in his coronation speech: "The King is responsible to God above. He extends to all his subjects the fruits of his fatherly kindness and governs them under the inspiration of God, grouped in their traditional classes."

Such were the principles which Metternich and the reactionaries sought to enforce by a series of Congresses, by the Holy Alliance, and by maintaining the rights of legit-

imacy and intervention. The separatist and absolutist tendencies of Austria and Prussia were entirely victorious at the Congress of Vienna. The Final Act of the Congress on June 9, 1815, framed a constitution for a German Bund, or Confederation, of thirty-eight states. It did less for German liberty and unity than the Articles of Confederation had done for the thirteen states in America. Instead of a central representative assembly there was a Diet meeting at Frankfort-on-the-Main, under the permanent presidency of Austria. The members were not elected by popular vote. They were the personal envoys of the princes and voted under their immediate and absolute control. The powers of the Diet over the fundamental law and ordinary legislation were broad though vague. But in practice it merely registered the mandates of the Princes. Even the princely majority might fail to rule because of the complicated method of legislation and the distribution of the votes among the states. Ordinary business was carried on in one kind of an assembly, questions concerning the fundamental law were settled in another. In the former, Austria, Prussia, and nine other states had one vote each, and six *curiæ* composed of the other states had each a single vote. Measures were prepared in this Ordinary Assembly for deliberation in *Plenum* where the sixty-nine votes were divided in rough proportion to importance. The six largest states possessed only four votes apiece, while even Liechtenstein with a few thousand inhabitants had at least one. It thus resulted that a coalition of the single votes of the small states could reject flatly the proposals of the six large states with five-sixths of the population of Germany. Since changes in the organic law and legislation on religious matters required unanimity, it was almost

as easy for a single petty duke to obstruct all progress, as it had been in the old Kingdom of Poland. The Bund was, therefore, impotent, as Metternich had intended it to be, and reactionary, because under the control of Austria. The Liberals* rejected this cumbrous parody of a Parliament in disgust.

Though Liberalism had succumbed in Germany as a whole, a ray of hope was left the Liberals in the constitutional movement in individual states. To stir his subjects in the last desperate struggle against Napoleon, Frederick William III of Prussia had promised them a constitution, and at Vienna sought to require every other member of the Bund to do the same. Nothing was more abhorrent to Metternich than a written constitution which conveyed the slightest degree of popular representation. His influence vitiated this clause of the Federal Act by expressing it in the vaguest terms and omitting the time limit altogether. The German people were left with nothing more tangible than "an unlimited right of expectation." Among those states, however, into which the influence of French political institutions had penetrated, constitutions were granted with great rapidity. The first state to promulgate its fundamental law was Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt on Jan. 8, 1816. This was followed by Schaumburg-Lippe, Jan. 15, 1816; Bavaria, May 26, 1818; Baden, Aug. 22, 1818; Würtemberg, Sept. 25, 1819; Hanover, Dec. 7, 1819; Brunswick, April 25, 1820.

The constitutions thus established, many of which remain to the present day, created the third type of state

* By Liberals are meant the groups which at various times under various names have stood for a liberal franchise and parliamentary government, the Burschenschaft, the Fortschrittspartei, the Free Conservatives, and the Social Democrats.

composing the Bund. There were the autocratic states, of which Austria and Prussia were the chief, where the will of the prince was the rule of the state. Here the institutions of Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa still flourished. The government was strongly centralized and administered as the personal domain of the monarch. No sacrilegious elective assembly intruded upon his divine right to tax and govern his people as he pleased. There was also the state where a liberal ruler called about him an assembly of the feudal states, in which the votes were by orders, not by individuals, and whose functions were seldom wider than the approval of taxation. The new type of constitutional state was closer to the German absolutist tradition than to an English parliamentary model. The king established a ministry whose signatures were necessary to validate the royal acts. This did not, however, imply a responsible government, since the king appointed the ministers, and no method was provided by which a hostile Chamber could force the withdrawal of a Cabinet. The legislative power was shared by king and Landtag, or elective assembly. The suffrage was regarded, not as a right, but as a concession from the beneficence of the ruler, and was almost universally indirect and public. In many states it was based upon the traditional system of classes, and placed the elections in the hands of a very limited wealthy group. Bills were initiated by the king, the assembly having the usual right of petition. It is characteristic of German institutions that none of these changes were made by a Constitutional Assembly chosen by popular suffrage. Reform was for the people but never by the people. There was nowhere the suggestion that representative government had been established.

Even this small advance towards democracy was soon followed by a recoil, and the breach in the Metternichian system was largely repaired. Less than half the states in the Confederation entered upon the constitutional path, and of these many later restored the old régime in part or entire. Nevertheless, through the student societies of the Burschenschaft and the Tugendbund, the Liberals kept up a steady and galling fire of protest and satire. Von Sybel has thus described the purpose of these societies:

"The young heroes returning from the war filled the universities with their patriotic indignation, and by the founding of societies of students, represented at all the universities, they sought to fill all the educated youth of Germany with their enthusiasm for unity, justice, and freedom. These societies, for the most part, cherished ambitions which were thoroughly ideal. They did not look to the overthrow of present conditions, but relied upon the training of the present generation. By moral elevation and patriotic inspiration they hoped to lead the state of the future to the great goal of national unity. To be sure, their notions of this future state were generally indefinite, and were mere unpractical fancies; indeed this enthusiasm rose in some groups to the pitch of wild fanaticism, so that they were even willing to seize the sword and dagger for tyrannicide. Yet such enthusiasts never succeeded in securing in the societies at large any great following for their projects."

Jahn, the founder of the societies, purified his dressing table by excluding from it every cravat of cloth "unworthy of a free German," and his vocabulary by replacing French words, such as *Universität* by German equivalents, such as *Vernunftturnplatz*. Student agita-

tion culminated in the Wartburg Festival on the tercentenary of the Reformation, which the youths celebrated with much feasting, speech-making, and some little disorder. At the Wartburg a copy of the *Code Napoléon*, the Federal Act, as well as a pig-tail, and a corporal's swagger stick and corsets—symbols of militarism—were tossed into a bonfire.

On March 23, 1819, Kotzebue, a Russian spy, was stabbed by a divinity student. It was the opportunity for which Metternich had been waiting, and he determined to make an end of all "*konstitutioneller Unsinn*." He pounced upon the Liberals with the Carlsbad decrees. It was declared with finality that Article XIII of the Federal Act meant that the constitutions granted should conform with German traditions by representation of the medieval estates only. Germany should draw no lessons from French or English models. The press and the universities were subjected to a humiliating censorship, and the student societies were put absolutely under the ban. "Carlsbad signifies in German history the suppression of liberty for a generation."

The party of popular government bent, though it did not break. The agitation continued under the very eyes of Austrian agents, who attended lectures, opened private correspondence, and carried on the meanest persecutions. Jahn was kept on the rack for five years, although not a charge could be proven against him. In spite of his great services during the War of Liberation, Arndt had his house ransacked, his most innocent expressions absurdly twisted, and was removed from his professorship for twenty years, though he swore that he hated all intrigues "like snakes of Hell." One preacher came under disfavor because he said that we owe to

Christ the liberation of all spiritual forces, and that every true Christian must believe that the kingdom of truth will conquer the kingdom of darkness.

The unfurling of the black, red, and gold flag at the Hambach festival in 1831 served Metternich as a pretext for sterner repression. In 1832 six new articles were added to the Federal Act of 1815. By them every prince was bound to resist any attempt of his local assembly to impair his sovereignty; no legislative body might refuse the necessary taxes to its ruler or use the taxing prerogative to extort further concessions, nor might it pass any laws contrary to the interests of the Bund as a whole. The Bundestag was constituted a supreme tribunal to decide whether a law threatened the Confederation or any individual ruler. The German assemblies thus brought under Austrian supervision were censored, as had been the universities, and if obstinate were dissolved altogether.

Metternich, no doubt, thought that he had given the quietus to the Liberal movement, but its spread was none the less irresistible. It was evident that the most rigorous police system could not root it out. On June 5, 1823, the King of Prussia felt constrained to summon provincial Estates with large competence in local affairs. The Revolution of 1830 in Germany had few results immediately apparent; but within five years (1831-1836) Hesse-Cassel, Saxe Altenburg, Saxony, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Lippe, and Lübeck gained constitutions.

A movement of a different sort, but of immensely greater import, was begun in the formation of the *Zollverein*, or customs union, which by 1840 included a large number of states. With its constitution, its assembly, and its economic uniformity, the *Zollverein* was an embryo German confederation, whose influence was the



Bismarck

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greater because it made the benefits of unity felt in a material sense.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate the political discontent in Germany in the twenties and thirties. Except for a tyrannical police most of the states were well governed, and even the persecution of the universities did not stifle one of the most glorious periods of German music, literature, and scholarship, such as she has not surpassed in the later days of her strength. The very pressure of the Metternichian political régime stimulated the energy of youth to find an outlet in other directions. It was also an era of prosperity and economy in government. If the people did not possess the right to elect their representatives to a national parliament, it was a liberty which, never having possessed, they did not value at its full. The party of the Liberals was a mere handful of the educated classes, hardly more than the Sinn Feiners in Ireland to-day. But like them, the Liberals were the brain, the heart of Germany. The leaven which for a generation they had been planting in the masses had by the decade, from 1840 to 1850, raised up a democratized Germany in the face of a feudal and autocratic Prussia.

That decade marked the turning point in the history of Germany. Prussia had supplied both a rallying point and a centripetal force to the supporters of German unity. There was no disputing the worth of Prussian administrative methods, as they had existed since the days of Stein. They were praised even by a stanch English Liberal: "No account," says Sir Robert Morier, "of the constitutional machinery of Prussia would be correct if it did not assign a fair and honorable place to the official hierarchy that carried the ark of the Stein and

Hardenberg reforms in comparative safety through the waters of the reactionary flood from 1815 to 1848." Prussian education and Prussian universities were vigorous and flourishing. It remained only for the largest state in the Federation to assume the leadership in the introduction of constitutional rule.

The constitutional development which began in 1840 in Prussia with the reign of Frederick William IV was therefore fraught with the most momentous consequences for all Germany. Save that he was no man of arms, the king was a true Hohenzollern. He was loosely built, awkward, and inclined to stoutness; but he possessed a keen intellect, a strong insistence on his own will, and a diversity of gifts which attracted such men as von Humboldt, Ranke, the historian, and Bunsen, the chemist, to his court. His versatility embraced a real knowledge of music, a certain skill in oratory, and the ability to paint acceptably. Piety with him connoted an almost fanatic belief in his divine mission to rule the Prussian people. "The royal crown seemed to him surrounded by a mystic radiance." People, parliament, and ministry all stood in the relation to him of children to a father. His conservatism was not of the school of Metternich; he held tenaciously, nevertheless, to his opposition to rapid or radical reform, and would indeed have accomplished the results of reform through royal favors, if that had been possible. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the fact that the leader to whom Germany looked in 1848 was a staunch Hohenzollern, steeped in the absolutist traditions of his dynasty.

Much was hoped from the Liberalism of the new King, manifested at the outset by a general political amnesty. He granted regular meetings of the provincial diets and

permitted the formation of permanent committees in them. In 1842 he even convened a meeting of the Committees at Berlin, where their demands speedily caused them to be sent home packing. Popular indignation broke out in a violent campaign through the press and popular mass meetings for a National Parliament. Torn between his medieval pietistic concept of his office, imbibed from Niebuhr and Ranke, and his desire to keep pace with his age, the King could not bring himself to redeem the promises of 1815. For five years he delayed, half-vacillating, half-reactionary. A famous cartoon depicted him with an Order in his right hand, a Counter-order in his left, and Disorder upon his forehead. At last, on February 13, 1847, he summoned a United Landtag, composed of all the provincial diets, to meet for the discussion of new loans, the levying of new taxes, and any increase in previous levies.

The day of representative government in Prussia had begun, but in the gray of dawn the people could distinguish only the chain which hampered the self-expression of the new Assembly. The Landtag was to meet only at the King's command, and so had no better guarantee for its existence than had the old Estates General in France. It was indeed rather a medieval than a modern body. The two Chambers, meeting separately, except for the discussion of finances, were a house of lords and a chamber based on the antiquated three estates method of election. The king was not bound to consult the Landtag on new legislation. It could suggest laws through petition only when two-thirds of both houses had agreed upon the petition. Even its financial powers were extremely tenuous. The tariff and all local and

provincial taxes were beyond its sphere, the former reserved for the Zollverein, the latter for the Crown. In emergencies, such as a war, the assent of the Landtag to an increase in taxes was not at all necessary, provided the change was announced at the next meeting. Frederick William had not abated a jot from his theory of divine right. He still held the nation's purse strings, and his power over legislation was almost unimpaired.

His public utterances evinced how little he reckoned that he had yielded. To the popular outcry for a real constitution he replied, "I know that I hold my crown as a fief from Almighty God and I owe him hourly an accounting for my government. To him who demands a guarantee for the future I give my word. It is of more weight and binds more firmly than any paper constitutions." The speech from the throne at the opening of the first Landtag declared, "Never will I allow a sheet of written paper to come like a second Providence between our Lord God in Heaven and this land. The crown cannot and ought not to depend upon the will of majorities. I should never have called you together if I had the least idea that you could dream of playing the part of so-called representatives of the people."

The leadership which the Prussian king declined, passed for the moment to little Baden, in 1831 the most radical state in Germany, and to-day the possessor of the most liberal electoral system of the states of the Empire. The most enthusiastic adherents of the liberal creed in Baden were Friedrich Hecker, a red-blooded, generous, impulsive politician of the romantic school, and Struve, who was in almost every respect a contrasting figure. A bent and bloodless student, "who lives on vegetables," he sup-

plied the intellectual marrow of the creed to which the personal charm of Hecker won followers. Under their leadership a meeting at Offenburg in Baden, in 1847, demanded a central representative assembly for all Germany, a government by the people instead of by a bureaucracy, abolition of social privileges, trial by jury, freedom of the press and the rest of the liberal program. Their project was too doctrinaire for general acceptance, but it led to a more deliberate petition, at a large conference at Heppenheim a month later, for a less important central assembly than the diet of the Bund.

The Baden program, which in the natural course of events would probably have shared the fate of other liberal manifestoes, came on the eve of a dramatic upheaval over the whole continent. The explosion which drove the July monarchy from France into exile had its repercussion in the various states of the Bund. In the latter part of February the governments were deluged with demands for reform, whose text was taken from the Offenburg program. Many of the smaller states passed through a bloodless revolution, as a result of which Bavaria, Saxony, Frankfort, Weimar, Brunswick, and Hesse Cassel, gained the adoption of at least a part of that program. The remainder of the Confederation waited upon events at Berlin.

Frederick William was by no means wholly opposed to reform. But he was adamant against any changes which would overturn the feudal basis of Prussian government or would impair the authority of Austria and her ignominious satellite, the Bund. At the beginning of March, 1848, however, he was no longer in a position to resist. Berlin was full of revolutionaries of every shade

from France, Poland, Russia and other parts of the continent. The surging mobs which pressed at times to the very palace gates, and could be dispersed only at the cost of bloodshed, warned him that he might follow Louis Philippe and Metternich, if he dallied too long with reform. One day he appeared in the black, red, and gold, of the German nationalists; the next he resolved upon stern repression. At last, after much starting and wavering, on March 17, he acquiesced in the Offenburg program and convoked again the Landtag which he had dismissed.

That body at once sketched the outlines of a future constitution and voted an electoral law on April 8, 1848, for the choosing of a Constituent Assembly by universal, indirect suffrage and the secret ballot. The result of the first elections was a Liberal majority in the Assembly, which forthwith denied the right of the King to prorogue or dissolve it against its own will. As reaction gained strength in Austria and Germany, Frederick William grew cooler and cooler towards his new ministry and parliament, until in December he ventured to put Berlin under martial law and sent the deputies packing. This arbitrary act was followed by the promulgation of a new, royal constitution, which after considerable revision became the Constitution of 1850, still the organic law of Prussia.

To exclude the Liberals from the next Landtag and to procure a chamber which would ratify his own constitution the King issued by royal ordinance of May 30, 1849, the electoral law which remains in force in Prussia to-day. The introduction of the public ballot and class voting so disgusted the democrats that they remained

away from the polls, with the result that in the new Diet a majority of two hundred functionaries among three hundred and fifty members gratefully accepted the constitution which Frederick William deigned to accord.

The electoral system which was thus evoked to protect the conservative, landed interests against the rise of democracy has since 1850 been made the impregnable citadel of absolutism and class privilege for all Germany. Even Bismarck, one of the greatest absolutists of the century, denounced it as the most miserable and absurd election law ever formulated in any country.

In Prussia the selection of the popular half of the legislative body is carried out in two successive operations. For electoral purposes, the state is divided into *Zirkel*, or electoral districts, subdivided in turn into *Urwahlbezirke*, which correspond to our primary districts. In the primaries every male citizen over twenty-four can vote, not, to be sure, for a deputy, but for an elector, or *Wahlmann*, who represents the voter and 249 of his fellow-citizens. The vigor of the popular vote is still further emasculated by the division of the electorate into three classes based on taxes. Though the classes differ greatly in number, each possesses an equal share in the vote.

On the day of the primaries the voter goes to the polls. The polling place has no ballot box, ballots, or mysterious voting machine nor any other of the arcana to which the American voter is accustomed. On the table before the Chairman of the Polls lies a large book filled with the names, occupations, and addresses of the voters. Presenting as identification the card which summoned him to the polls, the voter is asked to designate his choice for

Wahlmann, which he must do orally and in a loud voice. The chairman is not the only one who takes cognizance of the choice; for among the interested spectators is likely to be the agent of his employer, if the voter is a laboring man, or of his landlord, if he is a peasant. They have attended to observe the docility with which this member of the proletariat follows his patron. Like other German institutions, the elections are always orderly and are conducted with scrupulous honesty.

On the eighth day thereafter the *Wahlmänner* who have thus been chosen by absolute majority at the primaries are summoned to the chief place of the *Zirkel* to ballot publicly for deputies to the Landtag. The results of the votes in the electoral colleges is a House, to which all Prussians thirty years of age are eligible, but of which about a half is of noble birth.

The ever-recurrent complaints against this, one of the most characteristic of Prussian institutions, are indictments on four points. The present electoral system is indirect; the ballot is open and verbal instead of secret and written; no real redistribution of seats has been made to conform to the great shifting in population since 1860; and the three-class system, the rock on which the state is built, has come to be grossly and perniciously unfair.

Indirect election to the legislature and public voting are both agencies through which a dominant class may revamp the popular will to suit its own interests. The former can hardly be defended by the Junkers themselves, for Bismarck condemned it fifty years ago: "I am convinced that indirect suffrage falsifies the result of elections and that direct elections would bring more talent to the Chamber." On the other hand, there is a serious



Voting at the Polls in Germany



attempt to justify the open ballot. In Conservative circles the stock argument in its defense is the salutary oversight which it makes possible over the proletariat, whose caprice and material interests would lead them to abuse the franchise if unrestrained. It is certainly true that the Prussian system leaves little room for the personation, repeating, and ballot-switching with which American elections are afflicted. Elections are more honestly conducted. The Conservatives also claim that the open ballot calls out that highest of all Prussian virtues, *die echte Bürgertugend*. It is a test of the courage of a man's convictions, a challenge to his civic sense of duty.

Such is probably the case where the majority of the electorate is free to speak its own mind. But John Stuart Mill wrote: "If the dependent relations are such that the individual voter in any considerable number or to any great degree is afraid of the public ballot, and either abstains from voting or votes contrary to his convictions, then the secret ballot is the lesser evil." This is the condition in Prussia. Intimidation has been so freely used and so frankly admitted by both Liberals and Conservatives that the Social Democrats characterize the whole election system as one of terror. Butchers, bakers, and grocers are terrorized by Social Democratic housewives who threaten to trade strictly within party lines. Beer gardens are boycotted if the management is of a marked anti-Socialist complexion. In return, Treitschke asked in a widely circulated pamphlet: "Why do not our great manufacturers declare that they will employ no workmen who take part in the Social Democratic agitation?"

Control is still easier in the politically predominant

regions which are still overwhelmingly agrarian. The landlord in the Eastern provinces replaces his Social Democratic laborers with Poles; or if Poles are unavailable, he may raise their rent or foreclose a mortgage. Official candidature is encouraged by the fact that functionaries are eligible from the district where they hold office. Von Bülow, as Chancellor, declared that no official could occupy himself with Social Democratic politics; and it is well understood that, as votes the *Landrath*, so vote the minor officials, since he controls the local patronage. Through various channels a strong pressure is exerted in favor of landed and bureaucratic interests.

Whether Prussia is a pariah on account of this manipulation of the suffrage depends largely on the point of view. It is not clear what connection either open or secret voting may have with political peonage. Even if a landlord does not learn his peasant's vote at the open poll, there is a reluctance to lie if the question is asked him point-blank. Denying one's political faith under pressure carries with it somewhat the stigma of declining to recognize one's parents in a superior social gathering. *Die echte Bürgertugend* itself keeps down the number of Peters. The idea that when a man takes a voting paper in his hand, he suddenly becomes a detached political animal, is pure fantasy; for isolation is unattainable even in a polling booth. It is enough to say that it makes easier the independence of the voter from circumstances of employment and social affiliations. In Prussia, where both these ties are strong, public voting neutralizes universal suffrage by destroying the freedom of the common voter.

More significant than the practical effect of the open

ballot is its psychological effect. The small voter knows the dispute which an independent vote would entail, and rather than face the music, he stays away from the polls. One may concede the apathy of the farming classes; but the abstention of 90 per cent of the third class in one district in East Prussia, and of 92 per cent in Köslin betrays an unwholesome state in the body politic. The poorer classes would rather forego the suffrage than enjoy it under the patronage of the first class.

This depreciation in the worth of the individual vote is accentuated by the antiquated districting of the kingdom, a daguerreotype of the state as it existed in 1860. The population has increased most slowly in the Eastern provinces and Brandenburg outside of the Berlin section. In these provinces a deputy is now assigned to 71,000 inhabitants. In the rest of Prussia increase in population has been most rapid in the mining and manufacturing region along the Rhine. Furthermore, most of the large cities are outside of the region first named, and growth in urban population is seven times as rapid as in rural. Hence in the Western half of Prussia one deputy has come to stand for 98,000 inhabitants. Worse still, in the Rhine province a population of 7,120,000 is entitled to sixty-three representatives, while in East and West Prussia, Pomerania, and Posen, a total of 7,584,000 is assigned 109. Conversely, the fifty-four deputies of East and West Prussia represent 3,767,000 people: the fifty deputies of Brandenburg bear the mandates of 6,163,000 souls. The industrial classes in the state remain a submerged group, Berlin with her two million inhabitants sending twelve members to the Landtag. As Herr Traeger put it in that assembly, one-half of the

population of Prussia has twice the representation of the other half.

The half whose predominance in the government is thus assured is Eastern Prussia, the stronghold of the irreconcilable, absolutist Junkers, who are the seemingly adamant base of Hohenzollern autocracy. It is from the Eastern provinces that the Conservative party in the Landtag draws its strength. In 1912 they elected 193 of the 443 members of the Chamber, 87 of whom were great landed proprietors. Their representatives constitute two-thirds of the Conservative wing. From them have come such leaders as von Hindenburg, Heydebrandt, and Reventlow, who are said to carry swords in their mouths. Thanks to the districting of 1860 the Junkers are securely fixed in the saddle, and before their ironical contempt all efforts to give representation to the over-populated Liberal regions of the West have been abortive.

Finally to reduce the importance of the popular vote to the vanishing point, Prussia has hitherto been equipped with the famous three-class system, which makes wealth the coefficient of political privilege. The system of Servius Tullius, 2,500 years old, is revised and manipulated for the benefit of the wealthy classes. At the core of the three-class system is the distinction in the electorate of three classes: the great landowners and large financial and industrial fortune-holders; small business men and officials; and the proletariat. Prussia accepts the theory of the historian, von Gneist, that because of heavier contributions and higher intellectual capacity, the two upper classes must be endowed with a more effective share of political rights. In the tax-list of each primary district the taxpayers are enrolled according to the amount of their direct taxes, non-taxpayers being rated

arbitrarily as paying three marks.* The list is then divided, beginning at the top, into three sections. The first collectively pays the first third of the total contribution, the second, the second third, and the last class the remainder. In the primary elections each class chooses by absolute majority an equal number of electors, or indirectly has an equal share in the election of the deputies. Let us say, for example, that the district above is entitled to six electors. Voting by classes, the nine members of the two higher classes select four of these, while the other two electors represent the 250 voters of the third class.

Such gross inequality would not be exceptional in Prussia where the average percentage of the electorate in each group is 4 per cent in Class I, 16 per cent in Class II, and 80 per cent in Class III. In many localities injustice is still more flagrant, as in the 3,917 election districts where the first class includes not more than two men; or in Berlin where seven-tenths of 1 per cent of

* The following table illustrates the working of the method:

		Marks	Total Marks
3	{ Taxpayer (a)	1,200	
	{ " (b)	1,075	
	{ " (c)	1,058	3,333
6	{ Taxpayer (d)	1,000	
	{ " (e)	550	
	{ " (f)	490	
	{ " (g)	460	
	{ " (h)	430	
	{ " (i)	404	3,334
250	{ 200 Taxpayers paying 400		
	{ to 5 mks.....	3,183	
	{ 50 non-Taxpayers.....	150	3,333
		<hr/> 10,000	<hr/> 10,000

the electors choose four of Berlin's precious twelve representatives. To offer universal suffrage on these terms is a gratuitous affront.

The three-class system is the negation of all democratic government. In most districts the first and second classes are practically inaccessible. At Essen the male head of the Krupps is the only man in Class I in his voting precinct and Rothschild's position at Frankfort was similar. Sometimes the injustice works the other way. Chancellor von Hohenlohe was one of the heaviest taxpayers in Prussia; but, as his precinct was the financial quarter in Berlin, his ballot was engulfed with several hundred others, while elsewhere in the city one of his clerks voted with the select few. In this same district, the famous 28th, there is only one elector in the first class, and two in the second. Thus three men indirectly elect one of the city's twelve deputies.

Nor is the system more unequal than irrational. Two citizens of the same fortune will have entirely disproportionate political influence, if they live, one in a rich city and one in a country village. If a prosperous citizen chooses to settle in a moderately wealthy town, he may totally upset the composition of the classes there, may control one-third of the elections, and may even obtain personal representation in the Landtag. His dominant position is not at all the reward of intellect. Von Bülow, as Chancellor, voted among the proletariat, the only member of the first class being a sausage maker. In the ninetieth district of Königsberg there were six members of the first section, among them the keeper of a notorious house of ill-fame. Beneath him both the preachers of the Cathedral, one of whom was *Konsistorialrath* and possessed of honorary degrees, voted with three hundred


and fifty others in the lowest class. To justify the three-class system in 1849 the ministers of Frederick William IV declared that it put all the physical force of the state in the third class, the bloom of intelligence and *Bürger-tugend* in the first. So it is in the case of the Chancellor and the sausage maker, the *Konsistorialrath* and the brothel-keeper!

CHAPTER XX

GERMAN PARTIES AND ELECTORAL REFORM

THE Prussian electoral system has been examined thus in detail, because the leading rôle of Prussia in the unification of Germany and in its subsequent history made her influence decisive upon the cause of democracy throughout the empire. "The kingdom which dips one wing of the Eagle in the Niemen and the other in the Rhine" merited the primacy both in area and in population. When the Conservatives, "with whose blood the Prussian monarchy was cemented," overthrew the forces of liberalism in Prussia in 1849, they virtually conquered Germany. The mid-century was a turning-point in the career of the German nation, for, in spite of a temporary setback, the Hohenzollern house not long after became once more the acknowledged leader of the nationalist movement.

The two pre-revolutionary aims of the Liberals, democracy and nationalism, were therefore split apart. Prussia assumed the dual character of oppressor of Liberalism at home, and champion of the liberal, nationalist party in Germany. After the work of the Frankfort Parliament had been rejected, and the Erfurt Union had ended in the fiasco at Olmütz, Prussia turned the movement to her own ends, in order to substitute for the Austrian primacy a hegemony of her own over a smaller group of states. Her statesmen set to work to isolate Austria. Bismarck,



Philip Scheidemann

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who was now sent to the rehabilitated Bundestag at Frankfort, took pains to divest the Austrian envoys of their aura of supercilious dignity. Count Thun had monopolized the right to wear negligée and to smoke cigars in committee meetings; but at the second meeting Bismarck appeared in like attire, and calmly asked Thun for a light, to the perturbation of the smaller diplomats, who at once sent home for fresh instructions. The effect of the Austrian reverses in the war of 1859-1860 with Italy was seen in the foundation of the National Union, a patriotic society with the watchwords Unity and Liberty. These were both to be achieved under the guidance of a liberalized Prussia.

Prussia however refused to be liberalized. The years 1861-1866 marked the defeat of the parliamentary principle in the Landtag. The Liberals stood firm to oppose the formation of a militarist state. Their manifesto of 1861 demanded a responsible ministry, abolition of the privileges of the great proprietors, reduction of the term of military service and army expenses, and reform of the House of Lords. The outcome of their recalcitrancy over army reform was that William I and Bismarck ruled for five years without the consent of the lower house to the budget. The wars with Austria and France, by which unity was achieved, sealed the absolutist course with victory. Henceforth Prussia might be a constitutional state; it would not be a parliamentary one.

Opposed to the absolutist, particularist spirit of the princes of Germany, headed by the King of Prussia, there was the national, democratic tendency of the states outside of Prussia. It was the task of Bismarck to unify these two by giving expression to each in the constitution of the North German Confederation, which expanded

into the Empire after the Franco-Prussian war of 1871. The great Chancellor balanced the autocratic interests in the prince-appointed Bundesrat against the national, popular ideals of the Reichstag, which represented the people of the states, in the belief that by thus neutralizing each house the monarch could rule by gaining the support of either. To give the Reichstag its proper strength in this scheme, however, it was necessary to base it upon broadly democratic foundations and to make it more truly representative than the Prussian Landtag. The exigencies of German unity therefore made Bismarck the advocate of a liberal franchise for elections to the Reichstag.

There was a Machiavellian astuteness in his acting the rôle of champion of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage, which in 1867 was opposed even by Marx and Bebel because of its abuses, as seen in France. Both Lassalle, the good-natured Socialist leader, and Bismarck favored it, although for different reasons. Lassalle hoped to swamp the old, bourgeois Liberals by the industrial vote, which he planned to organize into a new labor party. Lassalle's wing of the Socialists thus lent their help to Bismarck's more wily scheme to balance the middle class vote by that of the rural districts under the control of the great proprietors.

Bismarck justified universal suffrage on grounds both of tradition and of expediency. In the Reichstag in March, 1867, he said, "Universal suffrage has come to us in a way, as an inheritance from the development of the German desire for unity; we had it in the constitution as it was drawn up at Frankfort; we confronted Austria with it in 1866, and I can only say that I at least know of no better electoral law. . . . The solid mass of popula-

tion should predominate at the elections." Again he declared, "I have found more intelligence in the general sentiments of the people than in the reflection of the electors of the second degree, and my impression is that with direct elections we shall get more considerable talents than with indirect elections." A broad franchise in the Empire had this advantage also to the Chancellor, that it dug a pit for the Liberals, who had proved so troublesome to him in his own state of Prussia.

To be an elector in the Empire it is necessary only to be a male citizen, twenty-five years old, the traditional age of civil majority in Germany. It is not necessary to establish residence in the state where one's vote is cast. The elector must be present only while the electoral list of his district is being made up and on election day itself, reducing the period of residence to about three weeks. The only groups excluded from the suffrage are the incompetent, the financially disabled, the soldiers and sailors in active service.

A month before the election day proclaimed by the Emperor the local authorities prepare the list of electors, which is kept posted for eight days for protest. On election day the voting continues from 10 A. M. to 7 P. M. under supervision of the Wahlvorsteher and at least two of his assistants. If on the first ballot no candidate obtains an absolute majority, a second election takes place two weeks later between the two candidates who on the first ballot obtained the largest number of votes. The result is the inevitable exclusion of large numbers of candidates from the younger parties, especially the Social Democrats.

The limitations upon eligibility are almost as few as those upon the suffrage. In addition to being twenty-

five years of age, it is necessary to have resided one year in a state of the Empire. The candidate need not, however, be elected from the state where he has declared his residence. Nor is he, when elected, the representative of his constituency, but of the Empire as a whole. By great freedom of candidature Bismarck sought to break down the barriers between the states.

It is a serious handicap on universal suffrage that the Government fixes the day of the elections. It is provided only that, in event of dissolution of the Reichstag within its five-year term, a new election must take place within sixty days. The labor parties have tried in vain to fix Sunday as election day, when the greatest number of workingmen might avail themselves of the franchise.

The secrecy of the ballot is carefully guarded. By a law of April 28, 1903, each voter is furnished with a voting paper, stamped with an official seal, and an opaque envelope. The actual marking of the ballot is done in a private booth. Before leaving the polls the voter must himself seal the paper in the envelope and hand it to the presiding officer, or deposit it in a ballot box.

German elections are far more stolid than those in England and France. There is comparatively little keen excitement in the game of politics. The clergy is very active, both in the press and in house-to-house visits, designed to win voters to the Centrist Party through the influence of their spouses. The bishops issue electoral admonitions, and many of the clergy run as candidates.

Campaigning is carried out with characteristic thoroughness, but with little of the bitterness which sometimes distinguishes it in other countries. Party workers divide up their districts into sections, and even apportion out different streets. Caricatures and posters abound, but

they are limited by the rule that they can be exposed only in designated places. Electoral pamphlets take the place of the ephemeral French news-sheets, which blossom for an hour at election time. Twenty or thirty different ones are usually printed by each party, and the printings sometimes run into the millions. The sheets are mild in tone, even in the industrial regions, where they are especially popular. They are distributed by hand from house to house.

Campaign meetings also have a studied moderation in their atmosphere. Voters are free to gather in open or closed places provided the police have been notified twenty-four hours in advance. The police have a right in the hall and can interrupt any speech which they consider dangerously subversive. They can also dissolve the meeting, if it appears dangerous to public safety. Meetings of the latter type are exceedingly rare. They generally take place in restaurants, where the audience receives the harangues of the speakers in silence, engrossed in its beer. Agitation is visible only on the evening of election day, when committees fly about in carriages to round up tardy voters.

Official pressure is rendered inevitable by the eligibility of members of the military and the bureaucracy to the Reichstag. Military and official candidacy had already broken the Liberal opposition in Prussia, and the right was stoutly defended by Bismarck in the Reichstag. "I claim for all the federated governments the right to make known, by any means or any organ, the candidates whom they prefer to see elected. It is part of the freedom of elections essential to the governments, who have their rights as well as the parties which oppose them. I think that the electors have the right to know the candidates

whose election the governments desire, as well as the governments have the right to make their preference known." This was the weapon with which Bismarck intended to disarm universal suffrage.

The districting of the Empire is in pressing need of reform. Upon the admission of Alsace-Lorraine the law of June 25, 1873, established three hundred and ninety-seven circles (*Zirkel*), each one of which contained roughly one hundred thousand inhabitants and elected one deputy. The smallest state possesses at least one representative. No deputy represents portions of more than a single state. No changes have been made in the allotment of votes since 1873, with the result that the present composition of the Reichstag is grossly unfair to the great centers of population. These have, for the most part, increased enormously in size during the phenomenal course of Germany's industrial development in the last four decades.

The change may be surmised from the following table showing the average population in a single district in various regions:

	In 1871	In 1912
Berlin	137,700	335,000
Rhenish Prussia.....	102,500	303,600
Westphalia	104,400	245,200
Mecklenburg Schwerin.....	93,000	106,600
Hanover	103,300	154,800
Bavaria	100,800	141,700

The eleven largest districts in 1871 constituted but three per cent of the total population of the Empire; to-day they form ten per cent. The sixth district in Potsdam has twenty-eight times the population of Schaum-

burg Lippe, and thirty-two times its voting population, and yet they both return one deputy. East Prussia and Hesse Darmstadt, with a smaller aggregate population than the Potsdam district, are represented by twenty-two members. Twelve of the most heavily populated *Zirkel* in the industrial regions contain 1,950,000 people, twelve of the least populous, 170,000. In Hohenzollern the average number of voters in a district is 75,000, in Conservative East Prussia, the stronghold of the Junkers, it is 121,000, in Berlin it equals 345,000. As in the kingdom of Prussia, the Conservatives have steadfastly refused to give due representation to the great, economic centers of German life, which are also the storm centers of the Social Democratic movement.


In few of the separate states of the Empire is there universal suffrage in the elections to the local diets. Many of the smaller states have tended in recent years toward a class system like that of Prussia, or toward a representation of interests, which has been intended to assure to the wealthy and educated classes a preponderance. Bremen, for example, has universal suffrage, but its deputies represent four different groups; Brunswick divides the electorate into seven *curiæ*. In the great majority of the smaller states there is either a qualification calling for the payment of a direct tax, or an apportionment of seats in favor of the heavier tax-payers. Democratic development has gone farther in the states of South Germany than in the North. In the North industrialism has made the Social Democrats a vital force. The desire to keep the proletariat from power has led to a restricted franchise and plutocratic rule, as in Prussia. There are no conservative parties of importance in the South, and the Socialists are less ferocious than in the North. Relieved

of the danger from both flanks, the clerical party, although not really democratic, has endeavored to catch popular favor by liberal electoral reforms.

Baden was the first of the Southern states to amend its electoral law after the beginning of the century. All male citizens, of twenty-five years of age, and two years resident in Baden can now vote, unless they are recipients of poor relief, or under conviction for crime. The vote is by direct and secret ballot. With Würtemberg Baden enjoys the reputation of being one of the most liberal states of the Empire. In the former there is also equal suffrage, and a successful scheme of proportional representation. The one hundred and sixty-three deputies of the Bavarian lower house are elected by all tax-payers, twenty-five years of age. The election of deputies is direct and secret.

Saxony, on the other hand, has a much less democratic franchise. The Lower house contains forty-three deputies of the towns and forty-eight from the rural communes. All Saxons of the usual age of twenty-five can vote, but extra votes are given for a variety of reasons. Every voter has the right to one, two, or three, additional votes, according to his income; the value of his landed property; membership in a Chamber of Commerce or a Chamber of Agriculture; his scientific education; his profession; and his age. This weighted vote obviously acts in favor of the upper middle classes at the expense of the laborers. The wealthy and noble classes, furthermore, have special representatives in the Upper Chamber.

The most serious obstacle to democracy is, as we have seen, offered by Prussia and her special position in the Reichstag. Bismarck counted upon a balance between the absolutist and the popular tendencies with the Em-



Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg



peror and his Chancellor holding the whip hand. As the Liberals have gained control of the Reichstag, the Bundesrat has almost completely overshadowed it in legislative importance. Theoretically, laws may be initiated in either house, but in practice virtually all bills, even those upon fiscal matters, proceed from the Upper House. After the measure has been submitted to the Reichstag, it must be returned to the Bundesrat, whose consent alone can give it the force of law. It is said that the Bundesrat makes the laws with the assent of the Reichstag. Every member of the former house must be heard in the Reichstag upon his own request, as though he were one of the ministry. Lastly the Bundesrat may at any time dissolve the Lower House with the consent of the Emperor.

Roughly, two-thirds of Germany's area and population are in Prussia; and the peculiar share which Prussia had in the foundation of the nation would in any case assure her preëminence. The King of Prussia is the practically irresponsible head of the military forces. In the Reichstag Prussia elects 236 of the 397 members. In the Bundesrat fourteen votes are sufficient to defeat an amendment, and the King of Prussia personally controls twenty. Prussia holds all but one of the committee chairmanships, and in case of a tie vote its voice is decisive. Bebel said that when the Social Democrats had won Prussia, they had won all. From the vantage point of the illiberal Prussian electoral system, the Conservatives have not only frustrated all attempts at democratization in Prussia, but have partly forestalled reforms among the smaller states.

It was therefore with deep interest that the introduction of a bill in the Fall of 1917 purporting to liberalize

the Prussian franchise was watched by other European nations with whom Germany was at war. The step followed the serious ministerial crisis of July, 1917, and was motivated by the results of that crisis as well as by the earlier promises of the Kaiser of a democratic suffrage.

The Reform Bill was promptly referred to a committee of thirty-five, composed of sixteen Conservatives, five National Liberals, three Progressives, eight Centrists, one Pole, and one Social Democrat. It became a party issue, which was evidently to be decided by the votes of the moderate parties. In order to understand the shipwreck of the Reform Bill of 1918, it is essential to know something of the attitude of the various German parties toward the problem of the franchise.

The Conservative Party, one of the oldest of German parties, was founded to oppose the national and liberal tendencies of 1848, and its origin has predicated its policy ever since. Although split into two camps in 1866 both the old Conservatives and the Free Conservatives form a compact and determined block, which under such fire-brand leaders as Heydebrand and Westarp, stands with great fixity of purpose for certain objects in politics. Of these one of the chief is the limitation of the suffrage to the economic classes who are able to use it wisely. They believe this a necessity for the preservation of the royal prestige in Prussia, where the monarch can be much more easily attacked by the Social Democrats and the Poles, than can the Emperor in the Empire. The Reichstag franchise, therefore, while bad enough in Germany, is an impossibility in Prussia, for it undermines a fundamental dogma of the Conservatives, the rule of the King by divine right over a united state and in traditional lines. Intermingled with this religious fervor for the

good, old, Prussian state, is a vitriolic hatred for social democracy, and all social reform which does not come from above. The fact that a fair suffrage would give due representation to the ever-growing ranks of the Social Democrats is precisely one of the strongest reasons why the hide-bound Junkers of East Prussia resist it, almost as a heaven-appointed duty.

Although sometimes ranked to the left of the Center, the National Liberals since the beginning of the war have generally placed themselves in fairly close relations with the Conservatives. They are the successors to the liberals who opposed Bismarck's army measures before the Austro-Prussian War. Although the party originally wore a democratic hue, it became in the latter years of the last century bourgeois in the reactionary sense, and closely connected with capitalism. In its program stand social legislation, opposition to reaction, and universal, direct, equal suffrage. When the party came, however, to the concrete question of carrying out the Government's promises in Prussia, its conservatism got the better of it. Although the official declarations of the party ran true to type, these were not sufficient to hold the allegiance of its members. The National Liberal Party split widely apart, and through its default the Reform Bill was lost. The danger from the extension of the vote to the Social Democrats threatened the capitalist monopoly no less than the agrarian interests of the Conservatives.

The largest block next to the Social Democrats is the Centrum, or Catholic Party, which takes its name from the seats which it occupied in the first Reichstag of the Empire in 1871. In its early years the chief concern of the party, which was led by Windthorst, was the preservation of the Pope's position in Italy and Europe; it

was naturally engaged in bitter conflict with Bismarck over the Chancellor's *Kulturkampf*, or anti-clerical program, and was one of the few groups which ever thwarted the great man in the Reichstag.

The Center is still ardently Catholic, but it has added to its program a large number of social and economic reforms calculated to increase its strength among the middle and lower classes. It desires to become a people's party, and indeed is such for South Germany. For example, it favors a strong middle class, as against great wealth, or, on the other hand, social democracy, and opposes all attempts to legislate against labor unions. This principle would naturally lead it to champion electoral reform. The official attitude of the Centrum on the Reform Bill of 1918 has been one of loyal Government support. Equal suffrage became the watchword of the party. Its leaders denied the talk that the laboring classes had gained control of its councils, since what the workingmen demanded was in no way different from its traditional program. This official sanction was, however, marred by the defaulting of a considerable minority of the Centrist deputies, when the measure came to a vote, with disastrous results for the bill. The Center held truer than did the National Liberals, but its support of reform may well have been actuated by a desire to catch the labor vote, rather than by enthusiasm for universal suffrage.

Of the parties which have earnestly labored for reform the farthest to the Right has been the Progressive Party. Its whole tradition has been liberal, for it was organized in Prussia in 1860 for the purpose of opposing Bismarck's militarizing of the Prussian state. Bismarck's eventual success caused the secession of a large wing of the Pro-

gressives who remained continued to labor for a stronger Reichstag, a responsible ministry, liberty to form trade unions, industrial arbitration, and universal, equal, and direct suffrage. In Prussia and elsewhere it has long stood for the representation of minorities, the ballot, and abolition of the class system of voting. Its conduct in the debates over the Bill of 1918 was entirely consistent with its previous policies.

The Social Democrats have been the champions year in and year out of franchise reform both in Prussia and in the Empire for the very cogent reason that their political existence, to a large measure, depended upon it. Socialism was not organized politically in Germany until 1863, when Ferdinand Lassalle launched the General German Labor Union. Under the guidance of Liebknecht and Bebel the German laborers connected themselves with the Marxist group of Internationals, and adopted a somewhat similar policy of aggressive action. Its conflicts with the police, ending in an attempt by two Socialists to assassinate the Emperor in 1878, caused the more Conservative parties to regard the Socialist movement as a pariah, which merited the most repressive treatment. Ten years of this rigorous persecution not only did not kill the labor party, but actually saw it make phenomenal strides in advance. William II, on his accession, deserted Bismarck's iron-handed methods, and sought to woo the Socialists, by removing all except merely restraining legislation. The Socialists and the Social Democrats continued to gain in numbers, until to-day they are the strongest political group in Germany.

As a parliamentary group the Social Democrats are not, in foreign eyes at least, sufficiently radical to merit the bitter aversion with which they are regarded by the

conservative parties. The party does not strive for new class privileges or prerogatives, but for the abolition of class rule and of the classes themselves, and for equal rights and equal duties without respect of race or ancestry. For this reason social democracy has been denounced by von Bülow as the very antithesis of the German state. The party desires to gain universal, equal, and direct suffrage for all persons over twenty, including women, proportional representation, redistricting of electoral constituencies according to population, two-year legislative terms, elections on legal holidays, when the laborers can vote conveniently, and direct legislation through the referendum and the recall—not a revolutionary program, surely. Long experience with the promises of Conservative Governments and with the shipwreck of previous reform bills have made the Social Democrats wary of accepting any reforms at their face value. They are, nevertheless, inalterably determined to attain the democratic suffrage which is absolutely necessary to give them the parliamentary representation due to their huge, and ever-increasing, numbers.

The strength of the various party groups is as follows:

	Prussian Landtag	Reichstag
Conservatives and Free.....	201	56
National Liberals.....	73	45
Center	103	93
Progressives	38	42
Social Democrats.....	10	110

According to the Prussian Minister of the Interior, speaking in favor of the Reform Bill of 1918, the Landtag, under a system of equal suffrage, would have been constituted thus: Conservatives and Free Conservatives


115, National Liberals 46, Center 92, Progressives 49, Social Democrats 101.

Left to the tender mercies of a Conservative Committee of the Landtag, the measure naturally reappeared in the Diet with an entirely different aspect from that given it by the Government. The parties of the Right arrived at a compromise, providing for the introduction of proportional representation in the mixed-language districts of East Prussia, and for a plural vote. One extra vote should be allowed on the ground of age, and two should be given to officials and persons qualified by education, wealth, or activity. Such a provision emasculates the principle of democratic suffrage by leaving untouched the dominating position of the great landowners and the bureaucrats.

It was expected that a close party struggle would develop in the Landtag over the choice between the original Government bill and the Conservative amendment. The Conservatives were entirely opposed to reform, the Poles and the Social Democrats were solidly in favor of it; but between the two extreme wings, numbers were more evenly divided. Both Centrists and National Liberals were almost evenly divided. It was foreseen that the fate of the bill, and perhaps of the party, rested on the attitude of the National Liberals. The Central Committee of the National Liberal party issued an appeal to its deputies to sink all personal objections to equal suffrage and to pass the Government's proposal, as a national necessity. The Center also endorsed the Government bill. The party members in the Diet could not, however, be bound by this action, which was doubtless intended chiefly for publicity.

Equal suffrage was defeated on the fourth reading of

the bill on June 12, 1918, by the surprisingly large majority of 235 to 164, an eloquent proof many National Liberals and Centrists had deserted their party standard and sided with the Junkers. In its place the Landtag accepted the Conservative amendment for the plural vote against the votes of a few of the National Liberals and Centrists, and of almost all of the Progressives, Poles, and Social Democrats. The sole resource left in the hands of the Government is now the dissolution of parliament, and a general election on the franchise question. Von Hertling has repeatedly declared that he is ready to resort to this remedy, desperate as it might prove, in Germany's present situation to open the lists to fratricidal party strife. It is doubtful, nevertheless, whether the Prussian government is sincere enough in its enthusiasm for democracy to push the question of reform *ad extremum*, unless military defeat pours oil on the fires of political discontent at home.



Metternich



CHAPTER XXI

LIBERALISM AND NATIONALITY IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY UNDER METTERNICH

ELECTORAL history in the realm of the Hapsburgs is only one of the threads inextricably entangled in the racial complications of the Dual Monarchy. The national problem in Austria Hungary has two aspects: the existence of mutually antagonistic and malcontent nationalities within a single state; and the close kinship of all these groups, except the Czechoslovaks and the Magyars, with independent states outside of Austria-Hungary. Because of these conditions its peace has been disturbed continually during the past century by the ambitions of Serbia, Italy, and Rumania for the incorporation of their fellow-nationalists within Austria-Hungary, and by the demands of the Czechoslovaks, the Jugoslavs, the Ukrainians, and the Rumanians for autonomy, if not for independence.

There is no Austro-Hungarian nation, nor even an Austrian or a Hungarian people.* Each political division

*The population of Austria-Hungary, according to the census of 1910, is as follows:

Austria:		Hungary:	
Germans	9,950,266	Magyars	10,050,575
Czechs	6,435,983	Germans	2,037,435
Poles	4,967,984	Slovaks	1,967,970
Ruthenes	3,518,854	Rumanians	2,949,032
Slovenes	1,252,940	Serbo-Croats	2,939,633
Serbo-Croats	783,334	Ruthenes	472,587
Italians	768,422	Others	469,255
Rumanians	275,115		
Magyars	10,974		
	<hr/> 27,963,872		<hr/> 20,886,487

of the Dual Monarchy has its dominant race with at least three subject nationalities. The Germans, the rulers of Austria, number ten million, and extend from South Germany on the west, straight across central Austria, reappearing in eastern Hungary. From this main body of German-Austrians a smaller group in the northwest is detached by the Czechs of Moravia and Bohemia. The protection and retention of this German element has constituted a major problem, and has furnished an additional reason for curbing the political vigor of the Czechs. The latter are a strong nationality with a long historical background and so high a type of political intelligence as to make them intensely dissatisfied with their present subjection.

In the southwestern corner of Austria, the Trentino, and in the vicinity of Trieste the population is approximately three-fifths Italian. The Slovenes occupy a block at the head of the Adriatic in Carniola, while the Serbo-Croats, another branch of the South Slav race, extend in a narrow strip down the Adriatic littoral. In close apposition to the great South Slav belt, and connected with Austria physically by the most tenuous system of communication, Istria and Dalmatia are among the most centrifugal parts of the Austrian kingdom.

The projection of Austria, growing eastward from Moravia and Silesia, and known as Galicia, contains both Poles, who are strongly attracted by their kinsmen north of the frontier, and Ruthenians or Ukrainians, whose fellow nationals have created a new state out of the wreckage of war-time Russia. There are Rumanians as well in the southern part of Bukowina. A glance at the map of Austria shows that the Germans, west and south of Vienna, are in the position of a hand at the center of a

bow, whose tips tend always to fly outwards and to project the nationalities scattered along them entirely out of the kingdom.

The situation of the Magyars, the rulers of Hungary, is somewhat more favorable for control than is that of the Germans in Austria. The former reside in the broad, fertile valleys of the Danube and the lower Tisza in western and central Hungary, in the heart of the country over which they hold sway. They were the conquerors of the land in the ninth century; the firm establishment of the Hungarian kingdom dates from King Stephen (997-1038). The Magyars, from time immemorial a steppe-loving people, have settled in the fertile flats of the river valleys, keeping the Slavs to the hills.

The Slavic peoples of Hungary fall into two groups geographically, the Northern and Southern Slavs, and into three main national divisions, the Slovaks and the Ruthenians in the north and the Jugoslavs in the south. Slovachia is the mountainous fringe of northern Hungary, sparsely settled on its more elevated outer fringe. The Slovaks form a connecting link between the Moravians of Austria, with whom they are akin, and the Ruthenians, or little Russians, in the east. They have a strong political affinity for the Czechs of Austria, and are included in the aspirations for a future independent Czechoslovak state. The Ruthenians are a hardy, though illiterate and undeveloped race. Their natural gravitation towards the Little Russians of the Ukraine makes them an object of Austrian solicitude in order to keep them within the boundaries of the Empire.

The Jugoslav problem in the Dual Monarchy is as much an Austrian as a Hungarian one, since the South Slavs spread over Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Carniola,

and Bosnia Herzegovina, regardless of political boundaries. The Jugoslavic race is itself a dual one. The two branches foster a Pan-Croat as well as a Pan-Serb ideal. Almost without exception every Serb is Orthodox Greek, and every Croat is Roman Catholic; and in this diversity lies the cause of long and fatal dissension. Parts of the Jugoslavic lands are among the most recent acquisitions of the Hapsburgs, the annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina dating from 1908. The South Slavs have always found a foreign champion, either in Russia, or since the renaissance of Serbia about 1903, in that small and land-locked kingdom.

As Austria has its Italian problem, so Hungary has within its frontiers a kindred people, the Rumanians, supposedly the descendants of Roman colonists on the shores of the Black Sea. Their land is by no means continuously Rumanian, for through colonization groups of Germans, Magyars, and Slavs have settled down even in its heart, and often in the most fertile plains. The most striking instance of colonization is the eastern border settlement of the million or more Magyar Szeklers, who were planted centuries ago as a frontier guard and have since become cut off in the rear from the other Magyars of Hungary. Because of the attraction exercised upon them by Rumania, the Rumanians of Hungary represent a liability to the integrity of the Magyar domains; although their passivity makes them a far smaller disintegrating force than that of the Slavs.

The problem of nationality in Austria-Hungary has always been enhanced by the natural exclusiveness of the races. Enclaves hold their peculiar characteristics for centuries in the midst of an alien people. It would not be hard to find parallels for the case of Serajevo, where

a colony of Spanish Jews, driven from Spain during the Inquisition, still preserve fairly pure the traces of their Spanish tongue. The villages of Hungary in particular are mutually exclusive. If an alien nationality arrives in considerable numbers, the original settlers tend to migrate to a new site. The typical German settlement in Hungary is reared around its church fortress, and retains the medieval custom of storing provisions against an attack by neighboring villages. In national politics racial intransigence is merely the reproduction of the age-old jealousy and combat of the inhabitants of the Empire.

The Hapsburg solution of the problem of government over this heterogeneous mass of races has been to divide and conquer. The Czechs have been divided from the Slovaks, and the Slovenes from the other Jugoslavs, by political frontiers. The Italians and the Jugoslavs have been encouraged to quarrel over the claims of Italia Irredenta. Likewise the religious differences between the Serbs and the Croats have been grossly magnified. The Poles have been granted privileges in their relations with the Ukrainians, thus robbing the Czechs of Polish support. The policy of "Divide et impera" has maintained the Germans and the Magyars in precarious control, but it has not in any wise mitigated the rebellious spirit of the subject races.

The imposition of minority rule upon a nation, totally without cohesive force among its elements, has fore-ordained from the beginning of the nineteenth century a rigid adherence to the *status quo*. In the first half of the century the apostle of immobility was Metternich. He was a man of the eighteenth century, every fiber of whose being rebelled at the advance of Liberalism. In order to

quell the revolution, it seemed to him a heaven-appointed necessity to bind and gag the spirit of nationalism and democracy wherever he met it, in Hungary or in Spain. With colossal self-esteem Metternich spoke of himself as the centrifugal force which held society in the well-worn orbit of the Ancien Régime, in which he and his associates lived. The *Leitmotif* of the age of Metternich was the perpetuation of feudalism.

No revolutionary epoch had destroyed the antiquated social structure of Austria. As in 1300, so in 1800, there were four estates: the clergy, the lords and knights, the burghers, and the peasants, whose condition, alleviated for a time by Joseph II, was now hardly better than that of the medieval serfs. The nobles were still exempt from compulsory military service and from a large part of the taxes, and they held almost a monopoly over nearly the entire official hierarchy. Furthermore the intricate and unwieldy government was almost totally without restraint from a national, representative assembly.

The only check upon the absolute power of the crown in Austria lay in the fourteen provincial diets, the descendants of the medieval Estates. They were convened only at the will of the monarch, in antique phraseology, "to listen in most obedient submission to the propositions before the Diet, and afterwards to take them to their loyal hearts, to weigh them maturely and well, to advise upon them, and then to come to such a decision as is demanded by our needs and by those of the margravate."

The Diets were but imperfectly representative even of the upper classes. They were, like the assemblies of the Middle Ages, privileged corporations, with the rights which had been conceded them in former times. They represented the public interest only in so far as this

happened to coincide with their own. The Bohemian Landtag consisted of fourteen prelates, one hundred and fifty-one lords, forty-three knights, and seven burghers. In Galicia the free cities had but a single deputy. The Diet of Lower Austria was wholly a noble body, in which the burghers were allowed to listen standing to the demands for taxes, and were then required silently to leave the hall.

The functions of the Diets consisted simply in advising on legislation and in dividing the levies and recruits within the province, or disposing of sums which the Imperial Government bestowed upon them for improvements. Their session was solemn, but perfunctory, sometimes lasting only a single day and usually ending with a pompous banquet. The corporate privileges of the Estates made them unpopular with the common people; and they caused the Emperor little anxiety by their claims to power. "I also have my Estates. I have maintained their constitution, and do not worry them," said Francis, "but if they go too far, I snap my fingers at them or send them home."

During the long intervals between sessions the Diet's functions were entrusted to the Landesausschuss, a committee chosen by the Diet equally from each of the Estates, and regarded as an integral part of the bureaucracy, instead of as a representative body. A member said that it was unthinkable that the Landesausschuss should not obey a command from the central government. Except then on the rare and brief occasions when the Diets met, the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy was ruled wholly at the pleasure of the monarch. Fear of the embarrassment to the German hegemony, which

might result from the adoption of parliamentarism, maintained a pristine absolutism in Austria.

The bankruptcy of representative government was less complete in Hungary because of the traditions of Hungarian independence. The rights first granted by the Golden Bull in 1222 had for centuries been tenaciously kept and staunchly asserted as justification for the existence of a separate Hungarian state. Political rights were bestowed only upon the Magyar aristocracy, the descendants of the original conquerors of the land, many of whom were poorer than the peasants among whom they lived. This nobility was more feudal than its Austrian counterpart. Although the only citizens, the nobles were exempt from taxation, and owed only the military duty of levy *en masse*. The burden of the taxes fell upon the non-Magyar burghers and peasantry, who resembled the metics in Athens.

The most vigorous political units in the Magyar state were the fifty-five counties, territorial divisions which may be traced surely back to the fourteenth century, and possibly to the Marches of Charlemagne. In them every three months met the Congregation, an assembly of Magyar nobles under the Foispan named by the King. In such a bulky gathering real discussion was impossible, and the poorer nobles voted at the pleasure of their seigneurs.

The functions of the Congregation were the election of two representatives to the Reichstag and the apportionment of the levies of taxes and recruits for the army. The elections were often tumultuous, with much drinking, feasting, and free fights upon the streets. The vote was by acclamation, as in England, and the victors were chaired about the town. The Congregation also possessed



Louis Kossuth



two means of control upon royal legislation. Through its right of protest it could obtain the repeal of obnoxious laws. By its absolute control over its representatives in the Reichstag and the local, elective executives, it might in theory at least obstruct all legislation whatsoever.

The Reichstag, or national assembly, had been since 1575 divided into the Table of Magnates, some eight hundred of the highest nobility; and the Table of Deputies, which contained two representatives from each county, two in all for the forty-nine free cities, and the delegates of the Croatian Diet. Nominally supposed to meet triennially, it convened only at the King's command, which was not given during thirteen years between 1811 and 1825.

The session of the Table of Deputies was a splendid pageant, void of political results. On the raised steps near the royal dais sat the officers of the royal household in their regalia, the Protonotarii, and the special legates from Croatia. Separated by a railing from these notables was a heterogeneous mass of gayly robed nobility, abbots, county delegates, deputies of the free cities, and proxies of certain magnates or their widows. Some had no vote, others, such as the representatives of a county, were bound by a collective vote, others cast only a *votum informativum*, according to the ancient principle: *Vota non numerantur, sed ponderantur*.

In its inequalities and anomalies the system bore a direct relation to the patchwork conglomeration of classes and races on which it was based. A small rural county of two hundred electors had the same weight as the twelve thousand electors in the county of Pest. All the forty-nine cities possessed but a single, collective vote, so that

650,000 of the bourgeoisie had no more representation than the impoverished nobility of some country district. There was not the faintest hope of reform, since the city population, being German and friendly to the Vienna government, would have endangered Magyar supremacy, if given its due voice. In Hungary too, therefore, the racial question blocked the pathway of parliamentary government.

The antiquated and disorderly Reichstag had still enough power so that the Government dreaded to convoke it. The prerogatives of the assembly included a general supervision over legislation, the consent to a declaration of war, the fixing of the tax levies and the raising of the army. No law or tax was legal without its approval. Such large privileges were embarrassing to the Emperor, and at least five years generally elapsed between its sessions.

But from 1825 on the Hungarian Reichstag regularly met and voiced the popular enthusiasm for liberalism, which grew steadily in the very blackest years of Metternich's régime. Before 1830 the aim of the reformers was simplification of the complicated and anomalous system of officials, rather than an extension of liberties. After the Revolution of 1830 the reform movement split into two camps. The Nationalists sought to acquire Hungary more completely for the Magyars by centralization and the adoption of Magyar, instead of Latin, as the official tongue. The Liberals emphasized instead the abolition of unfair taxation and social privileges, and the extension of the suffrage to the professional classes, ecclesiastics, and prosperous bourgeoisie.

In the latter party Kossuth was the unrivaled head of the hundreds and thousands of young Radicals, whose

daily bread and whose religion were democracy and nationalism. Forbidden to print his Liberal paper, Kossuth had it lithographed. When this practice was stopped, he had it written out by hand and distributed by servants. He paid for his persistency by three years in prison, but upon his release he found that his reputation was made. He became the flaming tongue of the Liberal movement. His appeals for democratic reforms in all departments of the government, delivered with an impressive presence and a magnificent voice virtually created the Hungarian Liberal party.

The Liberal party in Austria was not, like its counterpart in Hungary, distracted by nationalist aims, since the Imperial government was already German. It labored for constitutional reform and freedom of the press and of the universities. As Metternich grew senile, the rigidity of the censorship relaxed. The authorities winked at books and papers from England and France, which added fuel to the revolutionary blaze. This contraband Liberalism was an imitation of the contemporary movement in France. Beneath the crust of stagnant absolutism a matured, aggressive party had pushed its agitation nearly to the point of explosion.

That Metternich was able for almost a decade longer to flaunt the Liberals in both Austria and Hungary was due in part to the inertia of a ponderous government, which had run down but had not yet stopped. But still more was Metternich spared through the conflict of nationalities. He held over the Magyar Nationalists the threat of constitutional grants to the Slavs of Hungary; and he could depend on German support in Austria, because the Czechs also had separatist ambitions. A liberal

franchise therefore, like other democratic reforms, waited upon the old, racial problem.

The heat which for a time sufficed to fuse the Liberal and Nationalist parties in a combined assault upon Metternich's position came from the general revolutionary movement of 1848. The first impulse came from Hungary, where a reform diet had been sitting since 1847. At the news of Louis Philippe's fall Kossuth burst forth on March 3, 1848 with consummate eloquence. He seemed the revolution incarnate. Spread broadcast through Vienna, his speech there precipitated an insurrection of the students and the bourgeoisie, who invaded the Diet Hall of Lower Austria, clamoring for Metternich's overthrow. The aged Chancellor fled in disguise to England, while behind him his once impregnable system fell like a house of cards.

The feudal system was at an end in the Hapsburg monarchy. In the flush of victory the Liberals of Austria and Hungary moved in the same course. On April 25th the Emperor Ferdinand promulgated the Pillerstorf Constitution, establishing a bicameral diet for Cisleithania. The Upper House was to consist of life members, appointed by the Crown, and of one hundred and fifty members, elected for five years by the heaviest taxpayers among the great proprietors. The three hundred and eighty-three members of the Lower House were to be elected by universal suffrage in an indirect election, according to the precedent set by the elections to the Frankfort Assembly. The electors were divided into two curiae, the chief towns of the provinces and the rural districts.

In Hungary on March 15th the Reichstag under Kossuth's spell passed the first of the famous March Laws, which revived the sovereignty of the ancient Kingdom of

Hungary and modernized it. Besides the abolition of serfdom and unequal taxation, the March Laws instituted a responsible ministry, including Kossuth, Deak, and Szechenyi, and a Diet meeting at Budapest instead of at Pressburg. All Magyars retained the right of voting for deputies, and the franchise was extended to all others who had a business yielding a revenue of 125 florins a year, or real property to the value of 350 florins. No change was made in the system of districting, with the result that great inequalities still remained. The city of Debreczen with a population of 46,000 had only two deputies, and Pest had five instead of the eight or nine which were her due. So tumultuous had the Congregations in the counties become that they were now replaced by permanent deputations, chosen by the same electors as was the Table of Deputies. Both Austria and Hungary had thus at a stroke abolished feudalism, secured a representative, parliamentary government, and notably widened the franchise. Henceforth their paths diverge, and the history of the suffrage can best be traced in each separately.

CHAPTER XXII

UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND THE NATIONALITIES OF AUSTRIA

Austria

THE Imperial Proclamation of May 16, 1848 summoned a Constituent Convention, elected on a broad plan of universal suffrage,—only domestics and public charges being excluded,—for the purpose of drawing up an organic law. For the first time ninety-two peasants met among the delegates to a national assembly. The fruit of the Convention's labors was a constitution, which provided for a Federal Chamber of the Provinces to be elected by the provincial Diets, and a popular Chamber, for which the franchise was limited by a tax qualification of ten kroner, twenty hellers.

Before the Kremsier Constitution, as it was called, had progressed beyond the paper stage, the Emperor had regained military control of the situation in Bohemia, Italy, and Austria, and wholesale liberal concessions were no longer in order. On March 4, 1849 the young Francis Joseph I substituted for the Kremsier Constitution a charter based solely on royal grant, which did however retain the Federal Chamber of the Provinces, and the principle of general representation of a rather restricted electorate. It even extended the suffrage to members of certain professions and to others possessing a higher education, but not endowed with this world's goods.

The débâcle of the Hungarian revolution determined

that this constitution in turn should be revoked by a government, whose liberal sympathies varied in direct ratio to the dangers which threatened the Hapsburg dynasty. Kossuth, whose political actions had something of the fervor of the religious fanatic, had been instrumental in plunging his country into war with Austria to recover the March Laws, which the Chancellor, Schwarzenberg, soon abrogated. A ring of iron closed in upon the Magyar capital, with sectors held not only by the Austrian forces, but by the subject races of the Magyars, the Croatians, Rumanian, and Slavonian nationalities, as well as foreign troops from Russia. Before overwhelming odds the Magyar nation rose *en masse* to preserve its historic rights by a magnificent but fruitless resort to battle. By August 1849 the Hungarian revolt was ended; the revolution had already been ground out in Italy, Bohemia, and Austria. The glorious revolution ended at the nadir of popular government, even of the representation of a restricted, general class based upon wealth or education. A decade of absolute rule ensued, in which Hungary was united by force to the crown of Austria.


The one germ of national representation which survived the period of reaction was an institution created by the constitution of March 4, 1849, the Reichsrat. Although limited to the discussion of certain, determined topics, its debates furnished the framework, on which constitutional government might be reconstructed. A consultative, juridical body, its members were appointed by the Crown. To these the Patent of March 5, 1860 added thirty-eight members named by elections in the provincial diets, in which each member of the diet could vote only for the delegates of his own curia. The Reichs-

rat therefore became a caricature of Mirabeau's ideal of a representative assembly, which represented, not the people, but certain curiae in the diets.

The Diploma of October 20, 1860, the price paid by the government for the disasters of the Italian war, was a turning point in Austrian constitutional history. By it the number of provincial representatives in the Reichsrat was increased to one hundred, and that body was given a share in imperial legislation. The Patent of February 26, 1861 completed the development of the Reichsrat into a full-fledged, national Parliament, with an appointive House of Lords, and a Chamber of Deputies of 343 members, elected by the provincial Landtags. The government of Austria-Hungary was no longer a feudal despotism, but a constitutional monarchy, at least in the Tory sense.

The provincial Diets became, as it were, electoral colleges for the Reichsrat, and the mode of franchise in them was a matter of national significance. An annex to the Diploma of October elaborated for four provinces constitutions strongly reminiscent of the medieval organization of estates. These arrangements were the following year extended to all the provinces of Cisleithania. The Landtags were to consist of deputies of the clergy and the great landowners, the cities, the rural communes, and the chambers of commerce. The cities were given a preponderant place by comparatively generous representation and by direct elections, while the rural communes, which included both the agrarian districts and the industrial regions, received a smaller quota, chosen by indirect vote. The tax qualification was twenty florins in Vienna, and ten florins elsewhere.

Unfortunately for its unionist intentions the Govern-



Professor Thomas G. Masaryk

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ment counted without its intransigent nationalities. The Germans and some of the smaller racial groups supported the new constitution, but the stronger nationalities repudiated it and demanded a federal state. To enforce their protests the Magyars, Italians, and Croats from the beginning refused to elect deputies to the Reichsrat. Only the great landowners remained loyal to the unionist ideal, and the first Reichsrat upon the new basis was one hundred and forty short of its full membership. Most irreconcilable of all were the Magyars, who refused to recognize Francis Joseph as their king, and claimed nothing less than the restitution of the Constitution of 1848, the March Laws, and their ancient independence of Austria. Their obstinate resistance to advances from Vienna encouraged the Czechs and the Poles, and the Schmerling ministry found itself facing a growing deficit and at odds with even the Germans, its sole support.

There were three ways in which the Government might circumvent the obstructionism of the provincial diets. The first was by retreat. After two years it yielded substantially all of Hungary's demands, and restored dualism by the *Ausgleich* of 1867. Second, in Austria proper the Emperor had reserved by the Patent of 1861 the right to dissolve an obstreperous Landtag and to rely upon the great proprietors to elect another diet which would choose delegates to the Reichsrat. All the Premiers from 1867 to 1871, Potocki, Hohenwart, Auersperg, and Taaffe, resorted to this expedient. As an alternative, the Emperor might order the inhabitants of a province to elect their representatives by popular vote.

The third method of curbing racial intransigence was to take the election of the Chamber of Deputies entirely from the Landtags, and to entrust it to the people. The

exigencies of the racial problem thus shaped once more the development of the electoral system. A law of 1873 provided that the provincial diets should cease to send their representatives to the national parliament. They nevertheless impressed upon the popular election their own method of voting by curiae. The curiae, each of which chose a proportionate number of the three hundred and fifty-three deputies, were the large landowners who paid a land tax varying in the several provinces from \$20 to \$100, this curia including women and corporations; the cities, where every 10 gulden taxpayer, 24 years of age, could vote; the chambers of commerce and industry; and the rural communes, which resembled the cities.

The distribution of seats was on the basis of taxes paid, both as among classes and as among provinces. Each district elected a single deputy, and in the district each curia voted separately. There were enormous inequalities in the representation thus established. In 1890 there was one deputy for every 63 voters in the landowning class; one for every 27 in the chambers of commerce; one for 2,918 in the cities; and one for 11,600 in the rural communes, which were further handicapped by indirect election.

It was in a sense an advance, that a member of one curia or province could stand for election in another. The Liberals had desired as well that the increase in the number of deputies should be divided among the least represented curiae. But the government feared to lose the support of the Tory squires, without which in the depleted chamber the whole scheme would have foundered. The feudal stamp which was fixed on the entire electoral system was not erased until 1907.

Among the Radicals, the Socialists, and even the middle

classes in all the nationalities there was from 1880 onward a growing clamor for universal, equal, and direct suffrage. The first step on the path to universal suffrage was the law of October 4, 1882, which added 400,000 voters to the electorate by fixing a moderate tax qualification of five florins in all the provinces. The growth of industrialism and the compact organization of labor to secure political rights rapidly forced the electoral issue to the very forefront in politics.

In 1893 Taaffe, who found himself without a working majority, seized upon the question for the purpose of undermining the German Liberal Opposition, and introduced in an astonished Chamber a measure calling for the suffrage in the cities and rural communes for all adult males who could read and write, and who had paid any taxes or were engaged in any profession or trade. As a checkrein upon democracy Taaffe retained the *curiæ* of the landowners and the chambers of commerce, thus stamping his measure as a lukewarm concession to popular demands. It would have increased the number of voters from 1,700,000 to 4,000,000. The project proved to be a Frankenstein. It infuriated the German Liberals, because it inundated them in the city proletariat. The Magyars were apprehensive for the effect upon the Slavs in Hungary. The Conservatives of course repudiated the bill. Socialists denounced it as "an insult to the working classes." Taaffe resigned, before his head could be sent for.

The movement toward universal suffrage, *nomine mutato*, went on. The suggestion had been made already of Chambers of Industry, which should constitute a fifth curia. Others had proposed that all laborers who received sick insurance should be given the vote. In 1896 the

Badeni ministry brought forward a bill which combined both these ideas with certain features of Taaffe's plan.

It was no radical departure, but a wing which was joined to the central structure of 1873. Seventy-two new seats were created, to be filled by a new curia composed of all who had previously been electors, plus all who had hitherto been excluded from the other curiae. The latter composed sixty per cent of the new curia, which elected only seventeen per cent of the Chamber. On the other hand, the old curiae with forty per cent of the voters elected eighty-three per cent of the deputies, and, what is more, had a second vote in the new curia. The law raised the number of voters from 1,700,000 to 5,330,000, but the concession of general, direct, and equal suffrage was largely fictitious. It impugned the system of representation of interests but offered nothing better than a makeshift to take its place.

One important effect the Badeni law did have in serving as a model for the electoral laws of the provinces. Each of the unicameral diets, varying from 26 members in Vorarlberg to 242 in Dalmatia, included, besides representatives of the Church and the higher schools, delegates of the four old curiae. To these were added after 1900 in Moravia, Bohemia, and Lower Austria a number of deputies elected by a general curia, after the fashion of the law of 1896. The class system of voting has never been abolished in the provinces. The fact that the diets have no upper houses is taken to justify the special representation of the wealthy and educated interests.

Although on the face of it the Badeni law was a Liberal reform, it left the balance of power in the electorate substantially unaltered, that is in favor of the two highest

curiae. One deputy was allotted to 64 voters of the proprietor class, and to 26 members of the chambers of commerce. On the other hand, one deputy was chosen by 4,193 voters in the cities, 12,290 in the rural communes, and 69,503 in the general curia. The provinces were gerrymandered for the benefit of the ruling nationality, a district in German Vorarlberg containing 32,226 inhabitants, as compared with one in Slavic Galicia having 148,090. So thoroughly was this partisan districting worked out that on the average one seat belonged to 40,000 Germans, 56,000 Poles, 90,000 Czechs or 931,000 Ruthenians.

The partisan character of the Badeni law led to wholesale abstention and to violent obstructionism by the Czechs, who were virtually in the position of the least favored nation. A favorite parliamentary custom was the introduction of endless petitions in such numbers that the entire session would not have sufficed to read them *in extenso*, as the rules required. To prevent discussion of one obnoxious law drums, whistles, and cymbals appeared, no one knew whence, and with carafes and rattles kept up a charivari lasting six hours. The Czechs tore up benches and smashed desks, until, in despair of restoring order, the President declared the Reichsrat dissolved. For ten years, in the face of pressing, economic questions and ominous mutterings from Hungary, the Austrian parliament was paralyzed by tactics such as these in the hands of the subject nationalities.

Numerous factors combined to force a reopening of the electoral problem in 1906. The Russian Revolution of 1905 produced a great effect upon Austrian laborers. The use of the red flag and monster Socialist demonstrations impressed Baron Gautsch and his ministry of the neces-

sity of action. Their attempt at reform was repudiated, however, by almost all wings except the Conservative Catholics, who had nothing to fear from it, and the Young Czechs and Ruthenians, who had nothing to lose and everything to gain. The project finally accepted, the third to be proposed, was framed by the coalition cabinet of Baron Beck. With the Emperor's support Beck evolved a plan which was to put an end to the intolerable parliamentary deadlock. By January 26, 1907, the bill had passed both houses and had been approved by the Emperor.

The electoral system in vogue in Austria since 1907 is modeled on some of the most advanced features of the French, Belgian, and German systems. It abolished the *curiæ*, and established universal, equal, and direct suffrage for all male citizens, twenty-four years of age, who have resided one year in their commune. In order to keep politics out of the army, officers and soldiers are deprived of their vote, as are also, for other reasons, minors, public charges, bankrupts, and criminals without civil rights.

The secrecy of the ballot was compromised through the admission of illiterates to the franchise. While illiteracy averages as low as six per cent among the Germans and Czechs, it rises to seventy-five per cent among the Serbo-Croats and eighty per cent among the Ruthenians. The independence of the humbler voters is therefore protected by heavy penalties upon the assistant to a voter who does not cast a ballot as instructed.

The innovation of an obligatory vote was included in the law at the instance of the Christian Socialists, who contended that the franchise is a public and social duty, and that the indifferent should be forced to take an inter-

est in the state. The question was left to the provincial diets, and since 1907 five provinces have provided a penalty, ranging from one to fifty crowns, for those who neglect to vote without some recognized excuse, such as sickness or lack of transportation. The plural vote, demanded by the House of Lords, was kept out of the law only by the Ministry's threat to swamp the upper chamber with peers.

Electoral corruption, which has always been grossly flagrant in Austria, was the cause of severe limitations on party activity. Workers are forbidden under penalty of the law to give voters food or liquor on election day, to use any form of coercion on a voter, to spread false reports as to the time and place of polling, or to promise any economic advantages in return for a vote. To prevent disorder the voters are admitted to the polling place one at a time, and must leave immediately after voting.

By a radical redistribution of seats the law of 1907 marked the culmination of a century's struggle among the various races for parliamentary control, and the abatement of German supremacy. It was essentially a compromise. Among the 516 deputies two *blocs* were formed: the German-Italian with 257 seats, and the Slavic with 259. The representation of the Germans was increased only thirteen per cent; while that of the Czechs rose thirty-three per cent, of the South Slavs thirty-seven per cent, and of the Ruthenians over two hundred per cent.

In order to protect the Germans, who are placed in a permanent minority, the law provides that redistricting can take place only in the presence of three hundred and forty-three deputies. The present system of districting is most intricate, for it is the result of long haggling in

which the stronger races got the lion's share. Two general principles determined the allotment of seats: each nationality should be represented by its compatriots; and the cities should be assured a distinct and more equitable representation. To ensure the latter the law grouped cities and industrial regions together, neighboring rural districts separately. The former was secured by the construction of very small and homogeneous districts with a single delegate for each (except in Galicia). Racially similar districts or towns were united, even though not contiguous. Where this was impossible, separate racial districts were interlaced, without being intermixed, like one net laid upon another. A man may vote only for the candidates of his own race. This is the method by which strife between Czechs and Germans has been allayed in Moravia.

The Moravian system is impracticable in Galicia, which has strong racial minorities in almost every district. For their protection two-member districts and proportional representation were introduced. The candidate who gets an absolute majority of the votes cast is elected, as is the next highest candidate, provided he receives one fourth of all the votes. So scrupulously is the balance maintained, that one substitute each is elected by both Poles and Ruthenians, lest by a vacancy the representation of a district might become uni-partisan. As a matter of actual fact, the decline of the Ruthenian minorities in many districts has thrown both seats into the hands of the Poles, who have three times the number of deputies possessed by the Ruthenians.

By masterly opportunism the Germans in Austria have maintained their favorable position as minority rulers in spite of the advent of universal suffrage. They have



Dr. Alexander Wekerle

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played upon racial strife to keep their adversaries dis-united. They have not hesitated to "ameliorate" universal suffrage by gerrymandering and other familiar devices for weakening its effect. But the Germans have shown an adaptability and a willingness to conform with the demands of the subject races, when they could no longer be stayed, which contrasts with the irreconcilable defiance of the Magyar caste in Hungary. If Austria-Hungary is to become a federal state upon liberal lines, the leadership in the new movement will most probably come from the western portion of the nation.

CHAPTER XXIII

MAGYAR RULE IN HUNGARY; THE FAILURE OF ELECTORAL REFORM

THE national equilibrium which has been attained in Austria by mutual agreement has been gained in Hungary only by the absolute exclusion of the non-Magyars. It is by so much the more an unstable equilibrium. In considering the history of the franchise we must remember that we are discussing an almost solely Magyar prerogative; that when reform is mentioned, it is scarcely more than a bugbear, conjured up by the government to over-awe Magyar obstreperousness. As in Prussia, so in Hungary, the suffrage has remained where the men of '48 left it.

In the first years after the Revolution the Magyars were on the defensive, not only against the Emperor, but against the Serbs, Croats, and Rumanians as well. The demands of its subject nationals for such concessions as the Magyars themselves had obtained, and the fact that the Croatsians resorted to arms to extract these, gave the Emperor an opportunity to revoke the March Laws in the midst of Hungary's embarrassment. To give the act a show of legality the Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favor of his nephew, Francis Joseph I, on December 2, 1848. The young ruler and his autocratic minister, Schwarzenberg, with Bohemia, Italy, and Austria once

more under control, could bring full pressure to bear on the faction-torn realm of St. Stephen.

On April 14, 1849 the Radicals under Kossuth took the rash, though heroic, step of abjuring the Hapsburgs and declaring Hungary an independent nation under its ancient constitution. The end came swiftly. The Austrians invaded from the west, some hundred thousand Russian troops poured in from the north, and on August 13 the main Hungarian army was forced to capitulate at Világos. Kossuth and others fled to Turkey, while behind them the Austrians carried out a stern and bloody repression. The reaction equaled the wars of the sixteenth century in barbarity. Nobles were hung beside their peasants, houses were pillaged and burned, women were dragged into the barracks. "A troop of servile and ferocious lackeys fell upon the prey, respecting neither human nor divine laws, nor contracts nor oaths."


Nominally the kingdom was submitted to the imperial constitution of March 4th. In reality it was divided, like our Southern states after the Civil War, into five separate departments, without diets or other representative bodies, which were administered by an absolutist set of German and Czech functionaries sent from Vienna. Like the South again, the Magyars had staked their rule over their subject races on secession and rebellion, and had lost.

The purpose of which they failed in 1849, they attained through eighteen years of obdurate, passive resistance. Hungary refused to recognize Francis Joseph I, since he had never been crowned with the iron crown of St. Stephen. In all negotiations she insisted on the primary assumption that Hungary was a separate nation with distinct boundaries, whose fundamental rights had been abrogated in 1849, and had in no sense been restored by

the "granted" constitutions of 1848, 1860, and 1861. The Diet did not meet until 1861, and then after four months of wrangling Deak said, "What Hungary wants is that it should be given back its Constitution. Never will Hungary send deputies to a central parliament." He deeply resented the Patent of March 5, 1860, which assigned twenty-five seats in the Reichsrat to 17,000,000 Austrians, while 15,000,000 Magyars had but thirteen seats.

Francis Joseph himself opened the way to reconciliation. Deserting his German ministry, he visited Budapest in 1865 and was received with an unexpected welcome. Henceforth he renounced the federal idea, and under the guidance of Beust entered frankly into negotiations for a dualist state. The entente thus begun was expedited by the disasters of the Austro-Prussian War, which left Austria in no position to withstand Magyar demands. After prolonged bargaining Deak and Beust framed the famous Compromise, or *Ausgleich*, which was formally accepted by both states by the acts of December 21-24, 1867. By the *Ausgleich* Hungary regained her constitution, her practical independence, save for the identity of the two crowns, and the Imperial ministries of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs, and lastly her political control over the non-Magyar races.

The pivotal point in the maintenance of the restored Magyar hegemony has since 1867 been the electoral question. Any discussion of this topic has always precipitated in the Table of Deputies hot wrangling which sometimes verged upon civil war. The reason for the touchiness of the Magyars upon the question of electoral reform is entirely natural, considering the precarious



Count Istvan Tisza

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position which they occupy as the absolute masters of Hungary.

They are the original Hungarians, occupying the choicest portion of the country, the great Danube basin. Around them are grouped some six nationalities. Since the ruling caste is in the minority numerically, it has resorted to an inflexible and often times ferocious policy of Magyarization, through insistence on Magyar as the only official tongue and through implacable political repression. The language question has been carried to absurd lengths. On a Hungarian railway a station master and an engineer, after vain attempts to understand each other, fall back in despair on German. Baron Beust was forced to use an interpreter, and one leading statesman had to decline a Cabinet post, because he was ignorant of Magyar. The Hungarian electorate has been so skillfully constructed that the non-Magyars are practically deprived of all influence at Budapest. After the elections of 1910 they possessed seven of the 413 seats of Hungary proper in the Diet.

Nominally liberal, the Hungarian franchise is one of the most restricted in Europe. All males of twenty years may vote, if they fulfill one of the numerous qualifications on taxes, property, education, or profession. Members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, or of the learned professions, graduates of agricultural schools, engineers, druggists, and the clergy possess the ballot virtually without restriction; while men in active military service, members of the bureaucracy and police, servants, and farm laborers are disfranchised.

At the same time the vote is primarily in the hands, not of the intelligentsia, but of the great landowners. Enormous duties on wheat and absolute prohibition of

cattle importation into the Empire, assure the great landowners of Hungary an outlet on the Austrian market, without benefiting the small farmers—85 per cent of whom consume what they produce. Half the landowners of Hungary possess less than five acres each, and 99 per cent own less than a hundred acres. A high income qualification thus disfranchises the bulk of the lower class, whether agricultural or urban. Less than a twentieth of the working classes and less than a sixth of the small merchants can vote.

The system which fails to represent the Magyars themselves reduces the other nationalities to helotry. Electoral geometry reaches its acme in Hungary. Along racial frontiers the electoral districts are made long and serpentine, so that in some the one polling booth is sixty miles from the opposite boundary. The polling place is situated in the farthest corner, and off the main railway line. There are cases where an elector must leave home the day before election in order to cast his vote in time.

“Rotten boroughs” are numerous. Hungary has three districts with less than 200 voters, and seventy-seven with less than 1500. In 1901, 125 deputies were elected to the Diet with less than 100 votes each, and 90 per cent of the deputies polled less than 1500 votes apiece. In a country of poor peasants, the elections have gravitated into the hands of 18,000 squires who own half the arable land of Hungary.

To make its domination absolutely impregnable, the official class has employed terrorization and corruption to an unparalleled degree. Opposition voters are commonly disqualified by ignoring their applications or by entering their names wrongly. At the polls a non-Magyar is set aside if he makes a slip in his answers by

which he can be accused of not knowing Magyar. The Magyar form of giving a name is the reverse of the Slovak or Croatian, and if the elector votes for John Smith instead of Smith John he is promptly ejected. The oral vote gives endless chances for confusion or undue pressure. As all the proceedings are reported in Magyar, detection is difficult.

At close elections, the Magyars act more vigorously to nullify the non-Magyar vote. Bridges are broken down or declared unsafe; all the horses in outlying villages are kept under quarantine by the veterinary until the day after election. Crowds of ignorant Rumanian or Croatian voters are beguiled by sham voting booths, and find out their mistake only after the Magyars have voted and the polls have closed; or they are kept standing outside in the rain for hours to make them go home without voting.

To control the election of 1910, between twenty and thirty million crowns were spent, four and a half of which were taken from the public treasury. Two army corps were mobilized and transported to Austrian garrisons to deprive them of their votes. At the same time, the Junkers import troops to coerce voters so freely that at one election thirty-two men were killed and seventy wounded.

Elections in Hungary are in charge of a central committee in each town or county, composed of at least ten members, who draw up the list of voters and supervise the polling and the count. As in England the elections take place on any one of a series of days in various localities, each town concluding its poll within a single day. If defeated in one district, a candidate may stand for another. Nominations are made by ten electors,

and any registered voter is eligible, who is twenty-four years of age and can speak Magyar. In case no candidate obtains an absolute majority, ballottage takes place after a period of two weeks.

Voting is direct and public. Secret voting was unknown in Hungary before 1848. The electoral law of that year left the regulation of parliamentary elections to the town and county councils, which evolved a most remarkable form of voting. Each candidate had a large box, painted in a distinctive color, with his name on it. When the voter entered the polling place alone, he was given a rod six feet long (to prevent the concealment of non-official rods about his person), which he placed in the chosen box through a slot in the lid. The electoral law of 1874 abolished the ballot for parliamentary elections, but made it obligatory in town and county elections.

So ruthless were the means by which the Magyar proprietors preserved their oligarchy, and so completely was all liberal agitation extinguished, that movements for electoral reform made virtually no headway, until gigantic street demonstrations in the cities in 1907 and 1908 forced Andrassy, the Premier, to introduce a reform measure in November 1908. His project, however, by no means intended to compromise the Magyar character of the State. To preserve that character it imposed on manhood suffrage a scheme for a plural vote, based upon education, wealth, and other conditions, by which a citizen able to read and write Hungarian, who had completed a secondary school course, or paid a tax of 100 crowns (\$21), had as many as three votes. Persons not knowing Magyar were limited to one vote, and that cast indirectly.

In refusing the secrecy of the vote Andrassy said, "In

practice the secret ballot protects only the liberty of dishonest folk, *of those who do not consider themselves bound by their promises.*"

Under the bill a million persons in the first two classes would have had 2,320,000 votes, while 2,800,000 in the last two would have cast but a million and a half votes. The imposition of a Magyar educational qualification would have almost demolished the present Slav representation. The Socialists, the Radicals, and the Slavs united to kill this preposterous scheme for "universal, equal, and direct suffrage."

In 1912 the Lukacs Cabinet brought forward two plans for electoral reform. The first created *de novo* in the cities a class of representatives of the nation, chosen by universal suffrage, somewhat after the manner of the Badeni law of 1896 in Austria. The only results of this innovation would have been to increase a Chamber already too large. The Radicals were not in mood for this begging of the question and rejected it summarily.

Lukacs' second project was more complicated. It based the franchise on taxes, intellect, profession, and social rank, with an infinite variety of qualifications in all of these categories. The Opposition now branded Lukacs as a traitor, and on June 1 Kossuth, the son of the revolutionary hero, demanded a reform increasing the electorate twice and a half, and guaranteeing the freedom of the vote by means of the secret ballot, except in communes with more than sixty per cent of their population illiterate. He linked franchise reform with the proposed military laws in such a way that, if one passed, the other must follow.

The method by which the Magyar Junkers overcame the Liberal resistance to the army laws was characteristic.

The chief protagonist of the reactionaries was Stephen Tisza, the son of the great minister, Kolman Tisza, whose ministry coincided with that of Taaffe in Hungary. An apostle of parliamentary violence, tenacious, without humor and without irony, severe on himself, implacable toward his adversaries, he had the political bigotry and the frightful seriousness of conviction of an inveterate Tory squire. He entirely lacked the equilibrium of intellect and talent which is necessary for a modern parliamentary leader. The elder Tisza said: "My son is an excellent cavalier, but a very bad coachman." His ferocious energy made him the most cordially hated man in Hungary, but, like Cromwell, he did not lack a certain moral grandeur. He was the chief of all the retrograde Magyar forces, the irreconcilable foe of suffrage reform.

The leaders of the various wings of the Liberal Opposition were Kossuth, Count Karolyi, Count Andrassy, and Dr. Wekerle, one of the shrewdest and most far-sighted of Magyar statesmen. As Liberal obstructionism against the suffrage and army bills of 1912 continued, Tisza, the President of the Chamber, on June 4th refused the floor to the Opposition. In the disorder which ensued, he called for the vote on the military bill, passed it through all three readings, and left the chair.

The square before the parliament house was filled with hussars and infantry, and Budapest was declared in a state of siege. The Government plainly intended to stifle in blood any further opposition. As the uproar continued in the afternoon session, Tisza ordered Justh, Karolyi, and a score of the other deputies removed by the police, whereat the rest of the Opposition left the

hall in a body. The electoral reform of 1912 was at an end.

The next act in the drama of Junker ascendancy was the resignation of Tisza from the premiership at the end of May 1917. Sharing largely in the responsibility for Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia, he had gone to war for the integrity of the millions of acres owned by a few hundred noble squires and a dozen bishops, as he had protected the electoral monopoly of those classes at the point of the bayonet. His fall was due to a recrudescence, even in war-time, of Hungarian Liberalism.

A few months later Dr. Wekerle, the ablest financier of Hungary, who had stood aloof from politics since 1910 and had acquired a reputation as a Moderate, became Premier with a program which included electoral reform. In this he had the support of the Emperor Charles, of a strong Parliamentary minority led by Apponyi, Andrassy, and Karolyi, moderate or liberal statesmen, and of a majority of the press. Accordingly on December 21, 1917 the Minister of the Interior introduced in the lower house a Reform Bill of a somewhat different character from its predecessors.

Every male Hungarian above twenty-four, who satisfied one of the following qualifications, was to be given the vote: service for two years in the war; the rank of non-commissioned officer, regardless of length of service; completion of four grades of a public school education; payment of an annual tax of ten crowns (two dollars); pursuit of a licensed trade or profession; permanent employment in an industrial or agricultural establishment; or the possession of the franchise under the old law.

To any one of these qualifications must be added the

ability to read and write. This clause was worded thus: "the ability to express their thoughts in the Magyar language in speech and writing." What the Government was aiming at is too evident to need elaboration.

Women were to be granted the suffrage, if they were able to read and write and had passed four grades of a secondary school, or if they were members of a scientific or literary society. This educational requirement was waived in the case of widows who had lost their husbands in the war.

It was claimed that racially the bill approximated justice, although the Magyars kept a large margin of supremacy.* The over-representation of Magyars and Germans was due to the higher percentage of literacy among them, and also to the fact that the Magyars, who have indubitably worked wonders in the development of Hungary since the *Ausgleich*, wish to keep sufficient power to continue their constructive work. Practically every Magyar politician from the Premier down is committed to the perpetuation of the Magyar hegemony.

Even this safe and sane, Magyar reform measure was however too strong for Tisza and the Party of National Work, who formed a majority in Parliament. After much vacillation and numerous cabinet crises, Wekerle at length entered into relations in committee with Tisza, the arch-foe of democratic reform. This surrender marked the virtual abandonment of the bill as a reform measure. When it reëmerged from committee in June it bore all over it the marks of the master hand of Tisza.

	Magyars	Germans	Slovak	Rumanian	Ruthenian	Croats	Serbs	Others
* Per cent. of population..	54.5	10.4	10.7	16.1	2.5	1.1	2.5	2.2
Per cent. of votes	62.6	12.5	9.1	9.1	All other races			6.1 <i>in toto</i> ,

The safeguards against the admission of the subject nationalities to the vote had been made nearly iron-clad. The four classes of school education were replaced by six, in cases where the claimant was ignorant of Magyar. The qualification by virtue of military service was abandoned. Laborers were placed under the added handicap that they must have had a residence of at least six months in their district, either permanent industrial employment or agricultural employment during at least three years out of the last five, or that they must have had for at least half a year a license for carrying on an industry or trade.

Tisza succeeded in injecting into the bill a qualification by which all holders of eight *joch* (12 acres) of land might vote, except in Transylvania. Without endangering the Magyar position by admitting the Rumanian peasantry, he thus secured the franchise for the Magyar peasants, the most illiterate and conservative class among their race.

Other sections of the bill provided for the ballot in the towns, and for compulsory voting. Measures were prescribed to enable voters to reach the polls without undue sacrifices. Shipping companies and railways were to be paid by the state to transport voters to and from the polls.

The Reform Bill of 1918 as amended and finally passed by the lower chamber left the electoral situation exactly where it found it, with a Magyar minority in entire control through the most unjust discrimination. Wekerle's reason for accepting a compromise, which so emasculated the principle for which the Emperor had declared himself, was said to be the desire to secure a little reform immediately rather than to postpone the whole question. The little reform which he promised was indignantly rejected

by Liberal leaders, among whom Apponyi declared that Tisza had lopped off thirty per cent of the voters contemplated under the original bill. As for the subject nationalities, the evident insincerity of Magyar promises and the barrenness of the morsel which was expected to appease them simply heaped fuel upon their wrath.

The question of electoral reform in Hungary is at present in the crucible of war. The past gives little promise that Hungary has statesmen who have read the signs of the times and are willing to take the only step which can postpone the break-up of the Dual Monarchy, namely the grant of equal privileges to the non-Magyars. On the other hand the nations which are trying to dissolve her have made high bids for the favor of their fellow nationals. The Czechoslovak state and the Yugoslav state, proclaimed during the war, both promise direct, universal suffrage and parliamentary government. Rumania in 1918 introduced universal suffrage and reformed the land system which has long been an argument against the advantages to the Transylvanians of deserting Magyar rule. Whether reformed dualism, trialism, federalism, or complete dismemberment, be the fate of Austria-Hungary, it is not a rash prediction that the question of universal suffrage in Hungary will soon be taken from the jurisdiction of those who have for so long restricted the electorate to their own narrow economic caste.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE ITALIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

THE Italian "Risorgimento" or resurrection is one of the most striking events of the nineteenth century and in no country of the world has the liberation from alien domination and monarchical autocracy of a people long disunited and oppressed, been more dramatic and complete. Until the latter half of the century Italy was, as so aptly described by Metternich, merely a "geographical expression." Divided into tiny principalities and duchies, it was controlled by the reactionary influence of Austria. The breath of political freedom was absolutely stifled. Previous to 1848 no one of the various Italian states possessed a constitution, representative assembly of any kind, or any system of popular elections. There was no government anywhere in the peninsula which was not of the autocratic type. But the twelve years which succeeded 1848 witnessed a rapid evolution in the movement towards national unity and political freedom. By 1860, Italy, with the exception of Rome and Venetia, had been brought under a single ruler and had received a constitution which was already liberal, and one which was capable of such extension that in 1914 the people of no other European country enjoyed more completely democratic voting rights.

As in the case of Germany, the seeds of Italian unity and political development were sowed, quite involun-

tarily, by Napoleon. The Corsican conqueror, in 1796, drove out the Austrians and first established a group of republics of a moderately democratic type and subject to French influence, which at that time represented the most advanced liberalism of the Continent. These republics were given constitutions modeled upon the French, with representative assemblies elected by the people. The system of elections introduced need not detain us, for after the promulgation of the Empire in France (1804) the Italian republics disappeared. The peninsula was politically rearranged and divided into the kingdoms of Italy and Naples under Napoleonic control, and the political power of the people became as shadowy and their influence exercised through elections as merely platonic as in France herself. With the fall of Napoleon, Italy was once more subdivided. Austria controlled the lion's share in the north and various petty principalities and kingdoms were created or revived in the center and south. All semblance of national unity vanished. Even the forms of popular political institutions were abolished and the old eighteenth century autocracy was everywhere resuscitated.

But the Napoleonic domination had not merely given to Italy a temporary approximation to national unity; it had revealed to the Italians, in the words of a recent writer, "that truth, which once grasped can never be forgotten, that despite differences of climate, character, and speech they were in all essentials a nation." Furthermore, it had introduced for a period the principles of the French Revolution; the doctrines of civil liberty and political equality had been applied as in France, and the Italians could not forget them. Hence the generation that followed the overthrow of Napoleon was charac-

terized by a succession of plots and abortive revolutions, all designed to oust the Austrians, unify Italy, and inaugurate a régime of political freedom. The movement was marked by a high degree of political idealism, but it lacked unity; inspired with warm enthusiasm and the finest type of patriotism, its leaders were not practical in their methods. Time and again the nationalistic outbreaks were suppressed.

In 1848 the flame of revolution then spreading throughout Central Europe caught in Italy and for the first time the people of the peninsula stood all but united under the leadership of the Piedmontese King and determined to accomplish the expulsion of the Austrians. Once more the efforts of Italy to free herself proved unsuccessful. One by one, the various states were crushed or withdrew from the patriotic war; the liberal constitutions granted under stress by their governments were abrogated. Left almost alone, the army of Piedmont was finally overwhelmed by the Austrians upon the field of Novara and Austrian domination was reëstablished. But the ill-fated revolution bore fruit even in the moment of its failure, for it showed to Italy that it possessed in Piedmont a champion of its national freedom ready to lead in the next effort against Austria. And still more important, the constitution which the King of Piedmont had promulgated in 1848, was maintained by his successor, Victor Emmanuel; embodying a complete system of representative government, it stood as the beacon of political freedom in Italy and with no modification of text, it still survives as the constitution of united Italy.

The interest of the decade which followed 1848 centers around the preparations of Piedmont for a new and more successful attempt at throwing off the Austrian domin-

ation. The organizer of the movement was the Piedmontese premier, Count Cavour, who bent all his energies in the first place towards giving his country solid material power through the increase of national wealth, the development of her industrial and transportation systems, and the rebuilding of her army; and in the second place towards securing military assistance from some friendly foreign power. In 1858 he was able to sign an offensive and defensive alliance with Emperor Napoleon III of France, whose interest and gratitude he had aroused by sending Piedmontese troops to the Crimea three years before. Thus assured of French aid, Cavour provoked the second war against Austria and in the summer of 1859, the French and Piedmontese armies were victorious on the fields of Magenta and Solferino. The sudden withdrawal of Napoleon's coöperation left Austria in control of Venetia; but Lombardy was annexed to Piedmont. A large portion of central Italy, comprising several duchies and principalities at once revolted from their rulers, and by votes of their populations declared themselves in favor of annexation to the expanding kingdom of Victor Emmanuel.

Nor was the tide yet full. For in the early autumn of 1860 Garibaldi and his thousand red-shirts swept across Sicily, over the Straits, and into the Kingdom of Naples; in an incredibly brief period all of southern Italy had fallen into his hands. Here, as in the duchies of central Italy, the people, by an overwhelming majority, voted for annexation to Piedmont. In February, 1861, there met at Turin a Parliament representative of more than twenty millions of Italians, which proclaimed the kingdom of Italy. Venetia and Rome still remained outside, the one held by Austria, the other in the hands of


the Pope, who was upheld by French soldiers. But the defeat of Austria in 1866 and that of France in 1870, gave to Victor Emmanuel the awaited opportunity for completing the union of the entire peninsula. The capital was transferred to Rome, and in November of 1871 the first Parliament of United Italy was convened.

It was a matter of good fortune for the democratic development of the new nation that Cavour, who was chiefly responsible for the success of the unification movement was a convinced constitutionalist and parliamentarian. Unlike Bismarck, who despised Parliaments and who was always the agent of an autocratic sovereign, Cavour was not the type of statesman to carry out his plans without the approval of public opinion, and never felt strong unless he had a parliamentary majority at his back. He had warmly advocated Victor Emmanuel's continuation of the constitution granted to Piedmont in 1848. As the other portions of Italy were successively annexed to Piedmont, this constitution was extended to them and has ever since remained in force; it provides a form of government similar to that of Great Britain, with the control of political affairs in the hands of the majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

In theory executive power is vested in the King alone, and on paper his powers are large. In reality, however, the executive power is placed, as in Great Britain, in the hands of a group of ministers who are responsible to the lower Chamber in Parliament. Members of the ministry are regularly the heads of the administrative departments appointed by the Crown upon the nomination of the Prime Minister. The latter, who generally holds the portfolio of the Interior, is named by the King; he is ordinarily the leader of the party which can control the

largest working majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Because of the multiplicity of parties, the Crown possesses some latitude of choice, decidedly more than in Great Britain; no minister, however, can remain in power without enjoying the confidence of the majority in the lower House. To this principle of ministerial responsibility all the sovereigns of united Italy have manifested their undeviating loyalty.

Legislative power is given to a Parliament, which, as in Great Britain, consists of two Houses: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The former, unlike the British House of Lords, is not composed of the hereditary nobility as such, nor are its members elected as in the case of the French Senate. They are all named by the Crown from twenty-one stipulated classes, broadly representative of the high officials of state, of persons of achievement along practical and intellectual lines, and of landed and mercantile wealth. The Italian Senate, lacking an elective character and deprived of that prestige which the English aristocracy of birth secures from its restricted numbers, has never exercised the political influence which belongs to the upper Chamber in France; nor has it attempted the revising activities, characteristic for a period of the British House of Lords. Never has it been in close touch with the Italian people. Cavour had advocated an elected Senate and long after his death, in 1910, such influence was brought to bear in favor of this point of view that a commission was appointed to study the subject; the commission, after careful consideration, proposed that the major part of the Senate should be composed of members elected by colleges representative of the different interests of the nation. The project, however, was rejected.



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The Chamber of Deputies consists of representatives chosen directly by the people. Deputies must be Italian citizens, thirty years of age, and are elected nominally for a term of five years; but as most Parliaments are dissolved before the completion of the five-year period, the average term of the deputy's service is about three years. Sessions of the Chamber of Deputies are held in public except upon extraordinary occasions. In practice all measures of importance are inaugurated by the ministers in the lower House and after receiving the approval of the Deputies are transmitted to the Senate. In theory the King may refuse his consent to a bill passed by both Houses, but, as a matter of fact, the royal sanction is never withheld. As the Chamber of Deputies may at any time compel the resignation of a ministry by refusing to grant its approval to ministerial proposals, the political interest of the nation is here centered and it is with the elections to this Chamber that we are mainly concerned. Nothing is more indicative of the growth of democracy in Italian politics than the gradual extension of voting rights in elections for the lower House, an extension which has been carried so far that the suffrage is now accorded practically to the entire adult male population.

The original franchise law of the Italian kingdom was based upon the suffrage enactments of 1848, at the time when a constitution was first granted to Piedmont. It restricted the right of voting for members of the Chamber of Deputies to a small proportion of the inhabitants—about two and a half per cent. In order to vote, under this law, a man must be twenty-five years of age, a property holder, able to read and write, and must pay annually in direct taxes the sum of at least forty lire

(§8). Certain classes, to which were attached the appellation of "capacities," such as those including diplomats, doctors, officers on pension, officials with a salary ranging from 600 to 1,200 lire, received the franchise, provided that they also paid in direct annual taxes the sum of twenty-five lire. The educational requirement excluded the peasants, most of whom, whatever their wealth, were wholly illiterate; the urban laborers were excluded from voting by reason of the tax-paying qualification. Despite the small number of electors, the system was generally regarded as sufficiently democratic until, in 1876, the more progressive party came into power and began an agitation for further extension of the suffrage. This demand was met by strong opposition on the part of the conservatives, who only yielded to liberal insistence after a prolonged discussion which lasted six years.

The new franchise law, which resulted from liberal agitation, was finally approved by both Houses and enacted in 1882. It failed to institute what would now be considered a truly democratic suffrage, but was for the times a liberal measure and did not compare unfavorably with the suffrage then established in Great Britain. It increased the number of voters at once from 627,838 to 2,049,461, thus more than tripling the existing electorate. Two-thirds of the new voters received the franchise by the extension of the right to vote to all males over the age of twenty-one who had received a primary-school education, regardless of whether or not they were property holders. Of the other new electors, the larger portion were enfranchised by the lowering of the previous age limit from twenty-five to twenty-one and the reduction of the tax-paying qualification from forty lire to

nineteen lire eighty centesimi. For those voting under this tax-paying qualification the requirement of the ability to read and write was maintained.

A certain modicum of the new electors were enfranchised by a provision which extended voting rights to certain particular classes of persons who, while they must fulfill the ordinary qualifications of age and literacy, were exempted from the requirements of elementary schooling or tax payments. These classes were of various kinds, comprising certain national and provincial officials, members of academies of Science, Letters, or Arts, members of Chambers of Commerce or of agricultural associations, professors, masters, or teachers in colleges and schools, those possessed of a university degree, members of the learned professions, army and navy officers, and men who had spent two years in either branch of the service, as well as persons who received certain honorable decorations. The new law also enfranchised persons paying an agricultural rental of 150 lire, and, in towns, those who paid rent on dwellings, places of business, and factories to the specified amount, which varied from 150 lire in communes of less than 2,500 inhabitants, to 260 lire in communes of between 10,000 and 50,000 population, to 400 lire in communes of more than 150,000 inhabitants. For those qualifying upon the rental provision, the requirements of age and literacy were maintained as for the other classes.

In order to vote a man must show himself to be an Italian citizen, either by birth or legal naturalization. Non-commissioned officers and privates of the army and seamen of the navy were specially disfranchised so long as they were in active service. Members of the police

and the municipal watch, customs officials and the like were also deprived of voting rights.

Such was the franchise law upon which the privilege of participating in elections to the Chamber of Deputies in Italy was based for a generation. On paper it was liberal enough and if put into operation in Great Britain or the United States would have amounted practically to universal manhood suffrage. But in Italy the number of illiterates was so large that the proportion of voters to the population was by no means high and had in it nothing as yet calculated to terrify aristocratic interests. It is true that the extension of education promised to carry with it automatically an increase in the number of voters. But as a matter of fact, the development of elementary education among the masses proceeded so slowly, that even by the beginning of the twentieth century the quota of enfranchised electors was still comparatively small.

After the law of 1882 had been in operation for twenty-two years, in 1904, the number of enrolled electors amounted only to seven and one-half per cent of the total population, as against sixteen per cent in England, and no less than twenty-seven per cent in France; the voters had increased in numbers only from two million in 1882 to two and a half million in 1904. Many were disfranchised through their illiteracy, especially in the south and central portions of Italy. Others, who were actually qualified, would not take the trouble to claim the vote, either because of personal indifference or because of the order emanating from the Pope which forbade participation in political affairs.

During the twenty years which followed the passing of the franchise law of 1882, there was continual agitation for an extension of the suffrage which would give the

vote to the masses in general. The demand, however, was not of a very compelling nature. The fear of illiteracy was always so great that all the conservatives and most of the moderate liberals were unwilling to establish anything approaching universal manhood suffrage. All the attempts further to democratize the franchise were met with the argument that the law of 1882 provided amply for any one who could prove his capacity to exercise the voting right wisely, through a demonstration of his literacy. Fear of the influence of the Church over the masses also led the politicians to hesitate before they entrusted political power to those who, as they feared, would vote as their priests told them. Thus in 1904, when the Radicals and Socialists proposed that the suffrage should be granted to all adult Italian subjects, male and female, the strongest argument of the chief statesman who opposed the plan, Giolitti, was that the reform would almost certainly result in putting full political control of Italian destinies in the hands of the Clericals.

But despite this fear of illiteracy and clericalism, and notwithstanding the indifference displayed by the mass of the Italian people towards the possession of the voting privilege, the demand for electoral reform became more insistent and irresistible after 1904. In comparison with the proportion of enfranchised in England and France, the electorate of Italy, as we have seen, seemed closely restricted in numbers. The general trend of opinion throughout Europe was in favor of democratic reform in all political institutions and especially in those of an elective character. Furthermore, despite the paucity of electors and the general carelessness displayed by the Italian people towards political questions, the more liberal parties in the Chamber of Deputies were constantly increas-

ing in strength. In 1908 the Socialists, who had long insisted upon the introduction of universal suffrage, gained twelve seats, thus bringing their total strength in the lower House up to no less than fifty-two.

Under these circumstances the Government determined that the wiser course was to weaken the force of the democratic pressure by making some concessions before it was compelled to grant everything. Accordingly, in 1911 the Luzatti ministry proposed a plan for the extension of the suffrage. But so high were the hopes that had been aroused and so determined were the radicals upon the immediate establishment of a truly democratic suffrage, that when the Government suggested that their plan should not go into effect before 1913, the ministers were at once put in a minority and compelled to resign. Luzatti was succeeded by Giolitti, who in 1904 had been one of the strongest opponents of electoral reform. But he had since come to realize that no government could hope to stand firmly unless it brought itself into cordial agreement with the advocates of change; and he did not find it difficult to explain his change of front upon the most logical grounds. "After twenty years from the last electoral law," he said, "a great social revolution has taken place in Italy, and great progress has occurred in the economic, intellectual, and moral conditions of the working classes. To this progress corresponds the right to a larger participation in the political life of the nation, as there is nothing worse than to have a parliamentary assembly which does not thoroughly and sincerely represent the country."

Upon assuming the position of Prime Minister, Giolitti again affirmed the necessity of introducing a scheme of universal suffrage which ought, in his opinion, to provide


even for illiterates, and when he presented his program of electoral reform based upon this principle, he found ready and warm support among the liberal and radical parties. For once the Government could look for assistance to the Socialists and find response, and the ministers of the Crown discovered themselves in hearty agreement with such an extremist as Bissolati, who only eleven years before had shouted in the Chamber, "Death to the King." After a three-days debate the Giolitti plan of electoral reform was approved by a majority of 252 in the lower Chamber.

The bill itself was not enacted into law until the following year (1912). It provided that the suffrage should be exercised by all male citizens of twenty-one years who could read and write and also by illiterates who had reached the age of thirty and had performed their military service. Absolute manhood suffrage was thus not granted. As Giolitti contended, the right to vote was a political function of high importance, and its exercise presupposed a certain degree of intellectual cultivation which illiterates could hardly be expected to possess before they reached the age of thirty. It was further desirable to uphold the system of public instruction by establishing a distinction between those who had submitted to the obligation of attending school and those who had evaded it. With the attainment of the age of thirty, however, the experience of life acquired by that time might be considered sufficient to take the place of the education given in the primary schools.

The Socialists were not alone in their advocacy of this bill which provided a system which closely approached universal manhood suffrage. The Clericals also used their influence, both in the Chamber and in the country

at large, to assist its passage through the two Houses. On Easter Monday a manifesto was published by the official authorities of the Church, signed by the presidents of the five most important Catholic societies in Italy, and which enunciated the views of the majority of the devout Catholics upon the projected reform. The manifesto had been, if not approved by the Pope, at least examined by him, and its publication was permitted by the Vatican. It stated that the Catholics should welcome the extension of the suffrage and should prepare themselves so to act "as to prevent evil and promote good."

In the debates upon the Suffrage Bill a determined effort was made to carry an amendment which would confer the vote also upon women. Various "feminist societies" which were agitating effectively had begun to assume some importance, and when the woman suffrage amendment was brought up it was received with great applause. It proposed to grant the vote to educated women, more especially teachers, telephonists, shorthand writers, and typists, as well as those employed in the postal service and in the banks. All such women were obviously superior in intelligence, it was claimed, to the male illiterates of thirty, who were to be admitted to the franchise *en masse*. Signor Turati, speaking for the Socialists, demanded even that all women without exception be given the suffrage. Baron di San Sonnino, one of the most influential and respected of Italian statesmen, also supported woman suffrage, although in deference to his conservative principles he advocated making a small beginning. Even Giolitti, who hitherto had been unable to touch upon the subject seriously, abstained from the ironical remarks which had invariably characterized his





attitude upon woman suffrage, and went so far as to indicate his belief that at some future date it would become law. The amendment did not pass the Chamber of Deputies, but the impression left by the debate was that the feminist cause had made great progress.

The Universal Suffrage Bill was passed by the Deputies with a majority of 222. In the Senate few difficulties were thrown in its path, for in this House the Government exercised an influence which was practically supreme. Giolitti delivered here his most democratic speech. "The future of the nation," he said, "rests with the masses of the people; they should be summoned to take part in political life as the best means of giving them an interest in the preservation of the public peace." He further expressed the desire that working men of all sorts should become increasingly numerous in Parliament. On June 27, 1912, the Bill passed the Senate, 135 voting in favor of it and only 19 against. It was, perhaps, the largest measure of electoral reform ever enacted at a single moment. By it the number of voters was increased from something under three millions to more than eight millions. Under the existing franchise there are few countries in the world where the franchise for males is more democratic than in Italy.

The method of casting the electoral ballot in Italy conforms closely to that which obtains in the more liberal political systems. Originally the members of the Chamber of Deputies were elected in separate constituencies—one to each, as in the British single-member districts. So long as the struggle for unity and the effort to free Italy from alien domination vitalized the nationalistic impulses of the deputies and their constituents, this system worked well. But when the safety of Italian na-

tional freedom seemed assured, the deputies, elected largely by local influences, began to take narrow views of national questions and were to a large extent actuated by purely parochial interests. The members of the Chamber represented the nation too little and their own particular locality too much. It was thought by those who had the success of Italian parliamentarism closely at heart, that by increasing the size of the constituencies and by having several deputies elected in each district, the local tyranny, so obvious under the single-member district system, would be avoided. Accordingly, in 1882, at the time of the first general extension of the franchise, a clause was inserted in the Reform Bill which provided that the 508 seats should be distributed among 135 districts, each of which was to choose from two to five deputies apiece. Thirty-five districts were to elect five deputies, thirty-six should elect four, sixty-one should elect three, while three should elect two. This system was known as the general ticket or the *scrutinio di lista*.

At the same time some of the electoral reformers advanced the complaint that the system made no provision for the representation of minorities, and they insisted that some means should be devised by which the minority of voters in a district might elect deputies in proportion to their numbers. For, in their opinion, it was obviously absurd that in a constituency returning five members a simple majority of one or two votes should give to one party the entire representation for that constituency. Crispi, who was at this time just beginning to exercise predominant influence in Italian politics, opposed the demand for minority representation vehemently, but it was finally introduced in limited form. The Reform Bill of 1882 provided that in constituencies where

five deputies were to be elected, no elector should be allowed to vote for more than four candidates. A well-organized minority, by concentrating their votes on a single candidate, might thus be assured of some representation.

The general ticket system did not work well during the nine years when it was put into operation. It soon became apparent that, as in France, the wire pullers of the different localities were able to perfect an organization which, with the increase of deputies elected in each district, assured them far greater power than before. Political machines, of a rather crude but often effective type were developed which often turned the franchise of the people into a pure mockery. The older politicians of the Right, found that their political fortunes were suffering, and in 1891, on the first day of the session, they brought in a bill for the abolition of the *scrutinio di lista* and the reëstablishment of the system of single-member districts. Crispi, who was then in control of the Government, refused to sanction any change; but with his fall from office, which occurred shortly after, and with the entrance into power of a ministry which declared itself neutral on the question, the Chamber approved the return to the earlier method of election. A commission was appointed which was empowered to divide Italy into 508 electoral districts, each entitled to choose one deputy. Since May 8, 1891, the deputies have been chosen uniformly in single-member constituencies, their number remaining fixed at 508.

This system, as in the years preceding 1882, has led to the preponderance of local interests in politics and has thus hampered the solidarity of parties. Unless there happened to be some vitally important national question

before the voters at the time of election, the deputies have been elected, almost invariably, as the result of purely local issues. This has increased the difficulty of building up cohesive ministries and the Government has been apt to dissolve Parliament and arrange for new elections at times when the national spirit has been inflamed. An obvious instance of this policy took place in 1909, when Giolitti dissolved Parliament at the moment when the feeling of the country had been aroused against Austria by her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The electoral law provides that a candidate to be elected must poll a number of votes in excess of one-sixth of the total number of enrolled electors within the constituency. This stipulation has seemed necessary because of the large proportion of abstentions, for until recent years the voters would not come out except when particularly important issues were being contested. The lightness of the vote usually cast resulted chiefly from the habitual indifference felt by the ordinary Italian towards political questions, and in lesser measure from the order of the Pope which forbade Catholics from taking part in national elections. The candidate to be returned must also poll an absolute majority of all the votes cast. If no candidate succeeds in winning an absolute majority, a second ballot, known as *ballotaggio*, is arranged for and held a week later, to decide between the candidates who have received the greatest number of votes at the first ballot. In the elections of 1892 there were 162 districts of the entire 508 where second ballots were necessary, no candidate in them having received an absolute majority; in 1900 there were 77 such districts, in 1904, 39, and in 1909, 75.

The system of voting is similar in its broad lines to that

which obtains in most countries possessed of a democratic suffrage. Voting machines have not, as yet, been introduced. Two square boxes of glass are placed on a table in the polling station, one of them containing blank voting papers, the other empty. The list of enrolled electors is read alphabetically; as each voter's name is announced, he steps forward, takes a blank ballot from the box, takes it to the nearby table where he marks the ballot with the name of the candidate for whom he wishes to vote, folds it and deposits it in the empty box. When the list has been read through any voter not present when his name was called is allowed to present himself and claim the right of voting.

CHAPTER XXV.

PARTIES AND ELECTIONEERING IN ITALY

UNTIL recent years the history of Italian elections offers very little of that dramatic interest which has characterized electoral contests in the United States and Great Britain, where electioneering and polling invariably arouse such intense excitement during the course of an electoral year. This fact results chiefly, perhaps, from the multiplicity of Italian parties and the absence of clear-cut issues at election time. It may almost be said that there has been in Italy no such thing as a political party, in the Anglo-Saxon sense of the word. Certainly, before the rise of the Socialists such a statement would have been tolerably exact.

Groups of politicians there have been, associated together around some leading figure and assuming political titles. But each of these groups was a little more than a faction, united only by personal ties; no one of them stood responsible for a definite and consistent program; nor were any but the extreme democratic groups to be distinguished in any essential respect from their rivals. They lacked cohesion, their membership was fluctuating, their policy was invariably one of the purest opportunism. The result was that at times of election the issues placed before the voters were apt to be of a purely personal nature. The triumph of one candidate or the other meant little except to partisan interests.

The traditional so-called parties, from which ministries have almost exclusively been made up, were grouped, according to the fashion in Continental countries, into the Right and the Left. The boundary line between the two, however, was never closely drawn, and Governments were frequently composed of combinations drawn from both groups. Nor was there any vital distinction between their political aims, although the Right in theory represented the more conservative and the Left the more progressive interests. At the time of final unification in 1870 the former group held political control. Taught by Cavour that conservatism is by no means synonymous with reaction, the members of this party had played a great rôle in establishing a liberal régime during the period of unification; and although they were opposed in 1870 to any further extension of political freedom, they did not attempt to destroy any of the constitutional guarantees granted by the House of Savoy.

The Conservative régime was nevertheless one of rigidity, and by 1876 their hold upon the popular imagination was obviously weakening; nor did their steady opposition to the democratic tendencies of such men as Garibaldi and Crispi serve to increase their popularity in the country at large. The election of 1876, therefore, did not furnish great surprise when it brought an overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies to the group of the Left, which was destined to control Italian politics for the following twenty years.

As we have seen, the Left was nominally more democratic than the Right, and it was influenced by a radical section sincerely interested in reform along liberal lines. It became responsible for the remission of the worst taxes and for the Electoral Reform Bill of 1882. But it was

soon clear that the leaders of the party, once in power, cared more for office and its benefits than they did for principles. The policies of the Left, in the main, followed closely along the lines set by their predecessors. The radical wing of the party was quietly thrown overboard, and until 1887 the Left, dominated by Depretis, lived upon political maneuvers of a purely partisan character, and maintained its control at the polls and in the Chamber by the most shameless sort of corruption. Under Depretis' successor, Crispi, who for a period exercised a practical dictatorship, the policies of the party were more grandiose but equally opportunist and its methods quite as dishonest. Financial scandals and industrial troubles forced Crispi into the distraction of foreign adventure, which, in 1896, culminated in the overwhelming defeat of Italy's forces at Adowa by the Abyssinian emperor, and which terminated Crispi's political career.

Adowa opened a new era in Italian politics. The old parties were to a large extent discredited and each election gave greater power to new and more progressive elements. The Right became almost exclusively a group of pure reactionaries and of decreasing political influence. It drew upon the elements opposed to any change in the democratic direction: the old nobility and bureaucrats, the local factions of Naples and Sicily, who frankly sold their power of intimidation at elections, the great capitalists of the cities of the North. The extreme Right advocated an increase in the power of the Crown by the abolition of ministerial responsibility to the Chamber, and even demanded that the franchise should be narrowed rather than widened.

The Left, after Crispi's fall, began to adopt a slightly more progressive policy. Dominated by Giolitti, the

most capable Italian politician of our day and not over-scrupulous in his manipulation of a political system where success depended to some extent upon corrupt methods, the leaders of the Left recognized that times were changing and that avowed sympathy with popular demands was essential to the steady maintenance of a majority in the Chamber. The party has thus declared itself in favor of social reform. Its more advanced elements, in alliance with the opportunist, Giolitti, were chiefly responsible for the great suffrage measure of 1912.

But while the politicians of the Left have thus succeeded in holding political control during the past four elections, it has been obvious that the party's future was not bright. Composed of various groups which did not like to coöperate, compelled to look for assistance now to the Right and again to the extreme Left, it has existed on sufferance only, until stronger parties and younger groups, more truly representative of the classes in the nation at large, should develop their organization and take its place.

Of these new parties the Socialists are the most important, not so much because of the number of deputies they have succeeded in electing, as because they alone in Italy have set up a close party organization and are the first party capable of giving enunciation to the opinions of a popular class. Socialism made a late appearance in Italy, largely because of the absence of great industries and because of the all-absorbing interest aroused by the movement for unification. But in the eighties it grew fast and in the early nineties, contemporaneously with the foundation of the Independent Labor Party in England, there appeared an Italian Socialist party, which in 1895 polled 60,000 votes and returned twelve deputies.

Two years later, in 1897, the number of votes polled by the Socialist candidates was no less than 108,000 and sixteen Socialist deputies were elected. The young party was favored by the political circumstances of the period in Italy, at a time when the older parties were disorganized and had no specific program of a character designed to attract the votes either of the intelligent or the discontented.

The Socialist leaders wisely adopted at the start a party organization modeled upon that of successful political groups in other nations, and arranged to carry through an active electoral campaign. They also set forth a definite policy so that voters might know what to expect from elected candidates. This policy was enunciated in the so-called "minimum program," of 1895, which voiced their views with vigor and yet with moderation. "It is a program," said Villari, himself an adherent of the Right, "which every sensible man could endorse in its entirety." Its essential features were universal suffrage for adults of both sexes, payment of deputies, the neutrality of the Government in disputes between labor and capital, a national militia in place of a standing army, improved factory legislation for women and children, compulsory insurance, the nationalization of mines and railways, the abolition of duties on food, a progressive income tax and inheritance taxes, and the extension of compulsory education.

It was the strength of the Socialist party that it monopolized the advocacy of such practical reforms, which the Conservatives and the extreme Left, had they been alive to their opportunities, might earlier have taken for their own. Socialism in Italy has thus appealed to the most thoughtful of the educated middle classes and

has attracted to its ranks many of the intellectual leaders, amongst others the criminologist Lombroso, the novelist Di Amicis, the historian Ferrer, the poet D'Annunzio. The voting strength of the party is to be found chiefly among the artisans and railwaymen, especially in the industrial cities of the North; and here it is that Socialism has won its most striking parliamentary victories. Amongst the agricultural laborers of the Po valley the proportion of votes cast for Socialist candidates has been comparatively high, and they have not fared badly in Tuscany and the Romagna. In the South, although it has made recent gains, it is still comparatively weak.

Together with the Socialists, the Republican and Radical groups have joined to form in the Chamber of Deputies what is known as the extreme Left. The Republicans are decaying, for the question of monarchy versus republic has gone into the background. They inherited from Mazzini high ideals and fervid enthusiasm, albeit impractical methods. But the success of Cavour and Victor Emmanuel in the movement of unification solidified the prestige of the dynasty, and between 1870 and 1890 the Republicans were very weak. The struggle against the dictatorship of Crispi gave them a chance to reorganize their strength in elections, but as a party they have been eclipsed by the Socialists.

Stronger and possessed of a bigger future than the Republicans are the monarchist Radicals, who, like the Socialists, have polled most of their votes in the North—Tuscany, Venetia, and Lombardy. Many artisans and members of the lower-middle class who will not accept Socialism either as a creed or as a political party, vote for Radical candidates. In many respects the Radicals are close to the Socialists in their practical policy and

with the latter they have worked to prevent reaction and preserve liberty. Unquestionably, the whole extreme Left has imparted to Italian parliamentary life an element of seriousness and high purpose which was sadly needed. "They have forced Parliament and the country," said a deputy of an opposing party, "to attend to principles and forget personalities."

Besides the parties of the extreme Left, special mention should be made of the Catholics, who, during the past ten years and more, have been permitted by the Church to participate in political activities and have constantly increased their strength at the polls. As various writers have pointed out, the term "Catholic" is one to which a variety of connotations have been applied. In a sense the mass of the Italians may be termed Catholics—all, that is, who are neither Protestants nor Greeks nor Jews. Or in another sense those only are Catholics who regularly observe the tenets of the Church and of Catholic worship. In a still narrower sense the term may be limited to those who obey the Pope in all matters, spiritual and civil. In Italy it is the last-named sense of the word which is ordinarily applied to Catholics in their relation to political questions.

Until the accession of Pius the Tenth, that relation was characterized by a regular abstention from the polls and avoidance of any marked interest in the civil affairs of Italy. This attitude was the result of a policy carefully worked out at the Vatican, following the application of which, it was hoped, pressure could be brought to bear upon the national government of Italy and which would express the desired protest against the destruction of the Pope's temporal power, which had been accomplished by Victor Emmanuel when he made Rome his capital. In

1883 the Sacred Penitentiary formulated the decree *Non Expedit* by which it was declared inexpedient that Catholics should vote at parliamentary elections, although it stated the possibility that under certain circumstances voting was not to be considered as a sin. In 1895 Pope Leo the Thirteenth went a step further by expressly forbidding Catholics to vote at parliamentary elections.

But neither the *Non Expedit* nor the papal vote had the effect sought for, which if attained would have proved a serious menace to the State. The more intelligent Catholics were unwilling to stand aside pettishly while important political questions were decided. The priests were often in close touch with the civil authorities and had no desire to quarrel with them, while the Catholic nobles were anxious to stand well at court. In certain quarters, as in the papal stronghold of Bergamo, the *Non Expedit* unquestionably diminished greatly what would have been the normal vote cast. But in general it does not seem to have been widely or rigorously enforced. With the growth of Socialism, to which the Catholics are bitterly opposed, the latter began to take constantly a more active part in elections; as a clerical remarked, no papal veto could prevent him from carrying water when his house was on fire. Leo the Thirteenth, however, was pledged to the policy of abstention and could not abandon it.

The accession of Pius the Tenth gave the more progressive Catholics their opportunity of abrogating the *Non Expedit* in all but name. The new pontiff was acutely alive to the necessity of combating Socialism by every means that could be organized, and in 1905 he issued an encyclical in which he made it the duty of

Catholics everywhere, even in Italy, to share in the maintenance of social order; the encyclical enjoined the Catholics to take part in political contests whenever waged in opposition to social anarchy and wherever the institutions of established society were obviously menaced. Such participation must be disciplined and carried on under the direction of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Catholics might also stand as candidates for seats in the Chamber of Deputies, although, according to the encyclical, such candidacies were to be permitted only when they seemed to be absolutely necessary in order to prevent the election of an avowed enemy of the Church. They would be allowed only where there was a real chance of success, and with the express approbation of the proper hierarchical authorities.

The clericals had already begun to take an active part in the elections of 1904; they harangued crowds in the former Papal States, opposing to the statements of the Socialist candidates political arguments drawn from sacred writings and modernized to suit the taste of contemporary orthodoxy. The editors of the most important Catholic papers offered themselves as candidates. Even the haughty Catholics of Rome mingled in the turmoil of a general election. A Catholic was elected on the first ballot at Milan. After 1905 the intensity of the Catholic effort was increased. Notwithstanding the restrictions which the papal encyclical put upon the electoral activities of Catholics, they put forward candidates frequently in defiance of the particular prohibitions of the bishops, and in the elections of 1909 they infused great bitterness into the electoral contests which they waged.

Their efforts, however, gave to the clerical cause only

twenty-four seats in the Chamber of Deputies, a rather disappointing reward for the practically complete abandonment of the policy of abstention which had been imposed on them by the Vatican during the previous forty years. In Rome they were completely defeated. Their disappointment was the more bitter in that the increase in the number of clerical deputies (seven to twenty-four) was made mainly at the expense of the older parties and did not weaken the Socialists, who were the particular objects of clerical hatred. Most discouraging of all was the election in Rome of Dom Romolo Murri, a modernist priest, who stood as a Socialist.

With the vast increase of the electorate which resulted from the Reform Bill of 1912, the clericals realized that special efforts must be made to develop their voting strength amongst the newly-enfranchised masses. Their leaders, accordingly, with the tacit consent of the Vatican, undertook the work of skillful organization, similar to that attempted in France and Belgium, with a view to forming the Catholics into one body, and preparing for the formation of a powerful party comprehending all the separate Catholic associations. On January 26, 1913, was held at Venice a general assembly of the "Popular Union of Italian Catholics." Its business was to draw up a detailed program of the political and social demands which the candidates were to be required to pledge themselves to uphold, in order to obtain the votes of the Catholic electorate. The party intended to secure representation not only in the Chamber of Deputies, but also in the supreme Council of Labor, thus increasing its hold upon the working-man. The assembly demanded the independence and liberty of the Pope, an improvement in the condition of the working classes, the maintenance

of religious instruction in the schools, and the rejection of all bills relating to divorce. The essential features of the program which it drew up were its opposition to Socialism and its conservatism.

At the elections of 1913 Catholics were instructed to abstain from voting in any of the constituencies of Rome. As regards the rest of Italy, the bishops were left free to judge whether or not it was expedient to allow their flock to participate in elections; but participation, as a general principle, was to be permitted not merely when it was a question of keeping out of the Chamber an avowed enemy of religion but also in the case of a Socialist candidate. The result of the polling hardly justified the elaborate care taken by the Catholics to formulate principles and organize their campaign. For while the Radicals and Socialists made extensive gains, the clerical party in the Chamber could muster only twenty-four seats after the election of 1913.

The statistics of Italian elections in recent years show that the ministry in power, because of certain electoral conditions which we shall consider presently, has almost invariably been able to secure a majority for itself at the polls. The smaller groups, such as the Radicals, the Socialists, and the Clericals, have thus been working against difficulties of a more formidable character than would have been met in a country where the freedom of elections was strongly established. For Italian Governments, disposing of great influence, have not scrupled to use it at the polls, in order to secure the return of their supporters. Thus in 1892, Giolitti, who had just replaced a ministry of the Right in power, was able, through the control which his new position gave him, to turn the tide at the election completely in favor of the Left. In

the election of 1895 the candidates supported by the Government secured no less than 336 seats of the total 508. Two years later the Socialists, who had issued their clear-cut program and had undertaken to start candidates in every constituency where votes were likely to be polled, gave an indication of their increasing strength by securing eighteen seats and carrying Florence, Milan, Turin, and Reggio. Nevertheless the ministerial candidates, with their 320 seats, obtained an easy majority over all other groups combined.

The elections of 1900 were characterized by a determined effort on the part of the groups of the extreme Left, which had appointed a committee of three to superintend their electoral campaign; to this committee were affiliated sub-committees in each province whose duty it was to find candidates for the Opposition and to support them in every place which offered the remotest chance of success. Altogether these groups put forward 240 candidates, of whom 115 were Socialists, 50 were Republicans, and 75 were Radicals. On this occasion the Government, anxious to promote domestic tranquillity, formally supported official candidates in only 100 districts and apparently did not attempt to exert great influence in the polling. The result of the election was accordingly unfavorable to the ministry, the whole of upper Italy throwing in its lot with the Opposition.

The next election, in 1904, was, however, completely disastrous to the hopes of the popular parties. The advanced Socialists had been bitter against the Government in power, and in order to bring about the resignation of the ministers had proclaimed a general strike. Civic life was paralyzed in the chief towns of North Italy and serious disorders broke out in Naples, Rome, and

Florence. The voters were so disgusted by the anarchy which threatened from the policy of the extremists, that the voting everywhere went in favor of the more conservative groups. A Catholic was returned on the first ballot at Milan, as we saw, and the candidates of the popular groups were overwhelmed by enormous majorities. The sole Socialist of importance elected was Turati and he owed his success chiefly to the fact that he had opposed the general strike.

In 1909, however, the tide of the popular parties rose above even the high-water mark of 1900. The Government in power had returned to its earlier policy of exerting official influence of every kind; but the group of the extreme Left increased the number of its deputies from 80 to 114, of whom no less than 42 were Socialists; the latter group gained 16 seats and their aggregate vote in the country at large was impressively enhanced. At the voting for the officers of the Chamber of Deputies, a noted Socialist, Andrea Costa, was chosen one of the Vice-Presidents.

The elections of 1913 were naturally of peculiar interest because of the enormous increase made to the electorate in the previous year by the Reform Bill of 1912. They were long delayed, because it was not to the interest of any party to proceed too hastily to a general election: the Socialists were divided amongst themselves, the Catholics desired time for organization, and the ministerial party was not free from anxiety regarding Tripoli and foreign policy, and were worried by the popular attitude towards Austria. All therefore had full leisure to carry on their propaganda and for the first time in Italian history an electoral campaign was inaugurated similar to those in vogue in other democratic countries. The

Government adopted the tactics of supporting systematically every outgoing deputy, whatever his politics, with the exception of Socialists and certain persons particularly disliked by the Prime Minister. Even the Constitutional Opposition (Moderates) were treated favorably and, to the surprise of all, the electoral address of its leader was printed in full in the ministerial press.

At first, notwithstanding the increase in the number of voters, the campaign was not very lively. But gradually the Socialists began to display great activity and the other parties followed suit. In the Southern provinces, especially, excitement and passion ran high, and the electoral struggle, acute in character, was often picturesque in aspect. Because of the large number of electors who could not read, the publication of the electoral addresses of the candidates was generally replaced by picture posters, or the placarding of allegorical delineations of the candidates' ideas or programs. In some provinces moving pictures or even phonographs were utilized to eulogize or ridicule the retiring member or his opponent. On the days immediately preceding the polling, feeling was intense, and at some political meetings revolvers or knives were used; at Rome, as well as at Naples and in Sicily, there was at times serious danger of riots.

The interest exhibited, while it was thus displayed in a manner characteristically Italian, was notable in Italy where indifference to political questions had invariably marked the attitude of the masses. Out of eight million voters more than four million went to the polls. The comparative size of the vote brought out was due largely doubtless, to the efforts made by those in charge of the electoral campaign; for the various committees enabled the electors to travel by rail or by automobile, and some-

times also provided them with food. The interest displayed by the people was, probably, to a large extent genuine and may fairly be regarded as a sign that Italy is attaining her political maturity and that Italians are beginning to appreciate the significance as well as the value of democratic government.

The result of the voting certainly indicated a notable movement of the people of Italy in the direction of the principles and program of the more democratic parties. The Radicals gained sixteen seats and were represented by seventy deputies in the new Chamber. The Socialists of all shades made the most notable advance, capturing no less than eighty seats, a gain of nearly one hundred per cent over their strength in 1909. Nor does this fully represent their strength in the country at large, where they obtained an aggregate of nearly a million votes, or about a quarter of all the votes cast.

The increase of democratic strength in Italian elections is in part a result and in part a cause of the improvement in the morality of electioneering. It is more difficult to influence a large number of voters than a restricted electorate and the vast increase of 1912 led inevitably to a certain decrease in the amount of systematic bribery and to some mitigation of the corrupt influence that had formerly been exercised. In earlier days, corruption and intimidation had thrived in Italy and all the older parties considered that such methods were essential adjuncts of the business of conducting a successful election. In general the voters were influenced either by intimidation or bribery, for all the government officials were required to see that ministerial candidates in their districts were duly elected. At times, characteristic Italian gangs of criminals, such as the Camorra or

Mafia, were utilized in order to terrorize the electors and thus produce the desired result at the polls.

To understand the character and the extent of the corruption which existed in the electoral system until recent times, it must not be forgotten that there was little political interest alive among the voters. The richer classes voted, as in many other countries, according to habit and in obedience to their regular party ties. Of the other elements of the population, a majority, doubtless, voted from corrupt or trivial motives. Except in the North, where the Socialists began to create a livelier spirit about 1895, electors were easily influenced either by fear or by greed.

The Government in power was almost invariably the first to prove itself a connoisseur in the arts of conducting a corrupt election. It was a regular habit of the Ministry, before the dissolution of any Chamber, to make sure that all the administrative officials and the prefects in particular, could be trusted to secure the election of the "right men" in the voting for the succeeding Chamber. Frequently a complete "shuffling" of officials would be necessary. Thus before the elections of 1892, Giolitti, then Prime Minister, saw to it that of the sixty-nine prefects, no less than forty-six were either transferred or compelled to resign. Those that were left were all men who, either because of their political beliefs or their personal relations, could be trusted to work strenuously for the Giolitti party. A Secretary-General who was too highly connected to be summarily dismissed, found himself transferred six times in a single month from one post to another, because he seemed indifferent to the electoral fate of ministerial candidates.

The instructions sent to the prefects by the Gov-

ernment at the time of election, invariably urged the officials to make use of an "intelligent activity," naturally in favor of the governmental candidate; and those instructions were apt to be carried out to the letter. Woe to the prefect who failed! He must "prepare" the election carefully, and must work effectively, or else face dismissal, or at the very best temporary suspension until the election was over. In 1909 the Prefect of Ancona permitted four ministerial deputies to be replaced by candidates of the extreme-Left; removal to Belluno taught him that "opposition candidates must not be allowed successfully to poach on Government preserves." Such dereliction of official duty was rare and could hardly be traced to lack of opportunities for influencing the voting, for the prefects disposed of enormous powers. One of them boasted that he could control every election in his province.

The influence of the Government was exercised in a variety of ways. In 1892 and 1895 the names of electors whose political opinions were doubtful, were struck from the lists wholesale. In the former year there was enforced a law which provided that every voter, even though provided with a proper voting paper, must be personally identified by the scrutineers or have his identity sworn to by witnesses; in consequence, at Rome and in other districts, scarcely more than a fourth of the electorate came out to vote. In 1895 the Government, under the pretense of "revising" the electoral lists and removing the names of dead or incapacitated electors, with brazen effrontery struck off the names not only of those electors suspected of holding hostile opinions, but even of those persons who had displayed a certain lukewarmness towards the existing ministry. In this way at least

600,000 voters were summarily disfranchised and the electorate of 2,400,000 was reduced to approximately 1,800,000. At Bologna, 6,000 names were expunged out of a total of 49,000 electors; at Padua, 5,000 out of 25,000; at Treviso, an Irredentist center and therefore hostile to Crispi's policy of friendship with Austria, no less than 18,000 names were removed from an electoral list which had included altogether only 39,000. Such tampering with the electoral lists was an even simpler matter in Sicily; at Catania more than half the constituency (5,000 out of 9,000 voters), was disfranchised; amongst them were lawyers and university professors; a teacher of literature found that his name had been expunged upon the ground of "illiteracy." The result was that the ministerial candidates could not have polled in the aggregate more than 600,000 votes, although they claimed to represent a population of thirty-one millions. "The fiction of constitutional government was never more cynically laid bare nor its absurdity more nakedly exposed."

Government influence was exercised in a diversity of other fashions. Secret funds of State were utilized to subsidize newspapers; school teachers, who are Government employees in Italy, were compelled upon pain of instant dismissal, to canvass for ministerial candidates; railway employees must vote for the right man or look for another job; if they chanced to be Socialists of influence, the Government removed them from the scene of action. In the time of Crispi it was not unusual to hear of electors who had been arrested on false charges upon the eve of an election and who were kept in custody until the voting was over. Policemen were sometimes actually stationed in front of the polling-booths to shut out

voters of the opposition. An ex-Minister of Justice openly admitted that the Sicilian police were a "true electioneering agency."

In 1895, under the Crispi Government, the Ministry found that, notwithstanding their "revisions" of the electoral lists, their candidate at Alcamo, in Sicily, enjoyed very slight chance of election. It happened that an inhabitant of the town, one Saladino, was in prison at the time on a charge of forgery and murder. He had numerous connections and friends in the district whose influence, if exerted, would be sufficiently powerful to carry the election in favor of the ministerial candidate. Accordingly, the chief official of Sicily, General Murri, went down to Alcamo and arranged a bargain with the friends of Saladino, to the effect that the criminal should be released provided that his sponsors secured the victory of the official candidate. "He must be elected at any cost," the general is reported to have said.

In another constituency, at the elections of 1900, the police were sent around to the various villages to threaten the peasants with wholesale arrest, if the Government candidate failed of election. A secret circular was sent out by the Department of the Interior, which ordered the telegraph officials to transmit no message relating to the elections until it had been seen by the prefect of the province.

Still more outrageous was the use made by the Government of the societies of the Camorra and Mafia. The former is practically confined to the city of Naples; "despite its esoteric organization, its fantastic ritual, its strange perverted code of honor, it is a vicious, malodorous conspiracy of the dissolute and criminal poor, who live by blackmailing their fellow-poor and selling their

electoral services to the Government or the local Deputies." The Government so far from attempting to root out this organized threat to decent society, for a long time protected it. The leaders of the Camorra discovered that "electioneering is the only business that pays at Naples," and entered into a studied policy of making themselves so useful to the Government at times of elections that they obtained practical immunity from the police in the prosecution of their vicious trade. The majority of the Neapolitan constituencies were intimidated by the Camorra and compelled to vote for ministerial candidates.

In Sicily, the corresponding society of blackmailers and ruffians, known as the Mafia, was also utilized by the Government in order to terrorize electors. In the constituencies where the Mafia was strong it was practically impossible for a candidate to win a Parliamentary seat unless he promised his protection to the gang of criminals. Thus the Mafia had its sponsors in the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministers themselves entered into relations with the leaders of the society, who acted the part of grand-electors. The gangs went on their paths of crime undisturbed, engaged in their quiet blackmailing practices unmolested, were even given licenses to carry arms while decent folk were refused them, so long as they terrorized successfully the voters of the opposition and kept the seat of the ministerial deputy safe.

Government pressure upon the electors, in whatever fashion exerted, was always worst in the South. In the North, bribery was the most odious type of corruption employed. This assumed various forms. In a general way abundant use was made of promises that the Government would show some special favors to a particular

locality, such as providing a railway or new water supply to be established at governmental expense, new barracks for the important towns of the district, decorations for the chief supporters of the Government. Pecuniary bribery was not infrequent, and the laws which punished any attempt at direct or indirect corruption were rarely applied. When in 1892 a magistrate of Venetia desired to prosecute in a case of notorious bribery, he found his suit immediately stopped by "somebody higher up," and himself transferred to another post.

At the elections of 1900 bribery was rampant both in the North and in the South. At Catania twenty lire was paid for a vote; at Corteleona, in Piedmont, prices for votes ranged from five to twenty-five lire; at Intra the price fell to half a lire. Where votes were bought it was the practice to give one half of a bank note before and the corresponding half after the elector had recorded his vote. As proof of having kept his promise the voter must show the impress of the candidate's name on a piece of blotting paper that had been given him, the Italian law providing that the voter must write the name of the candidate on the voting-paper. Much of the money expended in bribery came from the Treasury, for the secret service funds of the Government were often directed to this purpose. In 1892 Pelloux is said to have saved up ten million lire for possible election contingencies; in one province at least two hundred thousand lire are believed to have been spent in bribery. In 1895 Crispi, immediately before the dissolution of the Chamber, dismissed 367 officials and thus effected a saving of 800,000 lire in salaries, which it was supposed he wanted to use in the approaching elections. One of the reasons for the perilous shrinkage in the funds of the Banca Romana was

the demand for loans made by successive ministries who needed the money for electoral purposes.

After 1904 it was hoped that the tone of electoral morality in Italy was ascending; but the elections of 1909, to the disappointment of many, proved, in certain quarters, to be characterized by a revival of the old disgraceful practices: bribery, violence, and official pressure of all kinds; frauds and trickery were also freely indulged in. Votes of dead men were counted and forged ballot papers thrust into the ballot box before it was sealed (a trick known as *fare il coppino*). A Southern deputy was convicted of having himself tampered with the ballot papers at the very time when the validity of his return was being investigated. But most of the worst corruption occurred in the South. In North and Central Italy the elections of 1909 were comparatively honest. And notwithstanding the excitement prevalent in the next elections of 1913, it is certain that corruption at that time was neither so blatant nor so extensive as in the earlier days.


Electoral corruption has not, indeed, been entirely weeded out, nor can too much be expected from the recently enfranchised Italian masses. Italy must be given time to work out her full political development, and the hasty critic must remember that the people, especially in the South, are socially and economically backward and still, to a large degree, illiterate. Italy has secured a political régime as democratic in form as is to be found in any country of the world; doubtless she was not entirely prepared for it. But it would have been questionable wisdom to have withheld longer the electoral freedom conferred by the Universal Suffrage Bill of 1912.

Political conditions have not been vitiated by that wide measure of liberalism, and, so far as it is possible to judge at the present moment, they have been materially improved.



Alexander Guchkoff

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CHAPTER XXVI

RUSSIA: TSARISM AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

THE Russian imperial electoral system, like that of the other states of eastern Europe, assumed the form it held until 1917, under the influence of western representative institutions. And yet there was a germ of democracy inherent in the Slavic people, purely indigenous, which was never crushed by the autocracy of the Tsars, and which, even without the democratic development of England, France, and Italy, must ultimately have made of the Slavs a self-governing people. In the earliest haze of Slavic history, the Emperor Maurice notes a passion for liberty among the Russians, a hatred of arbitrary sovereignty not dissimilar to the characteristics which were remarked by Tacitus among the Germans. Like the latter, the Slavs in the early Middle Ages had their assembly of the village, in this case called the *mir*, and a larger assembly of the canton or *volost*. In these assemblies, presided over by a chosen elder, the affairs of the community were discussed and decided. From them might have developed, as in England, a great national elective assembly, representative of the entire race.

Fate willed otherwise. When the hardy Vikings of the North set out first to ravage and then to rule the shores of France, England, and Sicily, various bands invaded also the districts to the east of the Baltic. Tradition has it that one of these adventurers, Rurik by

name, conquered and consolidated the Slavic tribes about Novgorod in the ninth century, and that his successors extended their sway to the south so as to include the great town of Kiev and the surrounding country under their rule. Hence the name Russia which comes from the word *Rous*, the Finnish appellation given to the "men of the North." From this conquest there developed many groups of petty principalities, governed by the descendants of Rurik and engaged in constant and ruinous internecine warfare.

Amongst these several, like Novgorod, were in character republican rather than monarchical. Here the assembly of the inhabitants elected and deposed their princes, decided questions of peace and war, judged criminals. But in general the local assemblies were completely subservient to the will of the prince, and the mass of the population was no longer so free as in the primitive age before the appearance of the Northmen. The peasant was despised; he was called *smerde*, evil-smelling, or *moujik*, signifying man of no importance.

A great accident of history further helped to prevent the development of a national elective system of representation. Russia in Europe is an extension, geographically, of the great Asiatic plain, and therefore exposed to invasions from the East. In the thirteenth century came the Tatars under Genghis Kahn, fresh from their conquest of China and seeking new territories to spoil. In desperation the Russian princes went eastwards to meet this "yellow peril" of the Middle Ages, but only to suffer overwhelming defeat (1224). "For our sins," says the Russian chronicler, "unknown nations arrived." The Khan of the "Golden Horde" established his headquar-

ters on the Volga and for nearly three centuries held Russia in subjection.

The rule of the Tatars was careless and left to the Russians their own institutions and manner of life. The nomad Mongols were not in search of land and did not disturb the people in their customary occupations. But the effect of their domination upon the later political development of Russia was profound. By separating Russia from western Europe, it helped to perpetuate a semi-oriental state of civilization; by rendering the Slavic princes responsible for the collection of tribute and the maintenance of order it enabled them the more to destroy the independence of the villagers and the privileges of the free peasants, wherein lay the germs of a true democracy. The signs and outer trappings of those in power became Mongol in character. The customs and etiquette of the court were oriental; the armor of the Muscovite princes was like that of China, and their head-dress was a turban. As Wallace remarks, the first Tsars of Moscow were the political descendants, not of the Russian princes, but of the Tatar Khans. Hence it is not surprising that when the Mongol yoke was finally thrown off and Russian national unity accomplished, there remained far less of local autonomy and of popular rights than in the same stage of development in western Europe.

The lead in the movement for liberating Russia from the Tatars and in unifying the different principalities was taken by the princes of Moscow. Towards the end of the fourteenth century in 1380, the Khan of the "Golden Horde" was defeated and it soon became apparent that all danger of a reëstablishment of the Mongol domination had vanished. Freed from the peril and

disgrace of alien rule, the Princes of Moscow set themselves to conquer the smaller principalities and to create an uncontrolled monarchical authority in the lands secured by their military forces. Possessed of great native ability, combined with absolute lack of scruple, their success was complete.

The ruthless and tyrannical administration of Ivan the Great and Ivan the Terrible brought all the petty autonomous states of the great Russian plain under the direct control of Moscow; at the same time these rulers developed an absolute autocracy in government, so that the Austrian envoy who was sent on a mission to Moscow reported that no sovereign in Europe was obeyed so implicitly as the grand-prince of Muscovy. Ivan the Terrible organized a special corps of civil officials and military retainers, numbering over six thousand, with which he completely terrorized the population; in order to kill the spirit of freedom which might linger in such a place as Novgorod, with its republican traditions, he is said to have massacred no less than sixty thousand of the inhabitants. The person and the goods of all his subjects were his property; the greatest lords of Russia, descendants of Rurik, were his slaves.

For a brief period, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, following the death of Ivan the Terrible, the Tsars of Muscovy lost their powers of autocracy and a period of political anarchy set in. Had the proper elements been present, a national popular movement might have been inaugurated. The throne fell vacant, the nobles were divided by mutual jealousies and distracting quarrels, the independence of the country was threatened by the Poles. Russia was saved from the foreign invader by a truly patriotic rising of the masses, and for

the moment it seemed as if the great national impulse might lead to the establishment of some sort of free government. It was a great national assembly at Moscow which, in 1613, chose Michael Romanov Tsar, and extracted from him promises of just and equitable rule. The new dynasty owed its elevation to the throne to public election and to popular devotion; for a period they called public assemblies for the discussion of important national issues, and the people hoped to count upon their gratitude. But the Romanovs soon forgot their debt; they discovered that the nobles were politically unintelligent and the people untaught. The assemblies, when called, made no attempt to extend their power, as they certainly would have done in England, and the whole façade of autocracy, shaken for a brief space, was soon restored.

With the accession of Peter the Great, Russia entered upon a new phase, but it was not one destined to culminate in democratic government. Peter appreciated fully the fact that in customs and manner of thought his empire was Oriental, and the great ambition of his life was to educate his people in the fashion of western Europe. But amongst the western habits which he hoped to introduce, popular self-government, at that moment becoming firmly established in England, was not included. At the moment when the British House of Commons was solidifying its political power and by the expulsion of James the Second asserting its supremacy over the Crown, the Tsar Peter was removing all shreds of opposition to his absolute autocracy. In order to occidentalize his subjects he clipped the long beards of his nobles, cut the skirts of their Oriental coats, instituted tobacco smoking, the most democratic of habits; but he

ruled always with the methods of a Tatar prince, and at times displayed in his personal government as grotesque a brutality as ever characterized Genghis Khan. His internal reforms and his foreign conquests transformed the Tsardom of Muscovy into the modern Russian Empire, but it was still a state ruled by an Oriental despotism.

Upon the death of Peter the Great, as after the rule of Ivan the Terrible, there succeeded a period characterized by weak sovereigns. But again the opportunity thus afforded for the development of popular rights was lost, because the people were incapable of seizing and using them. Power fell into the hands of intriguing favorites and self-seeking nobles, and whatever limits were laid upon the autocracy of the monarch redounded in favor of a small oligarchical clique.

With the accession of Catherine the Second the power of the sovereign was once more fully reëstablished. The great Empress used her authority to introduce reforms in the system of administration, she studied the philosophies of the West, and attempted to accustom her people to the refinements of Occidental civilization. But her belief in the necessity of absolute government was never shaken. She was not afraid to come into touch with her subjects by summoning a great assembly representative of all the peoples and all the classes she ruled; she even declared that "the nation is not made for the ruler but the ruler for the nation," and that "liberty is the right to anything that is not forbidden by law." But while she may have been benevolent, she remained always the despot; the good that ought to be done for the people, must, in her opinion, never be done by the people. And when the French Revolution began to establish

truly democratic principles upon the Continent of Europe, Catherine lost all her sympathy with liberalism, even in the abstract.

Obviously the Russian people were not at this time fitted to win self-government for themselves. Economic and social misery there was in abundance, and this is one of the elements of which political revolutions are made. But the mass of the people, living in the country districts, were totally uneducated; there was here no middle class, as in France, ready to instruct and to lead. Separated from western Europe, as by a Chinese wall, Russia afforded no possible manner of entrance to the doctrines of 1789, and if they had come in could have furnished no political soil in which they could take root. If the Russian people were to have political rights they must be slowly granted from above and accompanied by an expanding system of education.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was hope that the young Tsar, Alexander the First, might prove to be the liberator. Generous and impressionable in temperament, he had imbibed from his Jacobin tutor, La Harpe, the doctrines of Rousseau. Unafraid of change and willing to break the spell of the dead past, he advocated reforms of all kinds; abroad he was the enthusiastic apostle of the idea of universal peace; within he discussed the plan of granting his subjects a constitution. Unfortunately for Russia, internal reform was compelled to wait upon foreign affairs; it was the time of the Napoleonic wars, and the Tsar was busy, now in schemes of conquest in coöperation with the French Emperor, again in freeing Europe and Russia from the yoke of Napoleon's domination and in bringing peace to the world.

When Europe settled down after Waterloo to what

people believed to be the regeneration of the political system of the Continent and a durable peace based upon a just division of power, Alexander was looked to by many Liberals as the great hope of the future. By the reactionaries, amongst them the powerful Metternich, he was regarded askance, as little better than a Jacobin. In Russia he undertook reforms of all kinds, improved the administrative system, bettered the condition of prisons, endowed asylums and hospitals. In Poland he even established a constitution which authorized a representative Diet with the power of making laws and considering the budget. Neither Prussia nor Austria enjoyed such liberal institutions, and the franchise for the Polish Diet compared favorably with that then established in England. But the Tsar's enthusiasm was easily cooled, and the warmth of his liberal idealism evaporated as he came in contact with the persuasive Metternich. He was discouraged by domestic difficulties; troubles in Poland impressed him both with the ingratitude of a people and the dangers of a free constitution. When he died in 1825, he had become a convinced reactionary and his administration was dominated by a spirit of the most conservative repression.

Under his brother and successor, Nicholas the First, the pendulum swung still further away from liberalism. The new Tsar hated everything tinged with the democratic spirit, both because it seemed to him un-Russian and to savor of the West, which he detested, and also because he was unalterably convinced that for Russia an iron autocracy was an absolute necessity. An attempted rebellion at the beginning of his reign intensified his belief that his country could be ruled only with methods of severest repression, and for the next thirty years every



An Electoral Committee in Russia



breath of liberalism was ruthlessly crushed. Systematically and consistently the life of each individual subject was spied upon in order to eradicate anything that might lead to the introduction of the pernicious ideas of the Occident. The police, organized into the so-called Third Section, had powers almost of life and death. Besides those sent to die in Russian prisons, some one hundred and fifty thousand more were despatched to the mines of Siberia. It was altogether a reign of stagnation and servitude, and even Nicholas himself seems to have realized that it was a vast mistake. But he would never openly acknowledge his error, and to the last refused to alter the system: "My successor," he said on his death-bed, "may do as he pleases, I can make no change."

That successor, Alexander the Second, came to the throne at the moment of the great national disaster of the Crimean War. The previous reign had culminated in failure, in foreign as in domestic affairs, and a violent reaction became apparent so soon as the iron will of the Tsar Nicholas was removed. To this reaction, manifested almost for the first time in Russian history by the force of public opinion, Alexander proved to be susceptible and the first decade of his rule was one of far-reaching reforms. Of these the earliest, accomplished in 1861, was the emancipation of the serfs, who were liberated from the rule of the landowners and themselves became proprietors of the communal lands. The reform was not, it is true, complete nor satisfactory to the peasants. Regarding the land as their own, they found themselves compelled to pay for its acquisition; furthermore, the liberated serf secured only the house and lot on which he was living as his own personal property, for the lands surrounding the village became the property of the mir

and were owned by the community collectively. Formerly the serf of the landowner, the peasant thus became to all intents and purposes, the serf of the mir. As he was not permitted to leave the mir and seek his fortunes elsewhere, his newly acquired personal freedom often seemed little but a hollow mockery. The reform also left large quantities of land, which the peasants were certain to need as their numbers increased, in the hands of the nobility and the Crown.

But however unsatisfactory, the emancipation was a great moral victory for liberalism and undoubtedly paved the way for better things. It was succeeded in 1864 by another reform which led to the establishment of a certain measure of local self-government. This was the creation of local popular assemblies in the rural districts, known as zemstvos and shortly afterwards to the creation of municipal councils or dumas in the urban districts. Of the character and activities of these local assemblies more will be said later, for they contributed powerfully to the revolution of 1905 and provided the basis for the first national assembly; furthermore the elections to these assemblies accustomed the people to the exercise of some sort of a suffrage and thus made easier the establishment of a system of national elections in 1906.

Alexander, like his grandfather, found it impossible to carry his program of thorough reform through to successful completion. Vacillating and easily disturbed by the fear of granting too much power to his subjects, he was first driven back to a reactionary policy by the Polish revolt of 1863 and later by murderous attempts upon his life. The rise and rapid development of the Nihilist movement and the extension of the Nihilist policy of terrorism was met by redoubled activity and severity on the

part of the police. As time went on, the Tsar hesitated between an increase in repressive measures and a return to his earlier attitude of liberalism. Finally, in 1880, he decided upon a step of the greatest significance. On the advice of his minister, Loris Melikov, he decided to summon to a council representatives of the elective zemstvos and municipal dumas, a step which might be regarded as indicative of his intention of granting ultimately some form of constitution and national representative government. The summons was not yet made public when the Tsar went for his customary drive in the streets of Petrograd. A bomb was thrown at him by a Nihilist which failed to reach him, but as he left his carriage to look after the wounded, he was struck by a second bomb and torn to pieces. "The murderers had put back the clock in Russia for twenty-five years."

For the new Tsar, Alexander the Third, was not of the type to allow himself to be terrorized by the fate of his father into granting concessions. On the contrary, the assassination of the Tsar confirmed him in his natural conviction that in Russia autocracy was the sole guarantee of order, and severity the only method which promised security. Resolute and imperious by nature, convinced that liberalism was synonymous with anarchy, fearful of the subversive effect of western ideas of representative government, his reign of thirteen years was one of the most unqualified absolutism. It was not, however, a reign of stagnation, for there now began a period of intense industrial development which was destined to have far-reaching effects. Factories grew up and railways were constructed; new classes with new aspirations were born. In the towns the rise of an industrial proletariat like that of western Europe and a middle class

of rich factory owners and capitalists introduced new problems. For this new wine the old bottles of the Russian political system must necessarily prove entirely insufficient. When Nicholas the Second came to the throne in 1894 it was hoped that he might perceive the necessity of adjusting Russia to the new conditions. The flood of elements composed of factors all making for change could no longer be dammed. Reform or revolution began to be the issue.

Nicholas soon made it clear that he lacked the insight and the power to carry through reform on his own initiative. He announced his intention "to protect the principle of autocracy as firmly and unswervingly as did my late father of ever-living memory." When a local zemstvo suggested the desirability of introducing some sort of national representative institutions, he declared their proposals a "senseless dream" and caustically rebuked the presumptuous assembly. Repressive measures actually became more severe, and consequently disaffection more pronounced. The misery of the peasants increased. Their numbers, nearly doubled since the emancipation, found the land granted to them forty years before entirely insufficient; at the same time taxes were raised to provide for a stronger army and navy as well as the new railroads. "For the majority of the Russian peasantry," said an authority, "the primary object in life is to earn enough to pay the taxes, everything else is accident. The wonder is not at the lack of enterprise or thrift but at the endurance which enables men to toil along in the face of such conditions."

In the towns, the laborers, increasing in numbers, becoming educated in the school of industrial experience, began to imbibe the doctrines of socialism and to con-

stitute an active revolutionary force. In Poland, nationalist ambitions were sedulously fanned by conspirators who pointed out that Polish freedom could be attained only by revolt. To make matters worse, the Government proceeded to arouse disaffection in Finland by abrogating the constitution and depriving the Finns of the liberties which they had long enjoyed. There was present another element of revolution, neither economic nor national in character which was destined to play an active and necessary part in the coming political upheaval—an intellectual element. It was in vain that the Tsars had attempted to build a Chinese wall around Russia for the exclusion of foreign ideas. With the growth of the professional and educated middle classes there arose a factor capable of leading the movement for the destruction of the old vices of the Russian system and the creation of a new system built of better materials. Professors, lawyers, writers, and students found the atmosphere of oppression too stifling for endurance.

Quietly but none the less surely the current of liberal thought undermined the gigantic dike of autocracy. Supported by the economic and nationalistic elements of discontent it waited only an opportunity. That opportunity came in the defeat of Russian armies by the Japanese on the plains of Manchuria, and the destruction of Russian fleets at Port Arthur and Tsushima. An unpopular war waged, not in the interests of the Russian people but for the profit of a clique of corrupt bureaucrats, revealed at once the worthlessness and the weakness of the imperial Government. With the Japanese victories of 1905 the day of Russian revolution was at hand.

To appreciate the character of that revolution and that of the imperial Duma and electoral system which sprang

from it, we should pause a moment to consider certain institutions of an elective character which had already long been in existence in the Russian Empire. These institutions had not weakened the power of the autocracy, for the Tsar took good care that all local institutions should not acquire political character and that their functions should be of the most restricted sort. But it was by those who had experience in these organizations of local self-government that the lead in the revolution was taken, and without such experience the inauguration of a new national elective system would have been infinitely more difficult.

It must not be forgotten that when the revolution of 1905 broke forth, Russian society was still organized on the basis of the class system, which had persisted since the Middle Ages. There were three principal classes, the peasants, merchants, and gentry, each of which had its own separate organization and some degree of control over its own affairs. Numerically, of course, the peasants are by far the most important, for the foundation of the life of Russia is above everything else, agricultural. And in the communal life of the villages there still persisted at the end of the nineteenth century much of the old principle of self-government characteristic of the tribes of the eighth century.

The village, or mir, is the unit of government among the peasants, and after the decree of emancipation in 1861, was largely withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the land-owning nobility. Previous to that time the gentry, although they took no part in the village deliberations, naturally exercised the strongest pressure. That pressure, after 1861, was supplied by appointed officials of the central government; but the villagers still retained

their ancient assemblies. In principle, the mir is an independent and self-governing community, and its assembly consists of all the peasant householders. It has the general management of the property of the whole village, and since the central government did not want to be bothered with the care of infinite details, the responsibility of the peasants in their assembly was generally an actuality. It divided the village property, admitted new members, expended moneys, apportioned and collected the taxes.

It was this assembly which elected the village elder (starosta) who called the meetings and presided over them. He was entirely dependent upon the assembly, unable to rule without it, and when any major question arose would call a meeting. He was assisted by a village "Tenth Man," who is described as a sort of informal secretary, going around with a long pole and tapping at the window of each head of a house when a meeting was to be called. The Russian authority, Mr. Bernard Pares, describes a typical meeting: "We walk to the village green, where benches are placed and men are gathering. The women stand together within earshot; they are now entitled to hold land independently. The elected, a hearty, capable, brown-faced man, welcomes me with evident interest; we sit down on a bench and talk and smoke; when all the men are assembled the elected stands up. 'God has sent us a good time,' he says; 'shall we all go hay-making to-morrow?' As the pasture land is common and undivided, this question requires a meeting and during hay-making time there may be as many as three meetings a week. It must now be decided whether to-morrow is a suitable day, and if so, at what time the start should be made, and who should be set to

work on each part of the land. There is no vote-taking, only a general expression of opinion on each point. The meeting wavers for a while in deciding between four and four-thirty A. M. When everything is settled there is a kind of unanimous 'hurrah!' and the decision is ratified by general cries of 'Good Luck!' (literally, 'at a good time'). All face towards Rostoff, whose dome shines up in the setting sun, and the elected says a word of prayer. This is the only time when I have seen the conventional village chorus off the stage."

The next largest unit of self-government was the canton or volost, which is made up of the union of several mirs. The canton had an assembly representing some thirty villages, and consisting of delegates who are elected by the village assemblies. Each village sent one man from every ten houses to the cantonal assembly. The latter voted the salaries as well as the incidental expenses of the administration of the canton, and elected an elder and five peasants to serve on the law-court of the canton. The administrative authorities representative of the central government had supervision of the cantonal as of the village assembly, and all decrees and elections of the assembly were subject to the ratification of those officials. In the matter of legislation, in times of crisis the official might interfere with the most ordinary decrees, and at any time he was apt to step in with his veto if the assembly took up matters of political import. The rights of the elective assembly were not definitely fixed, and there was always a debatable ground between the authority of the representatives of the canton and that of the administrative officials.

In the elections for cantonal elder the assembly chose two or more candidates, and the administrative official,

the Land Captain, might confirm either or any of the candidates in the appointment; he was usually present at the election and his influence naturally went far towards determining its outcome. Again we may quote from Mr. Pares: "A large open space lies in front of the neatly built Court-house. The horses of the Land Captain stand outside. In the outer room there is a crush of dirty feet and a crowd of petitioners of all ages. The Land Captain sits at his table in the inner room. He has to wait from ten to one for the legal quorum of two-thirds to come in from the surrounding villages. Sometimes the meetings last a whole day. Here every eighth house chooses an elector and the village elders and tax-collectors come *ex-officio*. The list of all the members contains 116 names. . . . The first business is the election of the Cantonal Elder. By law a list of the candidates should be drawn up, but the Land Captain, on the excuse that many illiterates are present, has a rough and ready plan of his own. He recommends the nomination of a single candidate first and even directly suggests who he should be. He takes a vote on that name. Of course, even if the candidate gets a majority of the votes, the peasants are entitled to propose another; and perhaps in this next case even more will say 'yes' and even fewer 'no.' It is not that this meeting is any more directed than an ordinary committee meeting in England; but the difference is that the direction is official, and the Land Captain talks so often that the appearance of free choice is lost in an atmosphere of patronage and submission. The retiring elder, a simple, capable man with a quiet voice and a responsible manner evidently enjoys a considerable influence. There is a great deal of talking in groups, which is suddenly hushed when the election be-

gins. A rough ballot-box is put up outside the court-house; the Land Captain reverently covers it with a towel, but by watching the hands one can quite easily see which way a man is voting. The towel often falls off, but less frequently than one might expect."

The Land Captain now invited the naming of another candidate. "There is a unanimous chorus of discordant voices crying, 'The old one! the old one!' The name of the retiring elder is balloted. The Land Captain deals out a number of little balls which are put into a dish and handed out by the assistant clerk. Village by village each voter is called up; they are a motley train; orderly, but deeply interested, they crowd about the ballot-box; there is a rugged obstinacy about some of the faces, while others look smooth and cunning. One old peasant makes a bow to the Land Captain and passes on quite forgetting to vote; there is an outburst of rough laughter: 'He forgot.' Another crosses himself to the ballot-box as if it were an ikon, and then passes on. When the box is opened it is found that all said 'yes.' It is pretty clear why. The peasants want to reëlect their old favorite and they give him a unanimous vote in order that the Land Captain may have less excuse for finally naming the second candidate. . . .

"In a neighboring canton another elder has been chosen; he and his new colleague now go together to the church, where there is no one but the priest, an able and rather stately-looking person, who recites the formula of the Cantonal Elder's oath. The two peasants, with their hands raised, repeat the oath after him, word by word; it is mostly about fidelity to the Emperor. At the end the priest blesses them with a copy of the Gospels and with the cross, and then gives an excellent explanation

of their moral responsibilities, especially counseling them to work for the diminishing of drunkenness as the root of all sorts of trouble. The two listen earnestly, cross themselves, and quietly go off to their work."

The Cantonal elder received a salary ranging from \$300 to \$500 and during his three years of office must give up his regular affairs to attend to the business of his district. In cantons where political ambition did not seem to be dangerous, the elders were allowed a comparatively free hand by the Government. But in turbulent districts, and especially in recent years the Land Captain began to exercise a close supervision. As a clerk said to Mr. Pares, the elder "can follow the way that is marked out for him; there is his power."

The class of the gentry was descended socially from the bands of "companions" who followed the princes in the early days of Russian history, and who as "Boyars" became state officials. Their services were, as in other countries, rewarded with grants of land, but their dependence on the sovereign was always definite. The Tsar Paul once declared that there was no one of consequence in Russia except him to whom he himself spoke, and that only while he was speaking. But under Alexander the First the nobility became more independent. With the emancipation of the serfs the landowning nobility lost their serfs and half of their land, and were thus largely removed from contact with the peasants. Many left the country districts entirely and went to live in the towns. As a class they can hardly be said to have been extreme reactionaries. As in France before the Revolution of 1789, many of them thought deeply on questions of politics and economics and were sympathetic with schemes of liberal reform.

Like the peasants, the gentry were organized. The gentry of the district met to elect their Marshal. These district Marshals elected a Marshal of the gentry for the entire province. The Marshals met to discuss the needs of the province and look after the needs of their own class which were sometimes acute. Sons of the poorer gentry were thus supported by a class tax; minors were looked after; charitable institutions for the poorer gentry in towns were provided. The Marshal of the gentry in a province was generally consulted on the appointment of the Land Captains and discussed matters of importance in his province with the administrative officials. He possessed little actual power. His chief business and responsibility lay in his presidency of the zemstvo assembly.

The latter institution, as we have seen, was inaugurated by Alexander II in 1865. It was a local assembly in which representatives of the two classes, both peasants and gentry, might meet. The reforming Tsar adhered to the old units of administration as well as to the old class system. In each zemstvo there were to be so many representatives of the peasants, who must themselves be peasants, and so many representatives of the gentry. The exact number was fixed by law. A zemstvo assembly was established for each district of old Russia and one for each province or government.

At the time of the revolution of 1905 each zemstvo consisted of a representative council and of an executive board. It was made up of five different classes of members: the large landed proprietors, nobles owning approximately six hundred acres of land, who sat in person; delegates of the lesser landholders, who also included the clergy in their capacity of landed proprietors; delegates

of the wealthier townsmen; delegates of the less wealthy urban classes; delegates of the peasants. The classes in the zemstvo may thus be roughly classified into rich gentry, poor gentry, tradesmen, townsmen, and peasants. In the provincial districts there was little difference between the tradesman class and the townsman class. The representatives of the peasants were chosen indirectly; they elected delegates in the mir, who in turn elected the cantonal representatives. The honor was apparently not greatly sought: it is said that a peasant would give vodka all around in order to escape election; but if chosen he could not refuse to serve. From the two dozen or so elected from the different cantons the Governor chose ten to be members of the zemstvo. The others formed a supplemental list from which vacancies might be filled. The Marshal of the gentry of the province was *ex officio* president of the zemstvo and the district Marshals sat as members *ex officio*.

At the time of its first organization the zemstvo was given wide powers in connection with the incidence of taxation and for organizing the economic and social development of the districts and province. Much of these powers was later taken from it during the reaction under Alexander III. Nevertheless, the zemstvos accomplished work of great importance in improving the material condition of the country and in such matters as education. They were also, despite their lack of political function, valuable schools of political education. They were to take the lead in the first revolution and they furnished a model for the first national electoral system instituted in Russia.

It was not until 1870 that the municipalities were given representative assemblies corresponding to the

zemstvos in the country districts. These municipal dumas, or town councils, were chosen on a restricted suffrage, based always upon the class system, which assured the central government that they would not prove to be a force of democratic development. The system was not unlike that of Prussia. All owners of houses, merchants, artisans, and laborers were enrolled on lists according to the amount of their assessed wealth. The total valuation was divided into three parts, representing three groups of electors. Naturally the first group was small in numbers, and the third extremely large. Each of these groups sent an equal number of delegates to the дума. Electors must be twenty-five years of age and Russian subjects who had passed a certain term of residence in the municipality. Women were excluded from the direct exercise of the franchise, but those who owned property might be represented by their nearest relatives. Learned and trading societies were given the right to choose special representatives, and in general this was the only means by which the ordinary educated citizen engaged in a profession could enjoy the franchise. Many professors in the universities, for example, could not vote. In 1902 the franchise of Petrograd was slightly liberalized by the establishment of a lodger suffrage, which gave the vote to lodgers who paid a rent of approximately \$900 a year. Obviously democracy gained little by the change.

There were many exclusions which still further narrowed the municipal franchise. Priests, men excluded from government service, persons excluded from the class to which they had formerly belonged, and persons under police supervision were all refused the vote. The

last provision, of course, enabled the Government to disfranchise any one it chose.

The elections were held in the town hall, the mayor acting as chief electoral official and returning officer, and were conducted on the ballot system with at least theoretical secrecy. In the larger towns polling stations were established. The number of members to be elected varied. In the capitals, such as Petrograd and Moscow, they numbered about 150; in towns of 100,000 there were some eighty members. In the smallest municipalities the дума consisted of about twelve members.

The mayor of the municipality was chosen by the дума, as was the council board which served as an executive commission. Officials for the performing of various local functions were elected by the дума, which thus served not only as a representative assembly in the town but also as a sort of electoral college. As in the case of the zemstvos, the functions of the municipal dumas were entirely economic and social in character. They were allowed no political activities, and whenever their economic organization threatened to become too effective, they were closely restricted by the officials of the central government. In 1892 and 1894 they were subordinated to the provincial governors. In the case of the larger municipalities they were largely independent of the zemstvos; the dumas of the smaller towns, however, were under the control of the rural assemblies.

Such in its broad lines was the system by which the people of Russia, despite the autocracy of Tsarism, carried on their local affairs. It was not a system which permitted the exercise of anything like political liberty. And yet it had in it the essence of democracy, and could

it have developed on better soil, it might have resulted in gradual expansion which would have secured for Russia a free national government. Such a fortunate consummation was denied.



Russian Voters at the Polls



CHAPTER XXVII

RUSSIA: ELECTIONS TO THE IMPERIAL DUMA

DESPITE the narrow franchise and the restricted character of Russian local institutions of self-government, they had taught the people something of political forms and accustomed them roughly to the exercise of the suffrage in a small degree. Hence, when the revolutionary movement of 1905 came to a head it found the people to a certain extent prepared. The object of that movement, in its broadest sense, was simply to bring the Russian people into closer touch with the Tsar and to give them a responsible share in the government. This was to be accomplished by the creation of a nationally elected assembly. The idea of such an assembly was not totally strange. Michael Romanov, who had established the reigning dynasty, had been called to the throne by a national council. Similar councils had since been convened. Catherine II had called one together in 1767, although she took good care that it played no part in politics. Every one remembered that early in the reign of Alexander I, his adviser, Mikhail Speranski, had planned an imperial Parliament, of which the upper chamber had indeed been realized; and nine years later, when Alexander opened the first Polish Parliament, he had hinted at the intention of establishing a similar institution for Russia. Again, the plan of Loris Melikov, approved by Alexander II on the very morning of his assassination in

1881, had called for a sort of national convention of members elected by the zemstvos and municipalities.

When the disasters of the war in Manchuria, combined with the misery of the country, had finally made it plain that drastic changes in the form of the imperial government were necessary, it was the zemstvos that took the lead. The bureaucrats were obviously shaken by the failure of their foreign policy, and impressed by the universal sympathy manifested towards the cause of the revolutionaries at the time of the assassination of Von Plehve, in July, 1904, a man who stood as the personification of reaction. It was thus with the tacit consent of the police that in November of that year a general congress of representatives of the zemstvos and municipal dumas was held at Petrograd to discuss the situation. M. Shipov, President of the zemstvo board of Moscow, was chiefly responsible for the conference and largely directed the drafting of the program of reforms which were considered necessary.

That program included requests for wider guarantees of personal liberty, an extension of the system of local self-government, and above all a national representative assembly. The universal enthusiasm excited by this program in the country at large, made it obvious that the zemstvo conference was the true mouthpiece of the nation. Soon afterwards a number of conferences, representative of all classes and professions, was organized, all of them expressing without any uncertainty the necessity of reforms, and above all of "The Reform," the admission of popular representatives to a share in the government.

The Tsar, however, while he lacked the resisting force of his father, sought to evade the issue, and his chief

minister, Prince Mirski, who was not believed to be illiberal, was undermined by the reactionary bureaucrats. Thus the answer of the Government to the popular demands in December contained no mention of a national assembly. Agitation continued and developed into open violence. The slaughter by Cossacks of the "Bloody Sunday" crowd, led by Father Gapon, was followed by bomb-throwings and assassinations on the part of the revolutionaries. Strikes were organized and peasant jacqueries developed. With the murder of the Grand-duke Sergius and the resignation of Mirski, the Tsar issued a manifesto reaffirming the principle of autocracy.

Mirski's successor, Bulyguin, himself a reactionary, was, however, not slow to perceive that some concessions must be made, if the safety of the dynasty were to be assured. He therefore persuaded Nicholas to issue a rescript, in which he stated his intention of summoning the representatives of the people to aid in "the preparation and examination of legislative proposals." And, somewhat to the surprise of all parties, a commission of inquiry was established to consider methods for carrying this promise into effect. When, on the 6th of June, a second congress of zemstvos sent their delegates to the Tsar, he again promised the convocation of a National Assembly. On the 6th of August, 1905, the new law was finally published. It was known as the Bulyguin Law, from the name of the Minister of the Interior, to whom the drafting of the manifesto had been intrusted and who presided over the commission responsible for its preparation.

From that commission representatives of the zemstvos had been excluded, so that the system of elections now promised was the result of official ideas and, as might

have been expected, represented in character an unwilling concession dragged from the reactionaries. It was designed to prevent the choice of true popular representatives, to result in the creation of a sham assembly, and, in the event, naturally failed to satisfy the hopes and demands of the people.

The basis of the new electoral system, according to the Bulyguin Law, was the division of the Russian population into the three classes which we have already studied: the district landowners or gentry, the townsmen or merchants, and the peasants. Elections for the national Duma were to be indirect, each class meeting separately and choosing its own electors. In the first class were to be included those who as "high gentry" possessed the suffrage in the zemstvos, and also representatives of the lesser landed gentry and the priests, who were chosen in a preliminary assembly. This class also included inhabitants of towns which had no separate representation, who, by the ownership of real property or as capitalists and manufacturers, satisfied a high qualification of wealth. Voters in the class of townsmen, in towns which had separate representation, were qualified in the same way by the possession of property, landed or industrial, of considerable value, and by payment of taxes on lodgings. In Petrograd and Moscow, owners of real estate, in order to qualify, must pay in taxes twice as much as the amount required in other towns. Electors of the peasant class were to be chosen in the local peasant assembly of the canton. Special exclusions from the franchise were insisted upon. Soldiers in active service, police, and students were all disfranchised, as well as so-called nomad aliens. In any case, a man to vote must be twenty-five years of age.

The process of election as ordered, was complex. For the peasants there were four stages in the election that must be passed: first the peasants must elect their cantonal assembly; they then were to make in that assembly a second choice of representatives, who balloted for members of the electoral college, which in the fourth and final instance was to elect the members for the Duma. For the smaller landowners there were three stages: they elected their representatives, who were to meet with the larger landowners to choose members for the electoral college, which in turn elected the members for the Duma. For the larger landowners and the townsmen there were two stages: the choice of the electoral college and the election of the members for the Duma.

When the electoral colleges were convened, in the chief town of each province, the peasant electors were first to meet by themselves to choose a peasant member to the Duma. Afterwards, all the electors were to choose the rest of the members allotted to that particular province by law. Conduct both of the preliminary elections and of the proceedings in the electoral college was to be handed over to officials of the government. The primary assemblies were to be presided over by the mayors of the smaller towns and the marshals of the gentry. The final elections were to be placed in the hands of the provincial governors and the city prefects. Voting was to be by ballot.

Had such a plan of elections been presented by the Government of its own free will and before the disasters of the Japanese war, it would probably have been accepted with gratitude. But the time had passed when the people could be satisfied with such a mere appearance of political power as this law promised. The elections

were to be in the hands of the bureaucracy. The law excluded absolutely all the workingmen and a large proportion of the professional classes. Petrograd, with a population of more than a million and a half would have had less than ten thousand voters. Unsatisfactory as was this system of elections, the promised Duma was even more disappointing. According to the new law, the national assembly was not to be a real legislature, but merely a consultative body; it was to have only the right to examine and not pass upon legislative proposals, which were to be enacted by the imperial will as heretofore.

In the bitterness of their disappointment the Russian people resolved to bring new pressure upon the Government, and in October, 1905, a general strike was proclaimed. The whole mechanism of modern civilization stopped. Railways no longer were operated, commerce was at a standstill, shops were closed, lighting plants shut down, and the financial system of the nation threatened to collapse. Finally the Government was forced to yield, at least in appearance, and on October 30, 1905, the Tsar issued the famous manifesto in which he promised to grant "the immutable foundations of civic liberty," freedom of speech, of conscience, of association, and without delaying the elections "to enfranchise as far as possible those classes of the population which are at present totally deprived of the suffrage, leaving to the newly established legislative institutions the further development of the principle of universal suffrage." The concession seemed to be of the greatest significance; not only were all the people to participate in the election but their representatives were to have the power, apparently, later to develop the new constitution along democratic lines.

It is true that the extremists on both sides raised protests and the manifesto by no means aroused universal enthusiasm. The reactionaries, organized under the name of the "Union of the Russian People," began to counter the violence of the terrorists by atrocities of their own, insisting that extermination of the revolutionaries would alone save the empire from anarchy. On the other hand, the liberals of the zemstvos, who began to take the name of Constitutional Democrats, insisted that the constitution ought not to be "granted" by the Tsar, but should rather be drawn up by a constituent convention and owe its origin to the people. Despite the disorder which continued, the Government, now under the control of Count Witte, continued its plans for the election of a Duma, and on December 24, 1905, the new electoral law was promulgated.

The main features of the Bulyguin law were retained as a working basis for elections, but were liberalized to a considerable degree. The property qualification was lowered and the franchise thus extended to classes which would have been excluded under the law of August. Workingmen were admitted to the suffrage, and in the towns, all who paid house and lodging taxes were given the vote. In all factories which employed more than fifty men the workmen were to elect delegates, who had the right to choose members of the electoral college of the province. The land-owning class of voters was extended by admitting all those who rented or cultivated land. Representatives of Churches were given a vote either as property holders in towns, or as small land-owners in the provinces. Employees in the government service, or in service of the zemstvos and municipal dumas were enfranchised as town voters.

By these extensions the right to vote was given to the vast majority of the people. It was not strictly a democratic system, for voting was indirect, subject to official control, and unequal. But the only persons absolutely deprived of voting rights were women, workingmen in very small factories, casual laborers, and peasants without any property, in addition to the exclusions common to all countries, such as minors, aliens, criminals, and similar classes. Notwithstanding the advance made towards a liberal system, the revolutionaries of the advanced type resolved that in order to express their dissatisfaction they would boycott both elections and Duma.

It resulted that the liberals of the zemstvos, who represented the adherents of a moderate democracy, were able to control the first elections held in March and April of 1906. Organized under the name of Constitutional Democrats, and soon nicknamed Cadets from the initial letters of their party (K. D.), they included the flower of the "Intellectuals," or "Intelligence," and it was to them that the mass of liberal opinion, both in Russia and without, looked for the development of a form of government which should be at once stable and free. The Cadets were roughly divided into two sub-parties, of which the one desired to act with the revolutionaries in the fight against reaction, while the other desired to remain quite independent of the terrorists. The less advanced section was in favor of an assembly with two chambers, while the more democratic desired a unicameral assembly; the former was firm in its belief in a constitutional monarchy, while the latter looked for the ultimate creation of a republic.

Both sections of the Cadets advocated the granting of civic rights to all citizens and the immediate establish-

ment of universal suffrage, equal, secret, and direct. Both also believed that the non-Russian parts of the empire should be granted autonomy, and also representation in the Duma. On the agrarian question they demanded more land for the peasants, which should be supplied by the government out of Crown lands and from private estates, secured through compulsory sale at a fair price. Above all, they insisted that the new Duma must have real authority in the government, and that the principle of ministerial responsibility must therefore be enforced. Unless the ministers were responsible to the popular representatives, rather than to the Tsar, the power of the people would be merely titular.

Although they did not form an absolute party unit, the Cadets were sufficiently at one to carry on a successful campaign during the first elections. The electoral system was clumsy and the Government officials themselves did not know how to direct elections in favor of the conservatives. The prime minister, Witte, refused to allow the police to interfere with repressive measures and the people were given a chance to voice their real opinions. Alone, of all the parties, the Cadets possessed something of an organization, and even in districts where they lacked a majority they profited by the disorganization of their rivals, and by party compacts they secured more than their share of delegates. The radicals, who at first had determined to boycott the elections, when they saw how things were going, came out to the polls and threw their votes against the conservative elements.

It resulted that when the Duma was opened on May 10, 1906, the Cadets were found to number in their ranks no less than 184 members; they were supported by some 60 other members representing nationalistic groups who

advocated autonomy for the non-Slavic portions of the empire. There were about twenty-five Socialists, who favored a democratic republic, the transformation of the Duma into a constituent assembly for the accomplishment of immediate reforms, universal suffrage, and the settlement of the agrarian question according to the doctrines of Carl Marx. There were some eighty-five members known as Leftists, who occupied a middle position between the Cadets and Socialists, and about one hundred members who were classed as non-party, but who were opposed to the existing administration. There was thus an overwhelming majority of members who favored a régime at least as democratic as that of the countries of western Europe; many of that majority advocated putting into practice principles of advanced social democracy, and all of them believed in the principles of ministerial responsibility and universal suffrage.

On the other hand, the adherents of the ancient autocracy were few. Of the extreme reactionaries, only one or two were elected to the Duma, and there was only a small and disorganized group of members of the Right, who advocated the maintenance of the autocracy and the continuation of the Duma as an institution of State and not as a representative assembly.

Between this group, which drew its adherents from the rich bourgeoisie, the less reactionary bureaucrats, and the conservative peasants, stood the Octobrists, who took their name from their desire to stand absolutely upon the Tsar's manifesto of October. Numbering only 38 in the first Duma, they believed in the law-making powers of a Duma, but did not advocate ministerial responsibility; they did not refuse universal suffrage, but desired to safeguard it by indirect voting. Opposed to reaction

as to revolution, they aimed above everything else at supporting a strong government, which should be powerful enough to preserve order and the unity of the empire, and by its efficiency compel the legal support of the nation. This party included men of great strength and worth, such as Shipov and Guchkov, who had taken part in the zemstvo conference of 1904 and had been the first to demand the convocation of a Duma.

But if the old-style government was thus opposed by an overwhelming majority in the popular assembly, the bureaucrats were sure to find support in the upper chamber or Imperial Council. The latter, according to the Tsar's manifesto of March 5, 1906, was to consist of an equal number of elected members and members nominated by the Tsar; together with the Duma it was to be convoked and prorogued annually by imperial ukase. The two assemblies were to have equal powers in initiating and passing legislation and in questioning ministers. The arrangements for the election of members to the Imperial Council made it clear that the Government expected to find little opposition in that body. Elective members of the Council were to be eligible for nine years, one third retiring annually. Each zemstvo in every province was to elect one member. Six would be chosen by the Synod of the Orthodox Church, six by the representatives of the Academy of Science and the Universities, twelve by those of the Bourses of commerce and industry, eighteen by those of the nobility, and six by those of the landed proprietors of Poland. These latter would meet for the election at Warsaw; the representatives of the other bodies concerned were to be convened at Petrograd. In the provinces of European Russia where there were no zemstvos, a congress of landed proprietors was to

assemble in the chief town of each province to elect a member for the Imperial Council, representing the province. All members of the Council must have attained their fortieth year and must have academical degrees. Elected members were to receive an honorarium of twenty-five roubles a day during the session. The President and Vice-President of the Council were to be appointed by the Tsar. Members of the Council as well as of the Duma were assured personal immunity during the session and would be liable to arrest only with the consent of the House to which they belonged, except in the cases of flagrant offenses or of offenses committed in the exercise of their duties.

Laws voted by the two Houses were to be submitted for the Imperial sanction by the President of the Council. If, while the Duma was not sitting, an emergency should arise which seemed to call for immediate legislation, the ministers might lay the matter before the Tsar for decision. A measure thus decided upon could not involve any change in the fundamental laws of the Empire, the regulations governing the procedure of either House, or the conduct of elections; and it was to be provisional, pending its authorization by the Duma during the first two months of the next session. If the Duma should not attend to it, the provisional measure was to remain in force.

Had the Government been able to decide to act with the Cadet majority in the first Duma, the progress of moderate liberalism might have been assured. A ministry composed of the more conservative members of that party, with a few Octobrists interspersed, might doubtless have remained in control of the assembly, and the success of the new constitutional régime might have been

attained. But the Government could not bring itself to resign its absolute power or impair the autocracy. Witte, who had always desired to give the Duma the form without the reality of a Parliament, resigned just before its convocation; but his successor, Goremykin, was equally determined to fight the adherents of constitutional democracy, and his first act was to issue in the name of the Tsar, certain "organic laws," which could not be touched by the popular assembly.

It resulted that the life of the first Duma extended over barely two months. The Tsar in his opening speech from the throne, evaded the issue, as had done Louis XVI at the beginning of the French Revolution. He simply stated that he would watch over the stability of the institutions he had granted, that "order based on right" as well as liberty, was essential to the welfare of the State, and he concluded with the prayer that the Almighty might help him and the Duma so that he might "see his people happy" and bequeath to his son as his inheritance "a firmly established, well-ordered and enlightened state." The deputies desired something more definite than these vague phrases, and soon entered into bitter struggle with the Government in their desire to attain it. The contest came to a head over the question of ministerial responsibility, and by July had reached a stage of the most acute bitterness. The confusion was increased by the turbulent attitude of the Socialists, who declared frankly that the mission of the Duma ought not to be legislation, but rather to prepare a revolution.

In the country at large the parliamentary deadlock was leading to the spread of agrarian and labor disorders and mutinies, and to the growth of an extreme party among the peasants, which demanded the whole of the

land of the country without any payment whatever. By the middle of July it was clear that so long as the ministers were chosen from the bureaucracy, the efforts of the Duma would be fruitless. The Emperor would not appoint a responsible ministry, and the only alternative was a dissolution, which was finally announced by imperial ukase on July 21. The ukase fixed March 5, 1907, as the date for the convocation of a second Duma and elections were to be held during the weeks immediately preceding.

Upon one point the Tsar and his advisers, now headed by Stolypin, were determined, namely, that the electoral law of 1905 must be manipulated in such a way as to prevent new elections from giving the overwhelming majority to the adherents of constitutional democracy which they had secured in the elections for the first Duma. Frankly to alter the electoral law at this time seemed unwise, in view of the definite wording of the October manifesto, which established as an "unalterable rule that no law can have any force without the consent of the Imperial Duma . . ." and which had been later incorporated in the fundamental laws of March, 1906. Stolypin, however, planned to restrict the provisions of the existing law in such a way as to prevent the election of liberal members. This was accomplished with the aid of the article of the law which declared that interpretations of doubtful points were to be made by the Senate and that the decision of this body was final.

Accordingly, on October 15, 1906, the Senate, by order of the Tsar, gave interpretations which had all the effect of a new law, and which were all directed towards limiting the franchise. The most important of these was that which defined the peasant voter. The Government had


hoped that the peasants, especially if bribed by a promise of more land, would prove a strong bulwark of support for the old régime. But the peasants had elected as their representatives men of peasant origin certainly, but persons who had become members of the "Intelligence": school teachers, doctors, agricultural experts. They were not actual peasants in the sense of being cultivators of the soil, but were closely in touch with peasant conditions and fully equipped to represent the real peasants. These men had voted against the Government in the first Duma, and they were now disfranchised in thousands by the Senate's ruling that in order to vote, a peasant must not merely belong to a peasant commune, but must be at the head of a family actually engaged in farming. Another interpretation excluded from the category of small landowners all persons of peasant origin who had bought land in the district and thus become independent landowners. This class had proved to be radical in politics, and by excluding it from the electoral assembly of landowners in which the large conservative landowners voted, the latter were given a predominating voice in this category of voters.

Another interpretation disfranchised a large number of the radical workingmen voters in the towns, by declaring that a workman must have a hearth of his own in order to exercise the suffrage. Many of the Russian laborers and artisans lived together in barracks provided by the factory owner, and the effect of the interpretation was to exclude all of them from the franchise.

When it came to the elections themselves, the Government took every opportunity of interfering in order to exclude liberals from the polls, and to perpetrate tricks which would lead to the election of reactionaries. A

large number of the Cadet members of the first Duma had protested against its dissolution by a manifesto signed in Viborg, across the bay from Petrograd in Finland. They were all brought under indictment by the Government and therefore, according to law, were made ineligible for participation in the second elections. The Government took good care that the trial should not be completed before the date set for elections, and the Cadets' trial was still pending even when the third Duma was elected. This group contained the best political ability of any of the liberal parties. The eminent Cadet, Miliukov, was also excluded on a technical charge, as well as Kovalevsky, who was declared ineligible because his janitor had given the wrong date for the signing of the lease for his apartment. When a new party, the National Socialists, formed at this time and desirous of having an open organization free from conspirative tendencies, handed in a request to be registered, its members were at once indicted for belonging to an illegal and revolutionary society and were thus excluded from the elections. The Cadets were refused registration as a regular party, and thus were prevented from organizing party conventions or publishing official lists of their candidates. The list of the Cadet candidates in Moscow was published as coming from two private individuals, in the form simply of a personal recommendation.

Police interference in the course of the second elections was constant. A representative of the local police authority was present at each meeting, and upon his decision that the meeting was carrying on an illegal discussion, it could be immediately closed. The sergeant frequently would stop every speaker until adjournment was necessary. Or he would interpret the mention of



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the word "terrorism" as an approval of the terroristic policy. In some instances, if the word "bureaucrat" was used it was regarded as "resistance to authority," and the meeting would immediately be compelled to adjourn. A provision of the law declared that electors arriving late at the electoral assembly would not be admitted. It was not difficult for the police to detain radical electors on some pretext and thus definitely exclude them from the voting.

Notwithstanding the interpretations of the Senate and the influence of the police during the elections, the latter did not result in a majority for the Government, and the radical parties actually gained. But the second Duma was younger and contained less political ability than the first. The peasant members were less educated, and the moderates, in whom the hope of Russia rested, were weakened materially in numbers. Speaking broadly, the elections strengthened the extremes. In the parties of reaction there were 7 members of the extreme Right and 56 of the moderate Right, all standing for the autocracy. The Octobrists sent 34 members to the second Duma, and the Cadets 117, against 184 in the first Duma. The Radicals of the Left had increased their numbers to 97 and the Socialists to 83.

With such an increase of the forces of extreme democracy it was not likely that the second Duma could prove more successful than the first. It was true that Stolypin was far superior as a constitutional minister to his predecessor, but there was not at any time any possibility of coöperation between the Duma and the Government. Both the extreme Right and the extreme Left were opposed to such coöperation; all the debates and resolutions of the Duma could obviously have no effect and Stolypin

was soon anxious to find a suitable opportunity for bringing them to a close. That opportunity came in July, 1907, when he asked that nearly all the Socialist members be suspended, saying that otherwise he could not be responsible for the maintenance of public order and safety. The Duma refused to grant the request, deciding by a large majority to refer the proposal to a committee, in order to afford the Government a chance of presenting evidence of the guilt of the inculpatated members. But before the committee could meet, the Duma was dissolved by an imperial ukase of June 16, 1907.

The manifesto promulgating the dissolution of the second Duma was accompanied by a rescript which infringed upon one of the essential guarantees given in the Russian constitution, and which made of no effect the formal promises of the Tsar, for it altered the law of elections without the consent of the Duma. In the previous year Stolypin had violated this promise in spirit with the aid of a complaisant Senate. But the "interpretations" of 1906 had failed of their purpose and had not broken up the liberal majority. The new law of elections was frankly designed to provide against the election of a third Duma controlled by radical members. The arbitrary alteration in the electoral law was defended by the Government on the ground that "the right of abrogating the electoral law and replacing it by a new law, belongs only to that power which gave the first law of elections—the historic power of the Tsar of Russia." In explaining the character of the regulations which should determine the voting for the next Duma, the rescript stated that as it was evident that the Duma, as then constituted, was "not truly representative of the needs and desires of the

people," the Tsar had considered it necessary to modify the procedure for choosing their representatives.

The modifications adopted were thorough and were scientifically arranged so as to give every possible electoral privilege to the conservatives and to prevent in every way the election of radical deputies. The two earlier elections had shown the chief sources of radical strength to lie in the towns, amongst the peasants, and in districts dominated by the non-Russian or "alien" elements, such as the Poles, Armenians, Mussulmans, and Tartars. It was the purpose of the new electoral law to reduce the electoral power of these elements.

In the elections for the first two Dumas the most important source of liberal power, perhaps, had been in the larger towns, where the radical parties had carried practically all the seats. The new law altered this state of affairs by dividing the town voters into two "curiæ"; in the first electoral curia were placed the large manufacturers and merchants, men of extensive property, who might be expected to vote solidly for conservative candidates. In the second electoral curia were placed the townsmen possessed of less property, who had shown themselves almost invariably to be liberals. The conservative minority, which had been snowed under in the towns in the first elections, was thus to be assured of representation. The number of electors assigned to the two sorts of curiæ was out of all proportion to the number of voters in each respective curia, the advantage always being given to the first or conservative. In some cases the first curia, although it contained a far smaller number of voters than the second, received as many or more electoral seats than were assigned to the second. In the province of Viatka, for example, each curia was

given two electors, although there were only 200 voters in the first curia and no less than 2,106 in the second.

In order to weaken the non-Russian vote, which was invariably liberal, in districts of mixed racial population, the new law allowed the Minister of the Interior, at his discretion, to make a subdivision in the electoral assembly of landowners. This subdivision might be by localities, by nationalities, or by categories based upon the franchise rights of the voters; in other words, it permitted the Government to gerrymander in favor of the strictly Russian population. Where, for example, the Russian element was in the minority, the Minister of the Interior would make a division, separating it from the other elements, thus saving it from being swamped by the votes of the "alien" elements. But where the Russian population was in a majority, he would make no division, and the non-Russian elements would have no representation whatever.

A far more important change, however, and one which was directed especially against the radical vote of the peasants, was that which altered the number of electoral seats assigned to the different classes of voters: the landowners, townsmen, and peasants. Since the two latter classes had shown themselves to be overwhelmingly liberal, it was essential from the Government point of view that the number of electors assigned them should be reduced and that more should be given to the conservative landowners. This was accordingly provided for in the new electoral law. An instance of how this alteration operated may be taken from the electoral history of the province of Saratov. In the elections for the second Duma there were in this province sixty-four peasant electors, four workingmen electors, thirty-five townsmen

electors, and fifty-one landowner electors. The liberals thus held a clear majority of the electoral seats, the peasants and townsmen outvoting the landowners. But the new electoral law reduced the number of electoral seats assigned to the peasants from sixty-four to twenty-seven, or by more than half; the workmen electors were reduced to two. Of the electoral seats assigned to the townsman class, eighteen were given to the first curia, almost certain to be conservative in its political color, and only twelve to the second curia. The landowner class received, instead of fifty-one electoral seats, no less than sixty-eight, and thus the assurance of a majority in the electoral assembly of the province.

In Viatka, which was essentially a peasant province, and one where the landowners were few in numbers, the original law had assigned 148 of the total 204 electoral seats to the peasant class; thirty-four had been given to the townsmen, and only eighteen to the landowners. The new law reduced the number of electoral seats given to the peasants from 148 to twenty-three, while the number of electoral seats assigned to the landowners was increased to fifty-three. So few were the landowner voters that in one district three of them chose eight electors. Altogether, in twenty-seven of the fifty-one provinces of European Russia, the landowners held an absolute majority; in the other twenty-four provinces they had a majority in combination with the electors of the first curia of the towns.

Other alterations of a less radical character increased the electoral power of the reactionaries. The new law provided that one member from each class must be chosen by the whole electoral assembly, instead of stipulating, as under the former law, that the peasant electors were to

choose by themselves a member from their own class. This novel regulation practically permitted the landowners to nominate one peasant deputy: with twenty-one liberal peasants and a single conservative peasant in the electoral assembly, the latter would be elected by the landowner majority. As regards the electors chosen by the workingmen in factories, the new law unduly favored the small factories where the spirit of the laboring class was less radical than in the large. Thus a factory of fifty employees was allowed the right to choose one elector while a factory of 2,999 chose only two electors. The result was that in the electoral assembly, the electors chosen from the small factories greatly outnumbered those chosen from the large.

The electoral power of the towns, the peasants, and the non-Russian elements was further reduced by a wholesale redistribution of seats in the Duma. The total number of seats was reduced from 524 to 442, the liberal districts being, of course, the ones to suffer loss of direct representation. The towns, as being centers of radicalism, found the number of deputies elected by them cut down materially: under the former law the twenty-five chief towns had all returned separate representatives; the new law allowed deputies to only seven, namely, Petrograd, Moscow, Riga, Kiev, Odessa, and Warsaw. The other eighteen towns were permitted only to choose delegates to the electoral assembly of the province.

All the separate "nationalities" suffered by the redistribution, the Poles most of all. The latter had held the balance of power in the second Duma, because of the equality of numerical strength as between the Left and the Center, and they now paid the penalty by a reduction in the number of their representatives from thirty-

seven to fourteen; and of the fourteen seats, two were reserved, the one to the Russian population of Warsaw, the other to the orthodox population of Lublin and Siedlice. This was simply carrying into effect the spirit of the Tsar's manifesto, which declared that as the Duma "ought to be Russian in spirit," the non-Russian nationalities "shall not appear in numbers which make it possible for them to be arbiters in questions which are purely Russian."

With the same intent the new law reduced the number of members elected by the Caucasus regions from twenty-nine to ten, and gave special electoral privileges to the Russian population. In the second Duma all the deputies from these parts had been Armenians and Georgians, and almost all of them were Social Democrats. Hence the reduction. The number of members from Siberia (which was now called Asiatic Russia), was reduced from twenty-one to fifteen. Central Asia which had returned thirteen and the Steppe region which had returned ten deputies, were both deprived entirely of representation. The Mussulmans, who had held thirty-one seats in the second Duma, lost heavily as a result of the new law. They were bound to be deprived of many deputies by the withdrawal of representatives from the regions where they were numerous, as in Central Asia, and they were also weakened by the division of nationalities in the districts where they formed a large percentage of the population.

The new electoral law of 1907 effectively fulfilled the purpose for which it was designed—that of preventing the election of another liberal Duma. The advantages provided for the conservative classes in elections and the difficulties thrown in the way of the radicals were too

great to produce any other result. The elections to the third Duma could not by any stretch of the imagination be called representative. The percentage of abstentions was very high; often the choice of delegates to the electoral college could not take place because the number of voters required by law did not present themselves at the polls. The lightness of the vote cast was due in part to the determination of the liberals to boycott the elections and thus to express their protest against the new law. It resulted chiefly, however, from the complexity of the new system and the consequent bewilderment of the voters. The sub-division of the electoral assemblies, especially, led to the practical disfranchisement of thousands who did not know to which sub-division they belonged. In some provinces there were no less than twenty-five different categories of voters. There were the peasants, the large landowners, various separate categories of small landowners, two town *curiæ*, workmen, and Cossacks; all of these, except the clergy and the Cossacks, were further subdivided according to nationality. Often the subdividing of an electoral assembly was decided upon only a few days before the election. The date and place of the election were published only in the official papers, which were read by few of the peasants; no bulletins were posted and no notices of the elections were sent to the voters. Many heard of the date and place of the election only by word of mouth, and in not a few cases only after the election had already taken place.

Under such circumstances government officials did not feel it necessary to interfere in the electoral campaign as they had done in the elections for the second Duma. There were comparatively few instances of corrupt practices, coercion, or undue influence, and the wholesale ex-



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clusions on technical grounds which had characterized the second election, were not repeated. There was no need, for the new law had already provided that the liberals should not have a chance.

When the third Duma met in November, 1907, it was seen at once what an alteration in party strength the new electoral law had effected. The elections had reduced the Cadets, the strongest party in the first and second Dumas from 117 to 46. On the other hand, the Right, representing reactionary ideals and totally opposed to constitutional government increased from 63 to 76. Members of the moderate Right and the Octobrists, who advocated a constitutional régime but neither a democratic assembly nor the responsibility of ministers to the majority in the Duma, numbered no less than 195 instead of 34 as in the second Duma. The parties of the Left, including the nationalist groups and the Social Democrats, which in the second Duma could muster as many as 219 votes, were cut down to a paltry 63.

The new Duma was thus controlled by the opponents of a democratic régime, with the Octobrists as the strongest single political group; the change was the result, not of any reaction in political feeling throughout the country, but simply of the Government's coup d'état, accomplished through the arbitrary and illegal alteration of the electoral law.

With the enforcement of the electoral law of 1907 and the choice of the third Duma, interest in the Russian Imperial electoral system is naturally extinguished. The third Duma passed through its five-year term without meeting the violent death of its predecessors, and in 1912 was succeeded by the fourth Duma, which was chosen in the election of October, 1912. But neither the Imperial

Duma nor the election of 1912 possess any significance in the history of electoral democracy. Both were controlled by the bureaucrats and may be regarded as the merest camouflage—the one of an institution, the other of an elective system.

In the third Duma the Government found an obedient servile majority, which accepted, almost invariably without any demur, the laws and projects proposed by Stolypin, who appeared more and more clearly as the Russian Bismarck. Enlightened and progressive in many of his policies, he was arbitrary in his methods, self-willed, and, like his German prototype, entirely careless of whether or not he had a parliamentary majority behind him. At first he was supported by the moderate royalists and the Octobrists, who were led by Guchkov. They acted with the extreme Right, apparently as the willing agents of the bureaucracy, and were pliable instruments in such revolutionary policies as the destruction of the constitutional liberties of Finland.

Even the Octobrists, however, were appalled by the skill with which Stolypin controlled government without consideration of public opinion. They gradually perceived the danger threatened by his increasing disregard of constitutional rights. One of his maneuvers, particularly arbitrary in character, may serve to illustrate the power of the Administration, which seemed no less supreme than in the darkest days before the revolution of 1905. The Government had seen one of its legislative proposals rejected by the Imperial Council; whereupon Stolypin adjourned the Duma and the Imperial Council for three days in order to permit the Tsar to enact the proposals by ordinance. This blatant infraction or evasion of the constitution aroused a storm of protest from

the Duma, even from the Octobrists, who combined in a vote of censure upon the chief minister, which was passed 202-82. But the storm broke in vain upon the suave and unbending Stolypin.

It is true that certain reform measures were passed, such as the Religious Denominations' Act, which permitted every private citizen to withdraw from the established Church; the inauguration of Workingmen's Insurance, and above all the power granted the peasants of becoming owners of their land allotments. An increased budget for education marked another reform of importance. But these reforms were carried out by the Administration, and the Duma, with all its license of free speech, held merely the position of a debating society. It was with the exact facts of the situation in his mind, that the Minister of Justice could exclaim on the floor of the Duma: "Thank God! We have as yet no Parliament." Nor was the power of the administration materially weakened by the assassination of Stolypin in 1911.

An analysis of the legislative labors of the third Duma indicates the purely academic character of the body. The Government proposed and tried to have passed 2466 bills, from 1908 to 1912; the Duma proposed only 205 bills. Of the Government Bills the Duma dared to reject only 79, in all the five years of its life, or less than one in 300 of those presented. Of the Government Bills, 2,340 became law—ninety-five per cent. Of the bills brought in by the Duma only two became law—about nine-tenths of one per cent. At the expiration of the third Duma's term, the Cadet, Miliukov, said: "The five years of the third Duma have sufficiently clarified the situation. In order to acquire one single right—to *exist*,

the Duma had to become one of the wheels in the bureaucratic machine."

In October, 1912, took place the elections to the fourth Duma. They were marked by little excitement and the reactionary groups had it all their own way. The scandal of the election was the agitation carried on by the clericals, who made use of all the influence given them by their spiritual functions, in order to defeat all moderate monarchists. Their electioneering met with better success than it deserved, and resulted in a vast increase of strength for the extreme Right and the defeat of the Octobrists, who at last were beginning to protest against the slavery in which the Government kept the Duma. The Octobrists lost more than half a hundred seats, and could muster only 132 members, as against 195 in the preceding elections. Their leader, Guchkov, failed of election. The Right gained in even more striking fashion, increasing from 76 to 155. Other parties remained with almost unchanged strength, the Cadets gaining six seats, with a total of 52 deputies elected. In the large towns, particularly Petrograd and Moscow, the loss of the Octobrists was the gain of the Cadets. Despite the victory of the extreme Right, a coalition of Octobrists and Cadets resulted in the choice, as President of the Duma, of the Octobrist, Rodzianko, who later in 1917 was to take a prominent part in the overthrow of the Tsar.

The fourth Duma, despite the strength of the Right, was perhaps less servile than its predecessor, and at various times attempted to uphold the dignity of the representatives of the people. But it was quite as powerless. Dissatisfaction, which among the people of the cities was being more constantly voiced, and which betrayed serious movements that might take the form of social or

political rebellion, found an echo in the heart of the Duma, which passed the following platonic resolution: "The retention by the Minister of the Interior of the conditions of exceptional regulations, even after the restoration of peace, arouses dissatisfaction in the population and quite just feelings of indignation at the repressions which are obviously uncalled for. . . . The Duma insists upon the earliest promulgation of broad reforms." Conditions remained unchanged, however, and the parliamentarians who had been most optimistic in 1906, admitted their complete discouragement. "Should I be asked," said the Cadet leader Maklakov, "what my wishes for the Duma are, my answer would be: To perish with honor . . . rather than drag on a fruitless existence." The Octobrist Guchkov believed that a revolution was inevitable.

Such was the situation when the advent of war transformed the spirit of revolution into one of the highest and most selfless patriotism. The parties of the Duma forgot their discontent and their quarrels, and had the Government of Russia possessed the capacity, it would have found in the Duma the readiest and possibly the most competent of assistants and coadjutors. But by its very character, the bureaucracy was incapable of appreciating the opportunity given to it. It refused to the Duma the powers which it might have utilized for the victory of Russia, and it denied the necessary reforms in the military system, which were demanded by the Duma, and which were so obviously essential after the defeats of 1915. When, because of dark intrigues, the inner history of which has yet to be unfathomed, traitors and grafters, such as Stürmer and Protopopov, were called to direct destinies, all parties in the Duma stood ready to

protest and, if need be, to lead the revolution. Puriskewich of the reactionary Right joined with Miliukov of the Cadets to demand the purification of Government. And when the Tsar attempted to prorogue the Duma in March of 1917, the deputies, whatever their party ties or the method of their election, stood firm, as befitted representatives of the people, and refused to desert their post.

With the advent of the Provisional Government, and later of the Soviets, this history cannot deal. That subject is for the journalist or for the writer of the future. It may be that the last elections for Russia as a whole have been held, and that the future historian will deal with Finland, the Ukraine, Muscovy, and Siberia as separate entities. But should Russia ever become reunited, the experience of the Duma and of elections from 1906 to 1912 will be of value, not merely as a lesson in the holding of elections, but also, and perhaps chiefly, as a warning of the kind of system to be avoided.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN SCANDINAVIA


I. DENMARK

THE government of Denmark retained until the middle of the nineteenth century the absolutist character imparted to it by the Constitution of 1665, the *Kongelov*, or King's Law. That document has been said to have "the highly dubious honor of being the one written law in the civilized world which fearlessly carries out absolutism to its last consequences." In the nineteenth century, however, the strength of the King's power was partly forgotten because of the devotion and success with which the Kings of Denmark sought to promote the welfare of their subjects. Frederick VI, the ruler until 1839, was above all else a soldier, with little imagination, and with a self-esteem which ill brooked superior intellects among his companions. But he was a benevolent despot, blessed with ample humanity and political common sense. The respect and love of his people for their monarch made them contented with a degree of liberty which, though very small, was nevertheless larger than that enjoyed in Germany. In the years of blackest reaction south of the Elbe, the press of Denmark was comparatively free, and prison reform, compulsory education, and the English system of instruction were introduced. Reforms were carried out solely by the King for his people,

not by the people for themselves, for the latter had in 1661 granted away all right of participation in legislation through the meetings of the Estates.

Political life in Denmark felt the invigorating impulse of the revolutionary movements of 1830. Frederick's response to the desires of the Liberals was the Ordinances of 1831 and 1834, establishing four diets, one in each of the provinces of the realm—Schleswig, Holstein, Jutland, and the Islands. They were purely consultative and met but once in two years. The bills submitted to them were chiefly financial, regarding taxation and property. A few landowners, professors, and church officers were appointed by the King, while the remainder were elected from among burgesses and peasants by the landed proprietors. At the first elections over eighty per cent of the latter exercised the privilege of voting. The Danes hoped for still larger liberties from Christian VIII, who in his youth had been a highly educated, advanced Liberal. But like several other monarchs of his day, his discretion became excessive when he mounted the throne. He contented himself with making Denmark prosperous and well organized, leaving it to his successor to grant a constitution.

Within a week of his accession in January, 1848, Frederick VII granted the constitution, which, as modified the following year, changed Denmark from an autocracy to a limited monarchy with a representative Parliament. Though indolent and unstable, the King had won the hearts of his people by his democratic behavior as Crown Prince and his accessibility to all classes alike. He had further endeared himself by marrying a wife less well-born than himself, whose influence made him a constitutionalist rather than an autocrat in his sentiments.



A Russian Election



The Constitutions of 1848-1849 established a Rigsdag of two Houses; a Landsting, or Upper Chamber of 38 members, named by the Crown, and a Folkething of 114, elected by the nation. In 1866 at the end of the struggle over Schleswig-Holstein the constitution of 1849 was, after many vicissitudes, revived in slightly altered form, and was the basis of Denmark's electoral system until 1915. The Landsting was enlarged, and, except for twelve members still appointed by the King became elective. For the choice of the remaining fifty-four a successful device was hit upon for combining popular election with the special representation of property. The members were chosen by electoral colleges named, one half by all the voters, and one half by that part of them which had an income of 1,000 to 2,000 rixdalers annually. They were elected by proportional representation, a system which Denmark was the first country to adopt, although in 1866 Denmark used it only for elections to the Landsting.

The Folkething was to be elected by every native Dane, of honorable reputation, who had reached the age of thirty. Curiously enough a man could be elected five years before he was able to vote. The classes excluded from the suffrage were bankrupts, the recipients of state charity, persons under a guardian, and domestic servants who had no houses of their own. Deputies were chosen by single member districts, and, after 1901, by secret ballot.

In Denmark the Liberal party was recruited from the peasants and farmers who were in the majority in numbers; the Conservatives drew their strength from the towns. Following the disastrous war with Germany, the Danes turned their full attention to developing the re-

sources of their country, which were principally agricultural. With extraordinary zeal the Society for the Cultivation of the Heaths labored at turning barren moors into fertile meadows or fields, with such success that Danish agriculture became the most highly developed in the world. Denmark became one of the staple producers of butter, cheese, eggs, and bacon from her new stock-farms. She soon reached what many believe to be the limit to which her limited natural resources can be expanded. This phenomenal increase in prosperity was accompanied by rapid education of the masses, and by a very highly developed intellectual life among the middle class and the peasants. Besides the conservative, orthodox Lutheran group of thinkers, which exists everywhere in Scandinavia, she has produced critically negative, radical thinkers, like Georg Brandes, the noted author and historian. The tendency of this advanced school has been to ally itself with the aspirations of the socialistic laboring class, which has developed in the large towns, and which is often in conflict with the farmers. Such widespread prosperity, together with a high level of general education and a vigorous intellectual ferment, made it inevitable that Denmark should progress steadily on the path toward democratic government.

For forty years after the Constitution of 1861 political life was engrossed in the struggle of the Folkething to impose parliamentary responsibility upon the King and the Landsting. Like Bismarck, the bold, aggressive, Conservative minister, Jakob Estrup, ruled from 1885 to 1894 without any legal grants of the budget. In 1901, when the Conservative party in the Lower House had dwindled to eight against one hundred and six of the Liberals, Christian IX at last summoned a Liberal min-

istry with what grace he could muster. Since that year, the principle of government by parliamentary majority, although not firmly established, has gained consistently in strength.

Following the settlement of this absorbing question, the agitation for a more democratic franchise was begun. In 1908 the municipal franchise was extended to all male and female taxpayers. The most drastic change came in the constitutional reforms of 1915. The electoral sections of that legislation were sweepingly democratic. Henceforth no more members are to be appointed to the Landsting by the Crown. Its membership was raised to 72, 18 of whom were nominated by the outgoing Landsting. The remainder are elected by popular vote under a thoroughly democratic system of proportional representation. Both men and women twenty-five years old, including domestic servants, can vote, and the former special representation of heavy taxpayers has been abolished.


To the Folkething a number of new members were added who are elected by proportional representation. The system employed in Denmark is as follows. Before the seats have been allotted, the total number of votes cast is divided by the number of deputies to obtain the electoral quotient. The total vote of each party is divided by this quotient to see how many of the deputies it should have. It is then calculated how many seats each party actually won in the separate constituencies, and how many additional ones it needs to fill out its proper quota. Parties which returned no deputies at all from the constituencies get none of the additional seats, nor do those which returned their full quota. The additional seats which the other parties gain are awarded

within the party to those candidates who polled the highest number of votes and yet failed of election on the first distribution of seats. Women are entitled to vote and to sit in both the Folkething and the Lands-thing. The Constitution of 1915 is thus one of the most liberal on the continent.

II. SWEDEN

Like Denmark, Sweden preserved until the middle of the nineteenth century the assemblage of medieval estates, which it had had for hundreds of years. In Sweden these were four in number—nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants, meeting for short, irregular sessions and voting separately, so that legislation often fell to the ground through the pairing of the estates. The King in 1818 was Charles XIV, better known as Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals. During his reign his personal influence, exerted through an autocratic control of finance, a severe censorship of the press, and the control of the elections, repressed all attempts to alter the medieval parliament. A marvelous athlete, an accomplished tragedian, and a famous warrior, Bernadotte held throughout his life the devotion of a people whose language he could not speak. He loved to play the benevolent despot, and his subjects submitted to his absolutism without serious rebellion, because of the charm and fascination of the man.

Before the end of Bernadotte's reign, nevertheless, the tide of Liberalism was rising in Sweden, along with its advance in England and France. Englishmen established factories and colleges, and taught mechanics and agriculture in Sweden. English notions of parliamentary government entered with English cattle. Barriers be-



Björnsten Björnson



tween the classes had already lost their former significance. The inefficiency of the Parliament of separate estates and the need of modern legislation, which it could not or would not pass, inspired the Liberals to demand the bicameral system of England. Like so many other rulers of mid-century Bernadotte and his son, Oscar I, shrank from admitting a parliament to a share in the government, and sought by conservative reforms to cut the ground from beneath the Liberal opposition. They were supported by the two higher estates, who feared to lose their privileged position by parliamentary reform.

It was reserved for Charles XV (1859-1872) and his minister, de Geer, to introduce the long-sought reform of the Diet. Baron Louis de Geer, the penniless son of a well-known Dutch family in Sweden, made his mark as a young man, in his capacity as Minister of Justice, by urging Liberal measures upon the conservative King. His moderation, his high character, and his deep interest in the problem of reform won the confidence of the nation long before he was able to command the support of upper houses of the Diet. But in 1865-66, almost simultaneously with the reforms in Denmark, Sweden received a modern Parliament, consisting of two chambers.

The Upper House was thoroughly aristocratic because of the high property requirement for membership: the possession for three years before the election of property worth 80,000 kroner (\$22,400) or the payment of 4,000 kroner in taxes. If a member after election lost the required amount of property, he must resign his office. The members of the Upper House were elected for six years by the twenty-five provincial Landstings, or assemblies, and by the corporations of the five larger towns which had no Landstings. Here was indirect election and by a very

limited electorate. The franchise for the provincial assemblies was limited to owners of land worth one hundred kroners or of an income worth 500 kroners. Property was still more heavily represented by two peculiar methods in the Landsthings which chose the Upper House. In the cities an elector received a vote for every 100 kroner of income, up to one-fiftieth of the city's votes, or else one hundred votes. Primary electors in the country had ten votes for every 100 kroner of income with a maximum of 5,000 votes. Sometimes a proprietor disposed of half the votes of his district, and controlled the election more completely than is possible under the Prussian three-class system. Furthermore a voter might, as in England, cast as many votes as there were districts in which he fulfilled the property qualifications, an act made easy by the possibility of voting by proxy. So closely was the franchise linked with the possession of property, that even at this early date women property-owners could vote in the communes and control the elections, if wealthy enough.

The Lower House was chosen directly, but only by voters who had a fairly high property qualification, namely real estate valued at 1,000 kroner, a leasehold worth 6,000 kroner, or an income of 800 kroner a year. There was to be no plural voting. The Conservative party in the cities was given an advantage by the fact that they received a deputy for 10,000 inhabitants, while the Liberal peasantry in the country had one for 40,000.

So far as the suffrage question was concerned, the Constitution of 1866 did not break the deadlock, which had hampered the Estates. The first Upper House was chiefly composed of nobles and clergy, the conservative, wealthy, and educated classes; the Lower House corres-

ponded to the Estates of the burghers and peasantry; and friction between the Houses, quite as keen as in former days, continued for many decades. To the Liberals in the Lower Chamber were added after 1890 the Socialists, who demanded woman suffrage and the equalization of the franchise for all men. The Government began in 1896 to struggle with this knotty problem, but its program was blocked time after time by the Upper House, which jealously asserted its complete equality with the Lower. In 1901 the Liberals made electoral reform the first item in their program, and in 1902 the King in his throne speech assigned it the greatest importance. The great increase of taxes and military service after 1900 made it obvious that a broader suffrage would be necessary in all justice. The Conservatives, the Social Democrats, and the Liberals quarreled for upwards of five years for the credit of fathering the new suffrage law. For a decade the franchise question overshadowed all others, and at times nearly brought legislation to a standstill.

The Gordian knot was cut in 1907 by a compromise measure introduced by a Conservative ministry under Lindman, which, although denounced as inadequate by the Radicals, was liberal compared to the existing state of affairs. The Upper House was to some extent democratized. It is still elected by the provincial Landstings, but for a term of six, instead of nine, years, and by proportional representation. The local suffrage for election to the Landstings was liberalized by reducing the number of votes which a wealthy elector could cast, from one hundred in the towns and an unlimited number in the country, to a maximum of forty anywhere.

The two hundred and thirty members of the Lower House are elected by universal manhood suffrage and

according to proportional representation, in fifty-six districts, each of which is entitled to from three to seven representatives. By the law of 1907, reënacted in 1909, every man twenty-four years old and of reputable character can vote, except minors, bankrupts, and those who have evaded military service.

Proportional representation in Sweden offers an interesting variant from the system in other countries, although in the main it is similar to the method employed in Belgium. In order to preserve the fullest liberty to the elector there are no official ballots or nominations. Party organizations print their own ballots, which are accepted by the returning officers; but the voter is free to change these at will. The voter may or may not indicate at the top of his ballot the party to which he belongs. The names on the ballot prepared by the voter must appear in vertical succession, and must not exceed the number to be elected by more than two. In counting, the papers with indications as to party are grouped together, and the others are put in a "free group." The votes obtained by each party list are reckoned up, and the proper number of seats allotted to the list according to the Hondt rule.* In Sweden, however, the seats are distributed one at a time, the first to the highest candidate, whose list must wait until the number represented by one-half its total vote is reached; the second highest candidate next; and so on.

III. NORWAY

At the time of its union with Sweden by the Peace of Kiel in 1814, Norway possessed the fortunate title of the most democratic state in Europe. The Danish ruling

* See page 199.

classes left the country with the end of the Danish control. With a very small noble group of its own, Norwegian society was chiefly composed of independent, land-owning peasants, merchants, and sailors. In frugality, equality, and intelligent love of freedom, it did not compare unfavorably with one of the states of ancient Greece; nor was it comparatively very much larger. The framers of the Constitution of 1814 copied freely from English, French, and American democratic institutions, which they transplanted to Norway with a hardihood which was often doctrinaire. The constitution was based on the French constitution of 1791, which with its strict separation of powers greatly reduced the power of the King. He was in addition an absentee, for Bernadotte rarely came to Norway except for the sessions of the Storting, the Norwegian Parliament. His position there contrasted sharply with his autocratic supremacy in Sweden. In Norway he had no power to dissolve the Storting, and his veto was only suspensory—by passing a measure at three successive meetings the Storting could legislate without the King's consent.

The Storting was chosen for a term of three years, and met for two months only once in that term. It was divided into two bodies, the whole Storting choosing a fourth of its number to form the Lagthing or Upper House, the remainder constituting the Odelsting. The suffrage was liberal for that day. Citizens twenty-five years old could vote on several alternative qualifications: office-holding; land owning or leasing; in the towns, ownership of real or personal property worth 600 kroner; possession of an income of 500 kroner in the country or 800 kroner in the towns. The usual large list of causes of disfranchisement included that penalty also for buying

or selling votes in an election. The elections were indirect, but the ratio of electors to primary voters was generous.

Parties were divided in Norway, as in other parts of Scandinavia, differently from the other European countries. The Conservatives, who were favorable to the Swedish union and the King, held Christiania and the towns; the Liberals, who were in the majority, were a peasant party, who rallied the country behind them in opposition to the Swedes. Until the last decade of the century the conflict between the two countries was so incessant and so absorbing that internal democratic reforms had but little interest. A state which was looked up to by other nations of Europe as a model of democracy might well bide its time in agitating further reform.

The fight for parliamentary government, which began with the accession of Oscar II in 1872, was due to a mixture of national patriotism and of democratic reform, and was intended to reduce the power of the King of Sweden in Norway. This was the real turning point in Norwegian history. As an opening wedge to forcing the King to choose his ministry from the majority in the Storthing, the Chamber sought under the able and unscrupulous leadership of the Radical, Johan Sverdrup, to allow ministers to sit in the Storthing. The King was willing to bargain the point for the right of dissolving the Chambers and calling a general election, when he deemed necessary, a concession which they refused to grant.

In the bitter contest which ensued Johan Sverdrup and the Radicals showed a determination to stop at no constitutional or judicial barriers to gain the upper hand over the King. They voted the measure regarding the ministry three times in succession, and claimed that it

thereby became law, in the face of the fact that Norwegian courts had always recognized that the King's veto was not merely suspensive in constitutional changes. The Government refused to accept the new law, and was threatened with impeachment before the Lagthing, the supreme court in cases of the kind. Sverdrup's party, after an overwhelming victory at the polls, packed the Lagthing with Liberals, reduced the size of the Supreme Court, and committed other irregularities, but succeeded in its purpose of driving Oscar II's ministry from office. Thereupon the King had to swallow the bitter pill of calling in a Liberal ministry, with the arch-agitator, Sverdrup, as Premier. By whatever disregard of logic, precedent, and legal forms, parliamentary government and a responsible ministry had been won, and the peace-loving King after dignified protest accepted the change.

The introduction of full party government brought about the usual progress, which other countries have witnessed, the multiplication of parties, introduction of trial by jury, social legislation, and the introduction of universal suffrage. The old Liberal party, drawn chiefly from the country, was joined by a more radical faction led by the noted novelist, Björnsteren Björnson, whose tendencies were intellectual and even anti-religious. The introduction of large scale manufacture and the splendid prosperity of Norway's merchant shipping created a laboring class, which, as in Denmark and Sweden, is perhaps more radical and internationalist than in other countries. All of these groups, from Sverdrup's Old Left through the Socialists, demanded an extension of the suffrage to all men, and even to women (a feature, at least of the Socialist program, as early as 1890).

The Steen ministry (Radical) in 1898 brought about

the introduction of manhood suffrage for all Norwegians twenty-five years old, resident in Norway for at least five years, and having suffered no impairment of civil rights. Recipients of poor relief are debarred. The first real reform in the franchise since 1814 doubled the electorate. Since 1905 election has been direct. The polling for the Storting as a whole takes place every third year in 123 single-member districts; only after the election is that body divided into its two sections.

The democratization of the suffrage was completed in 1916 by the full adoption of woman suffrage after a brief and very successful agitation extending over some fifteen years. The Steen cabinet in 1901 had extended the municipal vote to unmarried women, twenty-five years old, who had an income of 300 kroner, and to married women whose husbands' incomes equaled that amount. Thereafter women's progress was steady and constant. In 1907 the parliamentary vote was given to those enfranchised for municipal elections in 1901. Three years later the municipal franchise, and in 1913 the parliamentary franchise, were extended to all women twenty-five years of age. Finally, in 1916 all women voters became eligible to sit in the Storting. Norway was the first of European nations to allow women to vote for the national legislature, and has increased its electorate by half a million by that act. In respect to the right to vote, Norway is to-day one of the most democratic nations on the Continent.



Ballot Distributors in Norway

CHAPTER XXIX

ELECTIONS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

I. THE BELGIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

THE present Kingdom of Belgium was the result of the liberal and nationalist Revolution of 1830, which spread far and wide over Europe at the news of Charles X's fall. It was, from the nature of its origin, predestined to be a more liberal monarchy than other states around it. The Constitution of 1831 was drawn up in the midst of a revolution against the autocratic rule of William I, King of the artificial kingdom of the Netherlands. There was a strong republican following in Belgium, which would have liked to do away with monarchy altogether. It was decided by the majority to retain the kingship, but to limit the king's prerogatives so explicitly and minutely that he would rule constitutionally or not at all. Leopold of Coburg was elected by the votes of his future subjects, and understood in accepting the office the conditional nature of his tenure. Both Leopold I and his successors were steadily loyal to the constitutional theory of their office; and Leopold I, although every inch a king, so averted criticism by tact and impartiality, that the cataclysm of 1848 passed in Belgium almost without an echo. The Constitution of 1831 was moreover frankly modeled on that mother of constitutions, the French Constitution of 1791, as well as on the government of

Louis Philippe. Belgium was only one of the many spots where the seed of the English parliamentary system took root and flourished during the first half of the nineteenth century. It is a proof of the quality of the makers' work, that, except for the extension of the franchise, the Constitution of 1831 has gone practically unamended to the present day, and still passes for a democratic instrument of government. It made Belgium one of the earliest, in fact, one of the few, states on the Continent where the parliamentary system has been thoroughly carried into operation.

The two greatest political questions since 1830, the control of education and the extension of the franchise, have been the battle field of two irreconcilable enemies, the Catholic and the Liberal parties. We say irreconcilable, for while in other countries the Republicans and Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives, could reach some sort of agreement as to the fundamental nature of the government, the Catholics and the Liberals held two opposite views of society itself. The religious line in politics has been sharply drawn in Belgium long after its real significance has disappeared in France and Germany.

The Catholics drew their strength from among the peasants of the Flemish region—Flanders, Anvers, Limbourg, and Brabant. They were blessed with the strongly centralized ecclesiastical organization for a party government, and with unusual opportunities for spreading party propaganda and for holding their voters securely. They held tenaciously to the necessity for religious instruction in the schools, and therefore for the control of education by the clergy; and were sometimes strongly Ultramontane in politics. The Catholic attitude toward demo-

cratic reforms shifted frequently, sometimes in keeping with party expediency, at others from principle. Originally a democratic party, the Catholics of the second generation after the Revolution discarded the liberalism of the Thirties, until fifty years later it saw a political advantage to be won by alliance with the Radicals. Certainly universal suffrage has repaid the Catholics handsomely, for it has kept them continuously in power since its adoption.

The Liberals were recruited from the industrial Walloon districts, where there was an affinity to France in language and sympathy. Elections were wont to be decided by the Walloon country and the great commercial cities like Ghent. The contest with the ecclesiastical hierarchy required a strong organization, which was established in 1841 by Defacqz, grand master of the Free Masons. He founded the Alliance Libérale, whose Congress in 1846 spread its branches into the provinces, and bound them all together by a campaign for state-directed education and extension of the suffrage to the limits allowed by the Constitution. The Liberals have never been unreservedly democratic, for they drew their votes from the moneyed middle class, which alone could vote until 1893. They agitated at first for a broad franchise, but by a peculiar irony of fate, it almost annihilated their party, when it came. The party name signified rather a free-thinking, anti-clerical policy than a radical one.

For the first sixteen years of his reign Leopold I adhered to the English theory in the eighteenth century that his ministry ought to be impartial and responsive to demands of all sections alike, instead of homogeneous. The Minister of Justice decried the "lamentable divisions which classification into parties always involves, those

classifications into Catholics and Liberals, which have no sense in the presence of the great principles of liberty in our constitution." These two factions, however, split so widely apart over the question of the schools, that it was impossible to pretend that they could longer act together. After the Liberal victory in the elections of 1847, the King did not hesitate to accede to the popular will, like a true constitutional monarch, and summoned Rogier and a wholly Liberal ministry. His wise submission saved Belgium from anything more than a slight scorching in the Revolution of the following year. Since that day Belgian ministries have been uni-partisan, in accord with the majority in the Chambers.

The party contests over the franchise since 1848 fall naturally into two divisions; the first, the period of Liberal ascendancy during all but two years until 1870; the second, the almost unbroken Catholic rule since that date. Rogier and the Liberals redeemed their promises in 1848 by reducing the property qualification to twenty florins direct taxes, the minimum allowed by the Constitution, and made this limit apply to provincial and local, as well as parliamentary elections. They were rewarded by a great accession of seats, for the reform doubled the number of voters in the towns, while it hardly affected the Catholic country districts.

Before long, however, Rogier found himself at the head of a section only of his party. Two influences combined to split the Liberals on the question of further reforms. Though the Revolution of 1848 had not been felt directly in Belgium, it now had a delayed, but perceptible effect. The French Republicans banished by Napoleon III took refuge in Belgium, and attracted the younger liberals by their pamphleteering and their stormy associations. The

ideas of Louis Blanc and Lamartine were fermenting on both sides of the boundary. Secondly, the literary renaissance of the mid-century was turning Brussels from a provincial town into one of the intellectual capitals of Europe, open to the most liberal currents of European thought.

The young Liberals, or Progressists, demanded further broadening of the right to vote, and even universal suffrage. The old Liberals, the Doctrinaires, desired to stop with the reform of 1848. On other measures also friction developed, and against a divided enemy the Catholics returned to power in 1870, because the Progressists refused to vote.

It was the period when Papal aggression, Papal Infallibility, and Ultramontaniam were arousing widespread hostility to Rome. Although the Liberals were out of office, a common hatred of clerical ascendancy drove them together into the *Fédération Libérale*, whose members christened themselves the Beggars, after their famous ancestors in the revolt against Spain. The combined forces of the Liberals made it necessary for the Catholics to continue the reform of the electoral system in order to retain their popularity. They lowered the franchise for the provincial councils, which were electoral colleges naming part of the Senate. In reply to the accusation that they used their spiritual office to exert improper pressure, they introduced (1877) a secret ballot, on the lines of the Australian system.

On the eve of the introduction of universal suffrage the attitude of the different parties toward reform was as follows. The Doctrinaires, to retain their advantageous position resting on the middle classes, wished to keep a property qualification, or at least to grant the vote only

to persons with a certain amount of education. The Progressists wavered between a literacy test and outright universal suffrage. They sometimes went so far as to unite with the new Socialist party, made up from workingmen of Ghent and Brussels and the coal miners and metal workers of south and east Belgium. The creed of Marx and revolutionary, republican socialism of the French type had gained a large following, which in Belgian politics opposed compulsory military service and a property qualification for voting. Its headquarters were the *Vooruit* at Ghent and the *Maison du Peuple* at Brussels. Its readiness to use fires, strikes, and other violence gave its demand a certain cogency, which, however, frightened away more of the Progressists than it won. The Catholics favored attaching the franchise to householding or lodging as in England. But as they were the Government party, and as the King in 1890 requested a revision of the Constitution, to them fell the task of introducing universal suffrage in 1893. Their reluctance was diminished by a shrewd desire to gather in whatever credit was to be had for a reform which was practically inevitable. After fourteen different plans for universal suffrage had been debated, the Parliament accepted the scheme of Professor Nyssens of the University of Louvain, the terms of which are described below.

The result of manhood suffrage with the plural vote was almost to obliterate the Liberal party. It was found that the workingmen in the Walloon districts elected Socialists, and the Flemish peasants, now admitted to the vote, were overwhelmingly Catholic. In that manner universal suffrage unfortunately split Belgium along the old national line of cleavage. Between the upper and the nether millstone the Liberals disintegrated, some

Progressists allying with the Socialists, the Doctrinaires being driven by the fear of the labor vote into the arms of the Catholics. There was nevertheless a considerable popular following left to the Liberals, and this body raised a demand for proportional representation, which should allot the seats for the votes polled by minorities as well as majorities. The idea was not a new one in Belgium, where it had been the object of a national reform organization since 1881, and had been part of the Government's program in 1893. The effect of its introduction in 1899 was the resuscitation of the dying Liberal party, although it did not damage the Catholics so much as had been expected. The latter have remained in power ever since, and at the elections of 1912 slightly increased the Government's majority.

The two Houses of the Belgian Parliament, the Senate and the Chamber of Representatives, differ chiefly in their size and in the method of their election. The former contains 120 members, chosen for eight years. About one-fourth of these (27) are elected by the provincial assemblies, each of which are represented by from two to four senators, according to population. A number of members, equal to half the number of representatives in the lower house, is elected directly by all qualified voters who have reached the age of thirty. The Senators thus chosen must pay at least 1,200 francs direct taxes or own immovable property in Belgium yielding an income of 12,000 francs. Thus by its manner of choice and by its personnel the Senate has a distinctive character of its own, and is to a certain extent the representative of property.

The members of the Chamber of Representatives are chosen in the proportion of one to a minimum of

40,000 voters, for a four-year term. The candidates must be placed in nomination a fortnight before the election by fifty or a hundred voters of their district. In Belgian elections the standard of morals is high. The presidents of the electoral bureaus are usually justices, who are independent and impartial, because they cannot be removed from office for political reasons. Every party list, and even every independent candidate, can have watchers in a place specially provided for them beside the chairman of the polls. The purity of the vote has long been safeguarded by a secret ballot of a somewhat peculiar form. Instead of marking the ballot, which might be done in such a way as to identify the voter who cast it, the elector merely blackens the white bull's-eye in a black square. If he wishes to vote a straight ticket or to accept the order in which his party has arranged its nominees, he blackens the spot in the square at the head of the paper; in case he wishes to split his vote, in the only manner in which this is permissible, he blackens the spot opposite his favorite candidate, who thereby benefits by his vote. The ballot is void, unless it is folded to be returned to the president, who drops it into the urn. To prevent disorder the voters are admitted to the polling place only in the number that can be accommodated simultaneously in its booths, a method which might seem likely to protract operations. Such has not been the case, for an intelligent electorate has been well coached in the machinery of voting before coming to the polls, and often attains the rate of eighty votes an hour. As there is a polling place for every five hundred voters, the voting may easily be finished up in the early afternoon. If a citizen does not avail himself of the right to vote and can

1

2

3

4

5

6

Cooreman
Bagerem
Van Cleempulle
Maenhaut
Verhaegen
Huyshauwer
Libbrecht
Suppléant :
Libbrecht

Braun
De Vign.
Mechelynck
Buyse
Van Doorne
De Saegher
Boddaert
Suppléant :
Buyse
Van Doorne
De Saegher
Boddaert

De Bruyae
Stevens
Suppléant :
Baudewyn
Cogh

Vandenbesche
De Buck
Suppléant :
De Buck

Anseele
Lampens
Cambier
Mostaert
Bruggeman
Gevaert
Nuyt
Gileon
De Visch
Van Sweden
Haack
Suppléant :
Bogaerts
Heynderyckx
Faucaert
De Vynck

Middernacht

A Belgian Ballot



offer no adequate excuse, he lays himself open to punishment for a misdemeanor.

The three-fold basis of the electoral system of Belgium includes: universal, manhood suffrage; its amelioration through a system of plural voting; and proportional representation. The first two were linked as a compromise solution of an *impasse* in the revision of the Constitution in 1893; the radicals allowed the universal suffrage, for which the laborers were clamoring, and which enlarged the number of voters tenfold, to be tempered by special representation of wealth, age, and capacity. Belgium owes two essential parts of her electoral law to university professors—the compromise of 1893 to Professor Albert Nyssens of the University of Louvain, and the scheme for proportional representation to Professor d'Hondt of the University of Ghent.

Every male Belgian citizen, twenty-five years old, who has not lost his civil rights, and who has resided one year in his commune is to-day allowed to cast one vote without respect to any other qualifications. Under certain circumstances, however, an individual may cast further votes up to the maximum of three. An elector is entitled to one additional vote for reasons of age, marriage, or wealth. The conditions are these: he shall be over thirty-five years of age, married or a widower, with legitimate children, and paying a householder's tax of five francs; or he shall, if over twenty-five-years old, own land valued at 2,000 francs, or possess a corresponding income from personal property. A voter enjoys two supplementary votes, if he has graduated from an institution of higher learning, or has completed a higher grade secondary education; or if he is an official, or a professional man with the higher type of training defined by the law. The

plural vote has not complicated the casting of the ballots, for each voter is given as many papers as he has votes, and these are cast as individual choices. In a total electorate of 1,721,755 in 1912 there were 998,483 electors with one vote, 404,786 with two, and 318,486 with three.

There is in reality much more equity in this system of plural voting than in those in vogue in Prussia or in England. The maximum is so low that no individual exercises undue influence in his district. Better still, the laborer as well as the millionaire can obtain one or two extra votes. He has one vote at twenty-five; at thirty-five he gets another, provided he is the head of a family; if he has purchased a house through a building loan association, even though the property is mortgaged to the association, he is entitled to a third vote. Such considerations, however, do not weigh with the Socialists and a certain number of the Liberals, who ever since the adoption of the plural vote have waged unceasing warfare for the principle of "one man, one vote." At first their ardor led them to foment strikes and riots, and to introduce horns or drums and other tympani into the Chambers to obstruct legislation. Although their propaganda has grown more peaceable, the Socialists have lately subordinated the other features of their program to the establishment of equal, universal suffrage.

We have seen the connection between the introduction of proportional representation and the effect upon parties of the adoption of universal suffrage and the plural vote. The proportional system was accepted in 1899 only after a long struggle. It compelled a change in the districting of the kingdom, for large constituencies are a necessity for R. P. (*Représentation Proportionnelle*), as the Belgians call it. To apportion the seats to minorities

there must be enough to go around. The smaller voting districts were bunched into arrondissements, naming from three to twenty-one deputies by *scrutin de liste*. At the same time the voters choose substitutes, so that bye-elections are unnecessary. The party lists, with the candidates arranged in a chosen order, are presented to the officials who prepare the ballots fifteen days before election. Seldom does a party make out a full list, since it rarely happens that a party captures all the deputies. As seats are allotted to candidates in the order in which they stand on the party list, that order is of great importance. It must not be left wholly to the discretion of the sponsors, who turned in the list. Every elector can vote in one of two ways. He may mark the square at the head of the column, thus approving both the list and the arrangement of its candidates. Or he may blacken the square opposite *one* name to indicate that, while he favors the party, he prefers to have another person its first, perhaps its only, nominee to be elected. This affords him a check on the power of the local party organization, but it has produced little more independent voting than we have in the United States.

At the end of the polling the seats are allotted according to a mathematical calculation devised by Professor Victor d'Hondt of the University of Ghent, the most perfect scheme yet invented. It may be illustrated by the election at Ghent in 1908, the ballot for which is represented on page 196. The leading parties in the count were: the Catholics (No. 1) with 78,865; the Liberals (No. 2) with 39,788; and the Socialists (No. 5) with 23,118. There were eleven deputies to be named. To obtain the common divisor, or "electoral quotient," the

measure by which the allotment was determined, the following operation was performed:

	Catholic	Liberal	Socialist
Divided by 1	78,865	39,788	23,118
2	39,432	19,894	11,599
3	26,288	13,262	7,706
4	19,716	9,947	
5	15,773		
6	13,144		
7	11,266		

Arranging these figures in order of magnitude, the electoral quotient, the lowest number which ought to suffice to elect one of the eleven deputies, was found to be 11,599 in the Socialist column. The list served to indicate to whom the seats should fall, in the following manner.

1st seat	78,865	Catholic list
2nd	39,788	Liberal
3rd	39,432	Catholic
4th	26,288	Catholic
5th	23,118	Socialist
6th	19,894	Liberal
7th	19,716	Catholic
8th	15,773	Catholic
9th	13,262	Liberal
10th	13,144	Catholic
11th	11,599	Socialist

The Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists got six, three, and two seats respectively. In practice this result is speedily ascertained by dividing the various party totals by the electoral quotient.

Now for the distribution of the seats won within the party—for example, the Socialist, whose 23,118 votes are composed by adding the votes for the whole list to the preferential votes cast for each of the several candidates, and form a pool on which the candidates in order may

draw. Let us suppose that M. Anseele had 4,250 votes after his name, M. Lampens had 1,725, while M. Mostaert, fourth on the list, had 13,470. The first Socialist seat is awarded to Mostaert, because, though fourth on the party list, enough electors favored him to give him actually more votes than the electoral quotient. M. Anseele draws 7,349 votes from the pool to attain the quotient, and is also declared elected. The party's arrangement could likewise be broken in the Liberal list, if as the pool became exhausted, the last person to benefit by it should, even with its assistance, have a lower total than the preferential votes for another nominee farther down the list.

Apparently complicated, the proportional system is in practice very simple, and even the large cities usually finish their calculations during the evening of election day. The mathematical reckoning is done by expert accountants, so that the system offers no difficulties to the voter. Belgian electors are diligently educated up to the business of voting without confusion or mistake, and the number of spoiled ballots is small. Proportional representation has not increased the number of small parties, as was feared before its adoption. The four great parties continue to poll the largest part of the votes. Public interest in politics has been enlivened by reviving vigorous and effective party activity, and preventing the tyranny of the majority. Most salutary of all the effects of proportional representation has been the closing of the rift which was rapidly widening between the Walloons and the Flemish, when the Catholics and the Socialists were left face to face with no mediators after the introduction of universal suffrage. Its desirability is no longer open to serious question. The leaders of all the chief

parties and the bulk of the voters seek, not to abolish proportional representation, but to make it more perfect.

Belgium has always drawn upon French models for political inspiration. But in modifying universal suffrage by eradicating electoral pressure and fraud, by introducing the plural vote and proportional representation, she has evinced originality, which makes her in turn one of the patterns for other states in electoral reform. As one German has said, Belgium is the political laboratory of the Continent.

II. THE DUTCH ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Dutch politics have little of the expansive influence or the variety and animation which lightens the story of party conflicts in Belgium through the nineteenth century. The apathy of the Dutch toward political life is complex in its origin. It is partly educational. The history of the glorious combats against Spain and England is so much more attractive than the prose of recent parliamentary government, that students know comparatively little of modern development. Legislation is thought to be "the artificial invention of subtle jurists," not founded on the people's needs. The Dutch have not the strain of French blood, which raises the temperature of Belgian politics. They are stolid and insistently deliberate and logical. The liberal fondness for the unimpeded freedom to think is sometimes synonymous with the freedom not to think.

The current of political life in the Netherlands has flowed as evenly and almost as slowly as the placidly somnolent rivers. The little kingdom has kept the dynasty, the Estates General, the parliament house, and

the traditions, of three hundred years ago. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic era inundated the country for a time; but, true to its motto: *Luctor, sed emergo* (I struggle, but I survive), a prince of the house of Orange, William I, as ruler of the United Netherlands, restored the government to its historic path.

Until mid-century the Netherlands were a constitutional monarchy, like France under Louis XVIII. The king and his ministers responsible to him shared legislation with two Houses of the Estates, the Upper, appointed by the King, the Lower, elected by the provincial diets. William I was an honest and indefatigable worker, whose simple habits would have befitted a burgher rather than a king. But he lacked the gift of working with subordinates or adapting himself to the limitations of a constitution. The loss of Belgium by the Revolution of 1830 he felt as a personal blow; the financial difficulties which ensued impaired his prestige as an arbitrary ruler. Disillusioned, and unpopular with his people, he abdicated in 1840 rather than submit to a constitutional revision. He at least had the perspicacity to see that the day of the paternal monarch was over.

The Constitution of Holland has undergone three serious revisions, in 1848, 1887, and 1917. The revision of 1848 was carried out chiefly by the Liberal statesman, Thorbecke. He was a man of iron will, tall, angular, and poorly dressed, without wealth or family to aid him in parliament; but his merciless dogmatism, his incorruptible reputation for honesty, and his love of freedom and the fatherland, made him *facile princeps*, as his chief opponent called him. "He created the forms, in which the Government was to move for a long time; his strong

hand had pointed out the way to progress in constitutional development, in material prosperity, and intellectual emancipation."

The lower house was elected by the provincial diets from among the heaviest taxpayers, instead of being appointed by the Crown. The lower house was named by direct, popular election by citizens who payed taxes varying from 20 to 160 florins (\$8 to \$64). The capitalists controlled the First Chamber, the small landowners and bourgeoisie the Second, leaving the laboring classes without a vote. Among other reforms the Estates General were given the power to initiate laws and to hold the ministry responsible to themselves. This was properly the beginning of parliamentary government in the Netherlands.

The revision of 1887 was made necessary by the demonstrativeness of a voteless laboring class in the Frisian towns and in the country, which agitated by strikes and mass-meetings for universal suffrage and the abolition of the First Chamber. The fundamental law of 1887 was a compromise with the radicals. The upper house of fifty members remained as before; the lower house, containing one hundred deputies, was to be elected by those citizens who possessed "conditions of fitness and social well-being." This was at first taken to mean householders, or lodgers who paid a minimum rent, and resulted in tripling the number of voters. But the words "fitness and social well-being" could be so variously interpreted, that in 1896 further legislation was necessary to define them satisfactorily. This law will continue to be the basis of the suffrage until the constitutional revision of 1917 goes into effect. The one hundred deputies are elected in single-member districts. Those are entitled to vote

who are twenty-five years old and have one of six qualifications: payment of a direct tax of at least one florin (the majority of electors qualify under this head); ownership or rental of a house of a minimum value and with certain stipulations regarding residence; ownership or lease of a ship of twenty-four tons burden; a salary or wage, varying according to locality from 275 florins to 550 florins a year; investments of 100 florins in the public funds or 50 florins in a savings bank; the passing of an examination required for holding public office. By this, the van Houten law, the electorate was increased to about 700,000, or nearly doubled.

The further extension of the suffrage has been investigated by royal commissions ever since 1905, and the Socialists and Social Democrats have pressed for both manhood and woman suffrage. A bill was brought into the Second Chamber in 1915, providing for the further reshaping of the constitution to conform with the advance of democracy. The franchise is extended to all males, twenty-five years old, who have not lost their civil rights, and recognizes the principle of woman suffrage, although it leaves its enactment for a later law. The law also adopts proportional representation and the obligatory vote. The two latter reforms ought to do much to break down the Dutch indifference to politics. The right to think is left intact, but the right not to think is no longer recognized. The law is still (1917) under discussion but no serious obstacle to its passage is likely to develop.

As for election machinery, the Dutch parties are well-knit, widely ramifying organizations. The Catholics in particular are strongly disciplined, their officials standing in as compact a hierarchy as the Church itself, with a

central committee of eleven, district and local committees, and even party heelers for every street. The parties have continuity of program and activity as well as of organization. Their first official act in the campaign is the presentation on the first Tuesday of June in election years of the lists of candidates, signed by at least forty electors. With so low a number of signatures for nominating petitions there are often five or six times as many nominees as there are deputies to be elected. A man may stand for any constituency in the kingdom.

The voting takes place on election day in districts including a maximum of 1,000 voters. After identification the voter takes his official ballot, with the names of the candidates in alphabetical order, and retires to a booth to mark it. The ballot resembles in form that used in Belgium.* The voter must drop it into the urn himself without the help of the chairman of the poll. If no candidate on the first day receives an absolute majority, a second election (ballotage) takes place fifteen days later between the two highest.

The conduct of elections partakes of the sober stability of the Dutch genius. They are never held on Sunday, and therefore are not the festival occasions which some countries make of them. The electors vote in their working clothes, as a matter-of-fact part of the day's business. Little money is spent on campaign posters, which are generally limited to the party recommendation of a list of candidates and are to be seen only in the places reserved for regular handbills. Very little propaganda is distributed from house to house. Campaign meetings for debates between the candidates are almost unknown, and although the great gatherings by

* See page 199.

torchlight in the open fields wax enthusiastic to the point of cheering, they do not grow disorderly. Those of the Calvinists and the Catholics are opened with prayer, and are dignified by the pastors and priests in clerical attire on the platform. The activity of the followers of Rome and Geneva in politics perhaps accounts for the purity of electoral morals in the Netherlands. In the last half of the nineteenth century but four elections were invalidated by the Estates General. Official pressure, the bane of France and Germany, is so nearly unknown that the law does not provide against it.

CHAPTER XXX

THE WORKINGS OF PURE DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND

BELGIUM alone can compare with Switzerland in the variety and interest of the electoral institutions, which a single small state has worked out experimentally for the benefit of all the larger commonwealths of the world; and Switzerland has gone very much further than the Low Countries in bringing about the direct personal participation of every citizen in the business of government. Other states have adopted parts of the radical program. It has remained for the small Alpine republic to adopt the initiative, the referendum, federative government, a plural executive, legislation by popular assemblies, and a certain degree of proportional representation, and to make them all very largely successful. It is not wholly paradoxical to say that Switzerland is politically so far behind the other countries of Europe that she is in their van. The direct popular government of the medieval towns never wholly ceased to be an operative system with her; with it she tempered the development of representative government, and now that reformers are discovering the vices to which the best of representative systems are prone, Switzerland challenges the attention of every citizen who believes that the people can manage their own household as well as can a parliament which is chosen by an Administration or a party machine.

Popular sovereignty is there more effective, more unob-

structed, than in the United States. There is practically no power which can stay the demand of an absolute, popular majority. The Swiss trust "the infinite audacity of elected persons" no more than did the Greeks; they choose to govern themselves rather than to submit to the uncertain management of periodically elected, benevolent despots. These former despots are employed only in a clerical or preparatory capacity. Besides maintaining their right to alter their constitution with the greatest possible facility to suit themselves, the Swiss have kept legislation so responsive to popular sentiment that they have achieved a considerable program of experimental socialism. The success which has attended this unusual form of government, with its extraordinary situation and its peculiar traditions and problems, entitles it to a prominent place in a study of electoral democracy.

There are several reasons for the diversity of the democratic experiments which have been made on the soil of Switzerland. The nature of that soil is one of them. Like Greece, the nation is divided by mountain barriers into local groups, comparatively secluded even in the days of the railway. There are twenty-five political entities differing widely in religion, language, race, and economic conditions. Roughly speaking, a half of the cantons are Catholic. In three-fourths of them the German tongue predominates; in five the French; Italian and Romansch in one each. In size they vary from 2,765 miles of territory in Graubünden to only 92 in Zug. Before the federation of 1848 these small states had each its own coinage, its weights and measures. Each district retained *gendarmes* at all frontier bridges at which every load of wine, hay, or wood crossing the boundary, paid a tax. Little, if any, idea of common nationality unified the political

institutions of the cantons which were thus so often in conflict. Topographically they were as widely separated from each other as they were from France, Germany and Italy, and mutual jealousy had held them apart until Napoleon summarily swept them together in the short-lived Helvetic Republic.

Although the centralized Napoleonic republic fell with its creator, the old Confederation which was revived in 1815 felt the impetus of the nationalist spirit which excited Europe after the Congress of Vienna. Attempt after attempt to bring about a closer union was foiled by the Conservatives and the Catholics who, in 1843, formed the Sonderbund, an alliance of seven Catholic cantons, to block reorganization of the confederacy. A civil war of eighteen days' duration, contemporaneous with the general upheaval of 1848, was necessary to clear the field for the introduction of a centralizing constitution which, with the changes introduced in 1874, is the organic law of Switzerland to-day. The revision of 1848 changed a federation of sovereign states into a federated state; but the particularist spirit and the divergences of local customs have never disappeared. Before considering the electoral system of the Federation, it is, therefore, proper to examine the governments of the communes and the cantons of which it is composed.

Swiss democracy is rooted in the local groups which from time immemorial have held tenaciously to the enjoyment of their freedom and to participation in their common business. M. Numa Droz, once Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Swiss Cabinet, wrote: "The Commune is almost the state in a small compass; to employ an illustration from natural history, it is one of the cells of which the social body is composed. It is certain that a

much-developed local right contributes to the strength and prosperity of the state. The Communes were the first and principal nurseries of democracy, and are still so in many countries. A citizen reared in the practical school of communal life will always understand better the popular wants than one whose political education has been obtained in the offices of the federal administration."

The Swiss communes are bodies resembling both a business corporation and a political unit. One of the strongest reasons for the long survival of direct popular government has been the corporate nature of the commune. The revenue from the communal pastures for sheep and cattle, and from the woodlands for swine, was once a common fund, in whose administration every citizen was interested. The existence of these local properties has been a powerful bond between the voter and the state. Almost every commune at the present day possesses some land, which provides resources for the care of the poor and for education and public improvements. Besides being an economic entity, the commune is also a political division, in which popular sovereignty has yielded very little to the necessity of delegating its powers. The communal government is, like the New England township, governed on a basis of almost pure democracy by an assembly of all the citizens. The Swiss commune in practice, however, has the greater freedom in the exercise of local government. Upon the assembly rests the duty of governing the commune in accordance with the relations assigned to it with the cantonal authorities. Some communes empower it to name all public employees whose salary is above a specified figure, and to elect even clergymen and communal

doctors. However varied the experiments which have been made by the different communal assemblies, they everywhere vote important local regulations, lay taxes, oversee expenses, and control the local officials, by direct popular vote.

As for the next unit in the political scale, the canton, no less than six cantons, Uri, Glarus, and the double cantons of Unter-Walden and Appenzell, have retained the pure democratic custom of direct legislation and election of officers by an assembly of all the citizens. The name of this type of government, *Landsgemeinde*, or state commune, betrays its character. It is obviously possible to carry it out to its logical extent only where the population is small and distributed over a comparatively small area. This condition is satisfied in the six cantons mentioned above, for the longest dimension of any of them does not exceed thirty miles, and most citizens can reach the Assembly by a journey of ten miles. Given these favorable circumstances, it was natural in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when adjoining communes began to unite for their mutual interest, that they should transfer their accustomed meetings to the new relationship. So abiding was the feeling that these assemblies of the sovereign people were the best and safest organ of control, that the growth of population and the complexity of modern cantonal business has shaken but little the attachment of the Swiss to these picturesque convocations.

The quaint atmosphere of the Middle Ages, from which it came, still hangs about the *Landsgemeinde* in session upon a dedicated spot in some meadow on a Sunday in April or May. In the early morning sunshine all the roads are full of homely, honest peasants with their fami-



© New York Times

A Landsgemeinde in Session

lies in festal array. Every voter wears a conventional costume, sometimes with a green coat, sometimes with a black, with a stiff, high collar, and a hat which has evidently been resurrected for the first time since the last assembly. Each man carries the family umbrella and a venerable sword, which also comes from retirement but once a year. A band in regalia renders music and leads in the national anthem. Professor Freeman has left a classic description of one of these picturesque ceremonies.

"It is one of the opening days of May, it is the morning of Sunday; for men there deem that the better the day, the better the deed; they deem that the Creator can not be more truly honored than in using, in His sphere and in His presence, the highest of the gifts which He has bestowed on man. From the market place of Altdorf, the little capital of the canton of Uri, the procession makes its way to the place of meeting at Bözlingen. First marches the little army of the canton, an army whose weapons can never be used except to drive back an invader from their lands. Over their heads floats the banner, the bull's head of Uri, the ensign which led men to victory in the fields of Sempach and Morgarten. And before them all, on the shoulders of men in the garb of ages past, are borne the famous horns whose blast struck such dread into the fearless heart of Charles of Burgundy. Then, with their lictors before them come the magistrates of the Commonwealth on horseback, the chief magistrate, the Landamman, with his sword by his side. The people follow the chiefs whom they have chosen to the place of meeting, a circle in a green meadow, with a pine forest rising over their head, and a mighty spur of the mountain range facing them on the other side of the valley. The multitude of freemen take their seats around

the chief ruler of the Commonwealth, whose term of office comes that day to an end. The Assembly opens; a short space is first given to prayer, silent prayer, offered up by each man in the temple of God's own rearing. Then comes the business of the day. Thus, year by year, on some bright morning in the springtide, the sovereign people, not entrusting its rights to a few of its own number, but discharging them itself in the majesty of its corporate person, meets in the open market place or in the green meadow at the mountain's foot, to frame the laws to which it yields obedience as its own work, to choose rulers whom it can afford to greet with reverence as drawing their commission from itself."

But the Landsgemeinde has far more than a romantic significance. It is a most important experiment in applied democracy, valuable as a demonstration of the extent to which real popular government is possible. All the male citizens over twenty years of age are entitled to be present; in fact, seldom more than three-fourths of them attend. The number of qualified citizens in 1900 varied from 3,000 in the smallest of the six cantons to 12,500 in the largest.

That a gathering of this size may accomplish any legislation, it is necessary to limit somewhat its freedom of action. In the smaller assemblies only is debate permitted; unless some one demands the ballot, voting is by show of hands, and measures are simply adopted or rejected. Most of all, time is saved by the preparation in advance of a program of agenda by the Great Council, which exists in every canton, no matter what the position of the Landsgemeinde. In the six cantons, which we have been describing, the Council's duties are subordinate to those of the Assembly. It is merely a bureau

which puts measures in shape to be presented to the popular vote. The councilors are elected directly by universal suffrage, in some cantons by proportional representation, and serve for an average term of three or four years. However much the functions of the *Landsgemeinde* may be curtailed by rules of procedure and by the oversight of the Great Council, it nevertheless affords one of the most impressive and effective examples in the world of a people giving direct expression to its sovereign will.

The second class of cantonal governments, comprising the remaining nineteen cantons, includes those in which, because of increased population or of geographical extent, the principal authority in election and legislation has been conferred upon the representative Great Council. Here the Great Council is the only legislature which is ever convened at one time and place. Although it is not the final authority on law-making, by its compactness and its power to draft proposals, it exerts a very considerable influence in directing public action.

At its maximum, however, the power of the Great Council is never sufficient to constitute genuinely representative government. Such a system, so far as it exists, is a recent growth, for until the Helvetic Confederation there was no government so large that the populace itself could not rule. When, in the early nineteenth century, the Swiss found that direct government would not expand to fit modern growth, they still maintained their suspicion of delegated powers. Their fears were confirmed by the fate of the governments established by the new constitutions of the thirties. Full and unrestrained legislative authority was vested in single legislative chambers, while the people stripped themselves of

the last vestiges of sovereignty. The Great Councils came into the control of cliques in the towns. Hasty legislation passed, unimpeded by executive veto, and sometimes the Great Council usurped executive authority itself.

In the course of later constitutional revisions, therefore, the Swiss turned in disillusionment from their experience with representative government and fastened the Great Council again to the apron strings of the direct, popular vote. One check placed upon the legislature was the adoption before 1900, in the cantons of Ticino, Geneva, Zug, Solothurn, Bern, and Basel, of proportional representation, in order to make its composition correspond accurately to the divisions in the electorate. Nominating petitions to the Great Council must be signed by a specified number of voters, two in Neuchatel, as many as there are candidates to be elected in Solothurn. No candidate is allowed to appear on more than one ticket; he must choose between parties; if this proves embarrassing, it is done for him by official lot. The official list of candidates is published a few days before the election, and only nominees therein included can be voted for. A voter has as many votes as there are candidates, but he may not concentrate them on one name. If he does not mark all the names, the remainder of his votes count for the list as a whole. In order to make proportional representation workable, the cantons where it is employed are divided into districts having two or more deputies. The method of apportioning seats follows the general lines of the d'Hondt system, already described in Belgium. The adoption of proportional representation in federal elections has several times been defeated by a large vote.

The most famous of the checks and balances which in Switzerland replace the executive veto and the judicial reversal, familiar in the United States, are the initiative and the referendum. The Swiss initiative is the nearest approach yet made to the ideal state of Rousseau, in which the whole body of the people in person makes its own laws. In history the two institutions just mentioned are unrelated, for the initiative was first adopted by Vaud in 1845, fifteen years after St. Gall had begun to employ the referendum. At the present day every canton, with the exception of Lucerne, Valais, and Freiburg, allows the voters to initiate legislative and constitutional changes.

Instead of being a petition which the Great Council may honor or not, as it pleases, the initiative is a compulsory instrument, which takes effect even against the wishes of that body. For purposes of constitutional revision the application of a number of citizens, varying from one in Glarus to 15,000 in Bern, is sufficient. Upon receiving their petition the government is generally required to demand of the electorate, "Do you desire revision?" In case of an affirmative answer, the Great Council drafts a new clause and submits it to the people at a second referendum, when a bare majority is usually sufficient to alter the Constitution. As for legislation, in every canton save three, between one thousand and six thousand citizens can compel the government to submit to a general vote a proposed law, or to repeal or amend a law already in force.

"The promoters of the initiative may express their legislative demand in general terms, or they may formulate it in a bill. If the initiative takes the former shape, it is a general instruction to the Great Council, either

to draft a bill and submit it to the people, or first to submit to the people the question whether the Great Council shall consider and draft a bill, afterwards to be submitted to the people. In most cantons the *modus operandi* is this: the Great Council considers the initiated proposal, and, if it disapproves, it submits the original demand to the people, and if the people accept, then the Council drafts the law." In some cantons, however, a bill proposed by the citizens must be submitted to the voters as it stands, although the Council may at the same time offer a counter proposal. As a matter of fact that body originates most legislation; but its prerogative may be assumed at any time by the citizens themselves, if they are dissatisfied with their deputies.

Lovers of historical parallel have found the origin of the Swiss referendum in the elaborate machinery which many cantons employed, even in the time of the Reformation, to refer official measures to the community; but in its modern form the institution is derived from the abstract rights theory of government of Rousseau. The French philosopher denied in his *Contrat Social* that the English were really free, in spite of their parliamentary government, since they entrusted themselves to the tyranny of their elected law-makers. The Swiss were the first to realize the theories of Rousseau in actual legislation, as some have suggested, because of their lack of confidence in their imperfect representative system. Certainly the course of politics has run more smoothly since St. Gall adopted the direct, popular vote on laws in 1831 than it did in the troubled half century before that date. So successful was the innovation that by 1880 a large number of the cantons and the Confederation itself had been converted to it.

The referendum is far from being a mere formality. When it was introduced in the Confederation, a leading statesman said that it would be the greatest trial to which a republic was ever subjected. Many feared that it would lead to irresponsible interference in public affairs; others saw in the practical side of the scheme an insuperable obstacle. But the frequency of its use in the past, and the importance of the laws which have been passed or rejected over the head of the legislature, is indisputable proof, that the referendum answers to a real need in the Swiss system of government. Among the laws rejected by referendum have been the modification of the franchise, the creation of extra offices, and additions to government expenditure. Among the important laws passed in the same manner are the Marriage Law, the Factories Law, the Banking Law, and modifications of the Constitution regarding patents, liquor monopoly, and capital punishment.

The compulsory referendum for constitutional amendments is in use to-day in every one of the Swiss cantons and in the Confederation; the referendum for legislation exists in the Confederation and in all the cantons except Freiburg. In some places the latter system is obligatory, in some it is optional. In constitutional matters the referendum in the cantons is supplementary to the initiative. We have seen the method by which a specified number of voters can bring a proposed amendment before the people, if the Great Council will not draft it. That assembly can also originate proposals, which must likewise pass before public judgment, before they are incorporated in the constitution. A bare majority of the electorate can thus at any time amend or completely

revise their constitution, which is, therefore, potentially a living and growing organism.

To produce a referendum on a legislative change the petition of between 500 and 6,000 citizens is sufficient, if it is presented within thirty days after the law concerned was enacted by the Great Council. In some cantons a majority of all the enfranchised citizens is necessary to decide a referendum; in others a simple majority of those actually voting rules. The vote usually takes place on a Sunday in the spring or the autumn, and there often are two votings annually, at each of which three or four bills are presented.

Thus far we have considered legislation and legislative checks only in the cantons. Federal laws are primarily the work of the Federal Assembly—the National Council and the Council of States. The two chambers solve the difficulty of apportionment of power among small and large states, which the United States once experienced. The National Council is a chamber of one hundred and eighty-nine members elected every three years by direct, manhood suffrage. The electoral districts are entitled to varying numbers of deputies, according to population, and do not embrace territory in more than one canton. Small cantons, such as Uri, have one representative, while the city of Zürich has twenty-two, and Bern has twenty-nine. Every male Swiss citizen, twenty years of age, is entitled to vote, and, unless he is a member of the clergy, to be elected to the National Council.

One might be led to infer that the Council of States is the Swiss counterpart of the American Senate. It is indeed a landmark of the separatist, federal tendency, the citadel of states rights. It is intended also to be a more dignified and deliberate body than the National

Council, and to exert a restraining influence on the latter. But there are many vital distinctions which should be made between the Senate of the United States and the Council of States. There is an entire absence of uniformity in the manner in which the two members of the latter from each canton are elected. Some cantons name them by popular vote, others by the Great Council; the length of term differs, as does the relation of the deputy to his canton. Furthermore, the Council of States lacks prerogatives of its own to distinguish it from the lower house. It has neither the dignity of a hereditary or indirectly elected upper chamber, nor has it the power necessary to attract to it men of ability and note. The faded prestige of the Council, and its anomalous position, form two notable points of weakness in the Swiss governmental system.

In the Federation the voters do not, as they do in the cantons, have the right to initiate laws which the Assembly has neglected to frame. They may, however, review the Assembly's action. All laws of general application, which are not specially urgent (budgets and subsidies are usually excepted) are suspended for ninety days, until there has been an opportunity for 30,000 voters, or the Great Councils of eight cantons, to petition for a referendum upon them. An adverse majority in the popular vote will undo the work of the Federal Assembly. Practically ten per cent of the laws within the domain of the system have been referred to the public since the adoption of the referendum, always at the petition of the people rather than of the cantons.

The federal referendum for constitutional changes is obligatory, and is conducted in much the same way as the cantonal system. It differs from the legislative ref-

erendum in that it employs the initiative as a preliminary step, if occasion arises. Fifty thousand voters may at any time demand a revision of part or all of the constitution of the Confederation. If the Federal Assembly approves, it must draft an amendment accordingly and submit it to a popular vote. In case it disapproves, it must, nevertheless, consult the people as to whether there shall be a revision. A popular approval makes it necessary for the Assembly to take steps against its will. The Federal Assembly must submit the proposed amendment, and, if approved, incorporate it in the Constitution. It may at the same time offer a counter proposal of its own.

Several interesting consequences of the use of the initiative and referendum are worthy of mention. The critics who apprehended that the referendum would open the flood-gates to the demagogues and to hasty mob-judgment, have been conclusively proven wrong. Between 1874 and 1906, of the twenty-nine laws proposed, only ten were accepted, and of the eighteen constitutional amendments two-thirds were approved. Apparently the crowd is conservative. It has been found to dislike many labor bills, whose ultimate effect would have been beneficial to the multitude; it has a marked antipathy for elaborate bills, and for suggestions for spending more money. In the days when the budget was subjected to the referendum, it was, more often than not, rejected. Sir Henry Maine has well described the reason: "It is possible, by exhortation or agitation, to produce in the mind of the average citizen a vague impression that he desires a particular change. But, when the agitation has settled down on the dregs, when the excitement has died away, when the subject has been threshed out, when the law

is before him in all its detail, he is sure to find in it much that is likely to disturb his habits, his ideas, his prejudices, or his interests; and so, in the long run, he votes 'No' to every proposal." At least it is true that many voters reject a bill, nine-tenths of which they approve, because of an objectionable one-tenth.

There are other arguments than the conservatism of the people which have been adduced against the initiative and referendum. Their use is somewhat spasmodic. They have been much employed since their adoption, but their use has resulted rather from bursts of public interest than from desire for intelligent progress. Some allege that the sense of responsibility in the legislature is lowered by the knowledge that its acts are likely to be overridden by the voters; but this is balanced by the fact that in the first thirty years of referendum law-making, nine-tenths of the laws were made by the Federal Assembly alone. It seems to be established that fewer men vote on referendum questions than vote for the election of officers. Switzerland, however, is so far ahead of many countries in the matter of abstentions that this can hardly be urged as an objection. A more serious obstacle is the fact no system has yet been devised for the satisfactory discussion of a projected measure, in order to enlighten the electorate. Although the bills are distributed to the voters beforehand, and debates are staged in the towns, these traps to catch the public eye are worth little in view of the large expenses which they occasion.

Yet whatever academic objections may be urged against the initiative and the referendum, the fact remains that the Swiss are so well content with direct government that it is on the increase in Switzerland. At the beginning

of the century there was an agitation for the election of the Federal Council, or cabinet, directly by the people. The project failed, but better success attended plans to extend proportional representation and the obligatory initiative and referendum to federal elections and laws. Although these bills have been defeated, they still command a considerable following, and their ultimate adoption is not unlikely.

The primary reason for the continued fondness for popular government is that this régime alone satisfies the Swiss instinct, and corresponds to Swiss tradition. "The only democracy in the world which cannot be betrayed is the Swiss. . . . The people must be sovereigns because, in the long run and on the average, their decisions will be the most unselfish and the wisest." If the Swiss are deceived in legislation, it is by themselves. Switzerland displays a most instructive intermixture of popular and representative government. The initiative supplies the positive legislative power to the public, without which the veto, provided by the referendum, would be incomplete. Certainly this mingling of the two systems produces as good results as does the order of machine-made representative government under the rule of the Boss in the United States. The Swiss have a check upon their deputies, which makes the latter more anxious to ascertain the mind of their constituents.

They have, more than most other nations of the world, put government in its proper place, taught it to represent the deliberate mind of the majority, and made their elected magistrates public servants rather than public dictators.

CHAPTER XXXI

BOSS RULE IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

SPAIN is perhaps one of the most conspicuous examples of the states which appropriated English parliamentarism in the early nineteenth century in the fond expectation that once entered on the statute books, parliamentary institutions would thereby blossom into full maturity. This wholesale copying of English models without consideration of differences in race led nowhere; for despite the traditional precedent found for nineteenth century liberalism in the medieval Cortes of Spain, the Spanish are without the rich and varied background of self-government, which some other nations possess. As a result Spain has afforded the spectacle of modern politics struggling with the prejudices and the popular apathy of the days of Philip the Second.

Democratic government was foredoomed to be chiefly nominal because of the influence which the kings have exerted upon the Cortes ever since the Middle Ages, in the attempt to reduce the importance of the people's representatives. The power which belonged to the king at the beginning of the nineteenth century, passed later into the hands of the Cabinet. At present the only functions directly and personally exercised by the King are the dissolution of the Cortes, the calling of an election, and the nomination or dismissal of ministers. Sovereignty, therefore, really resides, not in the nation nor in

the Cortes, but in the Cabinet, which depends upon the confidence of the King, who is moved by the advice of the old camarilla, a shadowy military and ecclesiastical oligarchy. Thus, arrived at the end of the lane, we find that we are not so very far from the two classes which have ruled Spain ever since the beginning of the recovery of her territory from the Moors.

Until Napoleon invaded Spain, the country was ruled by an absolute monarch without the intervention, during the eighteenth century, of the Cortes, or assembly of the estates. The effect of the capture of the Bourbon monarch by Napoleon, and of the removal of a despotic, military government, was not unlike the recent revolution in Russia. A people hitherto untutored in self-government now produced politicians of considerable ability, who had acquired a doctrinaire knowledge of politics from the study of the English system and the French Revolution. An assembly, elected by universal suffrage, constructed *de novo* the Constitution of 1812, later the model for revolutionists in other parts of the Continent.

The Constitution was a close copy of the French instrument of 1791. It gave the executive power to the King and his ministers. The legislative function belonged to the Cortes, a single chamber, elected by indirect universal suffrage and named for a two years' term.

The Constitution of 1812 declared in solemn terms that sovereignty resided in the people; but sixty years of almost continuous absolutism followed the restoration of the monarchy in 1814, until in 1869 another liberal constitution reaffirmed the doctrine that the nation was the basis of the powers of government. The most important liberal advance made during this long period was

the Statute of 1834, an adaptation of the Charte of Louis XVIII in France. The Queen Regent Christina convoked the Cortes, for the first time, in two houses: a chamber of *Proceres*, or peers, and a chamber of *Procuradores*, or deputies. The former were grandees of large income, or wealthy appointees of the Crown; the deputies were required to have an income of six hundred dollars and were chosen by indirect election among the property owners. If this assembly was but little representative, the ministry was still less so. It owed no obligation to the Cortes, and could persuade the Queen to dissolve that body at will. Here was, however, the formal beginning of ministerial government, and, as we shall see, this diluted responsibility of the government was nearly as direct as that under the present régime.

The introduction of cabinet government was followed by a seemingly interminable series of civil wars, revolutions, and military dictatorships, and by a brief attempt at a republic between February 12, 1873, and December 29, 1874. In the fifty years following 1834, no less than 78 ministries and 450 ministers held office, not one lasting for three years. In 1874 Alphonso XII of the Bourbon dynasty was restored to the throne under a constitution, which embodied features of several of the dozen constitutions which Spain has had in the last century.

The Cortes, or Congreso, to-day comprises a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The former is of curiously mixed membership, having senators who sit by virtue of their own right, by virtue of royal appointment, or by that of election. The first class includes the sons of the King, generals of the army and admirals of the fleet, the archbishops, the heads of the Supreme Court, the Council of State, and other high tribunals, and grandees

enjoying an income equivalent to twelve thousand dollars from landed property.

The King is allowed wide latitude in the choice of a portion of the Senate. He may thus honor or reward the ex-presidents of either chamber, ministers, deputies who have sat in three different chambers or who have been in Parliament for eight years, bishops, grandees, high officers of the army and navy, ambassadors who have served two years abroad, and presidents or senior professors of the various colleges and universities. In addition, are eligible those who for two years have had an income of four thousand dollars, or have paid direct taxes of eight hundred dollars, provided they have held one of the lesser offices in the government.

At least one-half of the Senate must be elected by the several electoral colleges constituted to represent the higher interests in the state. These one hundred and eighty members are chosen as follows: one for each archdiocese, elected by the archbishop, bishops, and delegates of the chapters; one for each of the six royal academies; one for each of the ten universities; one for each of five districts, named by the agricultural societies within the district; and the remainder by electoral colleges composed of local officials and the largest tax-payers. In reality the bourgeoisie and the laborers are virtually excluded from representation in the Senate, which is a purely class body. The agricultural societies are small and exclusive clubs. Most of the senators are named by the government through its control of the local administration.

Universal suffrage for elections to the Chamber of Deputies was not adopted until 1890. By a law of that year, amended in 1907, all male Spaniards, twenty-five

years old, can vote directly for their representatives. Most of the districts elect but a single deputy, although twenty-eight of the larger ones employ *scrutin de liste*. Those have the right to be proclaimed candidates and to have representatives on the electoral bureau, who are ex-senators, or ex-deputies, who obtained a fiftieth of the vote at a previous election, or who are presented by a specified number of voters. Every citizen, however, is at liberty to run as an independent candidate. The polls are held between eight in the morning and four in the afternoon on election Sunday; men vote by a secret ballot of white paper, which is deposited in a glass urn.

Proportional representation has never gained a large following in Spain because of another scheme, the incomplete vote, which successfully protects minorities there. If there are from two to four deputies on the ticket, the elector votes for one less than the number presented, if there are from four to eight, for two less, and so on. By concentration, therefore, the small parties, which abound in Spain, can make their votes effective. The suffrage is compulsory, unless a person has through age or judicial rank attained a dignity which excuses him from the duty. That the law for compulsory voting is but weakly enforced is evidenced by the fact that in the elections of February 1918, in Madrid, abstaining voters numbered over forty per cent of those on the lists, while in some country districts only about twenty per cent came to the polls. Sixty deputies were declared elected by default, because they had no competitors.

The chronic high percentage of abstentions is only one index of the disgusted apathy, with which the Spanish regard politics. The crudities of parliamentary life are too blatantly unconcealed to allow the voters any illu-

sions about self-government. The deputies are almost all lawyers, professional politicians, or bureaucrats; commerce, industry, and agriculture are not really represented. The majority of the Chamber has the most rudimentary idea of the questions which it is called together to discuss. The deputy's first duty is to put himself at the beck and call of a party chief, who dispenses both orders and plums. Parliamentary life is then occupied largely with personal intrigues among these chieftains. Legislation is cut and dried, and there is a superabundance of barnstorming oratory on picayunes, while serious matters, such as the budget, pass almost without debate. As the deputies receive no salary, the leisurely sessions last only two or three hours a day, and Parliament sits but a few months.

The malady which has brought Spain to this nadir of parliamentarism is known as *caciquism*, or the rule of the boss. But there is a double aspect to the disease, the use of fraud and actual violence, and the anæsthetic effect of boss rule even at its best. Corruption has been almost universally admitted, if not deplored, by Spain's leading statesmen and politicians. Castelar, the famous Republican, dictator-president in the republican interim of 1873-1874, said: "Each election is a misfortune; each campaign meeting a market; each elector a slave; each minister a sultan; each candidate a fomentor of public immorality; each election return a model of ignominy." The elections are battles, not of votes, but of falsifications. Illiterate voters, some time deceased, reappear at the polls on election day, having apparently learned to write beyond the Styx. All the known methods for falsifying lists or returns are in practice in Spanish elections, from the pudding ballot and the repeating voter to the offi-

cial return of a list on which the numbers have been omitted, to be filled in at the Government's pleasure. The caciques change the hour or the place of the polls, and if this does not exclude undesirable voters, violence is used, particularly in Andalusia.

Electoral fraud might, however, be judged a sporadic symptom which time and public education would eradicate, were it not for the pathological aspect of the whole cacique régime in Spain. The cacique is the microbe which infects a diseased and anemic political organism. Congenital, constitutional debility gives him his entrée into the Spanish system, and the prolonged, political novitiate of the Spanish people has allowed him to remain there, to grow and prosper. He is the go-between between the individual and the state, the modern substitute for the feudal local corporations, guilds, and estates, and in that sense a feudal relic. The cacique is an individual of much audacity and few scruples who, through his relations with the administration, has the prerogative of disposing of all the favors in his district. Without his consent no one can issue a writ, name a judge, or obtain a license to do business. He can free men from jail, exempt them from military service, and alter their tax quotas or their fines. Roads, tramways and canals are the wires by which he manipulates his henchmen. He is able to annul previous purchases of the public lands and to buy them at a lower price; he can, moreover, alter the public accounts, if necessary, in order to favor his expenditures.

Elections are a bargain between the Government and the caciques. A ministry comes into power through the favor of the King or a Madrid camarilla, dissolves the Cortes, and proceeds to mold from the electorate an as-

sembly to conform to its program. Once the contract is made with a cacique, the result is assured in his fief. His arguments are too persuasive to be resisted by those electors who take the trouble to vote. Authorities state that the Opposition has never been known to win an election in Spain! Ministries used to bungle by getting unanimous chambers elected, but to-day they more shrewdly make pre-election bargains, which give minorities a sufficient number of seats to keep their hand in. These overwhelming victories are scored by means of official pressure through the caciques, aided by the local bureaucracy. In the elections of 1918 the government swore that, for the first time, it would see that the voting went through entirely without interference; but the same ancient story was recorded once more. The government indicates clearly the recipients of its favor, it loans them money, it puts the official organization at their service. In the matter of official pressure there are no Pyrenees.

The cacique is sometimes defended as a necessity, on the ground that he is the only force which unites an indifferent people to the state. Without his control the elections would be fierce and bloody battles between bitter personalities, since Spain's political institutions are as yet higher than the social discipline and self-restraint of its people. The answer is that under cacique rule self-restraint or even political self-interest will never be attained by the great bulk of the population, who look with disdain or with despair on the prospects of a parliamentary career. The cacique is the greatest profiteer by politics. To make his profits he has usurped the national sovereignty, and practices his trade outside the law. He makes no adequate return for his gains, either in insuring good government, or in the political education of the

nation. Even though the caciques were men of integrity and ability, their parasitical system would be bad. Spain can hope for the benefits of actual parliamentary government only as she is able to develop an electorate of sufficient education and public spirit to take over the affairs of government, which now, but for the hands of the caciques, would fall to the ground.

PORTUGAL

Constitutional life has been as precarious, as fictitious in its values, in Portugal, as it has been in Spain. Like its larger sister, Portugal has followed French and English models, with no appreciation of the necessity of intelligent and disinterested citizenship in working those systems. Because dissatisfied with the results of monarchical government, she struck boldly out upon the republican path, which is infinitely more difficult for her to follow in her circumstances. The theories of her statesmen have so far outstripped the capacities of her citizens that with nominally democratic institutions Portugal is one of the hardest-ridden states in Europe to-day, for the reason that an iron-handed government is the only possible government.

The Constitutional Charter granted by Dom Pedro IV in 1826 established quasi-popular government in Portugal, which until the time of Napoleon had experienced only a thoroughly absolutist rule. The political incompetence of a newly liberated people delivered politics over to the play of personal jealousies and mercenary cliques. After the attempts of the King's brother, Miguel, to usurp the throne had failed, his followers, nevertheless, retained his name as the symbol of the partisans of absolutism.

The other principal parties were the Chartists, the supporters of the constitution, and the Septembrists, who desired a more radical charter on the lines of the Spanish Constitution of 1812. In 1852 the two latter parties amalgamated as *Regeneradores*, or Regenerators, and internecine party strife to some extent diminished. Changes in ministry continued, however, to be kaleidoscopic, for the parties bartered and sold to each other in a rotative system of tenure of office.

The Cortes in the Portuguese monarchy consisted of the *Camara dos Pares*, or House of Peers, and the *Camara dos Deputados*, or House of Deputies. At the close of the monarchical régime there sat in the upper chamber the princes of the blood who had reached their majority, the archbishops and the bishops, the few surviving hereditary peers whose title to office was being gradually abolished, and some ninety appointees of the king. The appointed peers were at least forty years old and were men of large wealth.

The deputies to the lower house were elected by a system which compared well on paper with any in Europe for liberality and progressiveness. All citizens, twenty-one years old, were entitled to vote, if they paid a tax equivalent to about fifty cents, or were able to read and write. The great prevalence of illiteracy (seventy per cent of the population being unable to read or write), and the large number of causes of disqualification really narrowed the electorate far more strictly than might have been surmised from the letter of the law. Deputies were required to possess an income equivalent to four hundred and twenty-five dollars or to have enjoyed an education in the secondary schools. After 1852 election was direct.

But since good laws do not of themselves a democracy

make, representative government in Portugal, during the nineteenth century, was very largely a farce. The Ministry kept, at large expense to the public treasury, a Government Administrator attached to every municipality, whose business it was to work the elections. He coöperated with the local boss, the cacique, an individual quite as predatory and quite as efficient as his Spanish counterpart. As a result of the joint labors of the cacique and the Administrator the Government candidate was almost invariably returned, unless the Opposition had made a bargain for a few seats. The Ministry was created through some Lisbon intrigue without reference to public opinion in the rest of the country. Once in office it proceeded to "make" a Cortes, in which it commanded a majority, by ordering a general election. One famous politician declared: "I buy my deputies ready made." It is an unknown phenomenon in Portugal for a cabinet to be defeated at the polls; the difficulty is rather to adjust the seats granted to the Opposition, so that it will rest contented, though impotent. The *Regeneradores* and the *Progressistas* under the monarchy divided the loaves and fishes between them, to the almost complete exclusion of the Republicans, who in reality commanded a large following in the country after 1890.

The growth of Republican sentiment in Portugal was due to dissatisfaction with the corruption and inefficiency of the government. Portuguese Republicans were discontented patriots. Budget deficits occurred practically every year after 1831, and amounted in 1910 to an enormous sum for a small country. Yet large expenditures gave the tax-payers no substantial returns for their sacrifices. In 1910 the national defenses had been almost abandoned, and the navy of a once proud, seafaring na-

tion consisted of a few decrepit pre-dreadnoughts. The treasury had been drained by illegal advances to the late King, Dom Carlos, and by an army of fifty thousand functionaries holding a host of official sinecures. The post-mortem held over the Portuguese monarchy after the Revolution declared that death was due to moral bankruptcy and intellectual inanition. It had made no adequate returns for the burdens it imposed.

A doctrinaire Republican Club was formed in 1890 and for twenty years maintained a desultory and subterranean warfare of intrigue. That it was successful in making considerable headway was due as much to the negligence of the Monarchists as to the zeal of the Republicans. The fortune of the Republican cause was really made by the King's act in 1906 in calling a reform minister, João Franco, reputed to be a man of iron. Franco's economies, and his arbitrary threats of dissolving Parliament, as well as the scandals in the king's treasury which he was called upon to gloze over, threw the dissident Monarchists into alliance with the Republicans. After bitter wrangling over the King on the floor of the Chambers, the monarch and the Prince Royal were assassinated in the streets of Lisbon on February 1, 1908.

The apathy with which the country received this shocking crime might have warned the monarchy, if it had had eyes and ears. Indeed the government probably realized that it was being undermined, but it was apparently impotent to start counter-mines or to take aggressive action of any sort. The Republicans had the vigorous support of the Free-Masons and the Carbonari, who were violently anti-clerical, and these three factions in October, 1910, brought about a revolution in the streets of Lisbon, in which the nation at large had little share. The coup

d'état was staged by ambitious emulators of the Frenchmen of 1848, who did not consider the difference between the content and character of French and Portuguese life and politics. The rest of the country acquiesced passively, in the hope that possibly the Republicans might be more competent to govern than had the Monarchists.

Dr. Machado, a member of the first ministry of the Republic, said, "For the first time there will be an election without the intervention of the Government." But it was too much to expect. Ever since the advent of the Republic, the party in power has been hampered by the fact that if the oligarchy of the Carbonari, who have controlled affairs with the assistance of other radical Republicans, lost its footing, the republican cause would be only the forlorn hope of a minority in the nation. It has been under the absolute necessity of returning Congresses which were packed with Republican supporters, and to do so it has resorted freely to the means which have proven so effective all over the Iberian peninsula. Elections before the Revolution and elections after that event are as alike as Tweedledum and Tweedledee.

The Republicans have indeed thrown royalist methods into the shade by the ruthlessness with which they have fought their party battles. For much of the last decade the forty thousand Carbonari have been masters of the streets of the towns, and have visited violent and summary punishment on newspapers or business firms which were prominently monarchist. The courts are no longer allowed to judge impartially but have their instructions to inflict the maximum penalty for political offenses. In its effort to destroy the "Christian myth" the Republic has exaggerated the most excessive anti-clericalism of France. During the first years of the Republic any

teacher who mentioned God in his classes was suspended, his school was closed. Portugal is probably the only country which has seen its children parading the streets with banners: "No God, no religion." Hundreds of political prisoners of the highest character have been kept in prison for months without trial, or condemned before a military tribunal. A noted priest was immured for sixteen months, then sentenced without evidence to six years' solitary confinement and to ten years' penal deportation.

When politics are conducted on these tactics, the letter of the electoral laws must not be taken for the fact. Fair enough, upon their face, those laws are. The lower chamber, called the National Council, is elected for three years by direct suffrage. To distinguish the upper house from the lower, the former is chosen indirectly by all the municipal councils, and is renewable one-half at a time every three years. The Government's control of the municipal administrations gives it the guiding hand in the composition of the upper chamber. Both chambers unite to elect the President of the Republic, with a mandate of four years and without the right of reëlection. Upon the basis of the Constitution of 1911 Portugal may, in the course of time, work out a sound and representative government. At present she is ruled by an oligarchy, and by an oligarchy which has sapped the economic, religious, and intellectual life of the country, as well as its political integrity.

CHAPTER XXXII

ELECTIONS AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN THE BALKAN STATES AND THE TURKISH EMPIRE

THE story of the Turkish Empire in the nineteenth century has been one of long and painful dismemberment. After the Congress of Vienna Turkey entered upon the stage, which came upon feudal Germany in the Middle Ages. The principle of nationality cut swathes back and forth and obliquely over the Balkan peninsula. The Moslems made no attempt to understand or to amalgamate the Christians, whom they insulted with the name of rayahs, unprotected flocks, good only to be sheared. In the course of the century the Christian repaid the Moslem's contempt by stripping off leaf after leaf of the Turkish artichoke, until to-day the very core is barely left.

The first to rise against the Turks, the second, by one year, to gain their independence, were the Serbians. Miloch Obrenowitch succeeded, by ingratiating himself with the Sultan, in winning for himself in 1830 the title of Prince of the Serbians. What the Serbians won by negotiation, the Greeks gained by warfare, in which they were aided by the contributions of Greeks in every country, and later by the armed intervention of the European concert. After a merciless war of eight years' length (1821-1829) Greece became a kingdom entirely independent of Turkey.

At the same time the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, (later Rumania), were made practically free states. From 1830 on, both Serbia and the principalities were ambitious to change autonomy under Turkish suzerainty into national independence. Their opportunity came after the shocking massacres in Bulgaria in 1876 had fixed the attention of Europe on the atrocity of Turkish rule, and had brought Russia as protector of the Balkan Christians, into actual war with the Porte. Rumania declared its independence and with Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro crushingly defeated the Turkish army in a war of nine months' duration. By the Treaty of Berlin (1878) all three of the Balkan allies achieved their complete independence.

The same treaty established an unnatural division of Bulgaria into Bulgaria proper, with autonomy and a prince of its own choosing, and Eastern Rumelia with a Christian governor appointed by the Sultan. The latter province resented the artificial separation from its sister, and in 1885 by a bloodless revolution against its governor declared its union with Bulgaria. The two Bulgarias pronounced themselves independent of Turkey in 1908, when the Young Turk Revolution threatened to tighten its grip on the few provinces which remained to the Sultan in Europe. Such has been the process of division of the Balkan peninsula. With these facts in mind we shall turn to the story of the governmental development of its component parts.

I. GREECE

The acquisition of national freedom was not at once followed in Greece by the establishment of constitutional

government. The Powers decided that a monarchy was preferable to the Hellenic Republic which was desired by some of the Greek revolutionaries, saturated with the most advanced ideas of western Europe in 1830. Otto, a younger son of the King of Bavaria, was prevailed upon to accept the crown, and arrived in February, 1833, bringing with him a Bavarian staff, which proved to be largely ornamental. King Otto's realm was exhausted by long and ruthless warfare with the Turks, infested with brigands, and in a state bordering on savagery. He was led by necessity as well as by inclination to rule as an absolute monarch, repressing sternly the local independence, which had grown up under Turkish rule.

Although the Greeks had preserved little of the actual glory that was Greece, they uncompromisingly cherished its tradition, and they submitted with ill grace to a Christian, in place of a Moslem, autocrat. They were a peasant and a sailor folk of democratic ways. The pathless mountain country was still divided, as in antiquity, into local groups under popular chieftains. The Grecian army recruited from this liberty-loving soil forced Otto I in 1844 to accept a liberal constitution of the type so widely adopted in Europe a decade later. Greece was thus the first of the Balkan states to possess a national assembly of two Houses, the Lower elected by universal suffrage, and a responsible ministry, which was really made or unmade by the majority in Parliament. In the election of the deputies the ballot and *scrutin de liste* were employed. The general lack of education and the difficulty of earning a livelihood made politics the game of professional politicians and government officials. As the polls lasted a whole week, they were the occasion of the most varied abuses, official pres-

sure, false ballots and counts, and very frequent bloody assaults. Because of the intensity of political jealousy the ballot was of very little use as a safeguard for the secrecy of the vote, and was responsible for constant intimidation.

The incompetent and unpopular King Otto was driven from the throne by a revolution in 1862, and the voters of the nation unanimously selected a ruler from another house, Prince William of Denmark, who assumed the title of George I. His arrival was attended by the promulgation of a constitution (1864) more democratic than its predecessor. The Senate of the earlier law had accomplished nothing except to draw its own salary, and it was now abolished. "The Assembly thus freed itself of the one salutary check on its action; it has since been the tool of demagogues, and subservient to the inordinately sensitive and passionate public opinion, which is so marked a feature of modern Greek democracy." This needed balance-wheel was restored in 1911 by the revival of a Council of State with the function of supervising the constitutionality of laws. The lower legislative body is the Boulé, which to-day numbers about 180 members and is elected for four years.

The electoral system established in 1864 and amplified in 1877 continues in use to-day, and is distinguished by numerous peculiarities from any other system in Europe. Ever since its earlier constitution Greece has retained manhood suffrage for all Greek citizens over twenty-one, resident in a commune. Every voter twenty-five years old, who is not an official, is eligible to the Boulé. The campaigning period normally lasts for a month and a half, and nominating petitions, signed by twelve electors, must be presented at least twenty-five days before the

election. The candidate must at the same time deposit 200 drachmæ (\$40) for election expenses entailed by the novel system of voting. The aspirant is expected to carry on a house-to-house campaign in the rural districts. He is compelled by etiquette to accept whatever hospitality his admirers thrust upon him, and after a spirited contest a participant sometimes adopts a strict diet. He must at the same time be ready with plenty of tobacco and wine for the deputations which come to call on him. These social amenities take the place of the public meetings and stump speeches familiar in other countries.


The polling generally takes place in a school-house, and lasts from sunrise to sunset on but a single day, which is always Sunday. The experience of the country with the ballot under the constitution of 1844 demonstrated that in Greece it was no safeguard whatsoever for the secrecy of the vote. In 1864 the government adopted a scheme, long in use under the British protectorate in the Ionian Isles, which brings to mind the classic days of ancient Greek democracy. On entering the polling place one is confronted by a long row of tin boxes, as many in number as the candidates, each locked with three keys. The box is divided into compartments in which are two sacks, one white and one black, and bearing the name of the candidate to whom the box belongs. This name appears conspicuously on the outside of the box as well. To prevent any mistake the outside is painted in a corresponding black and white, with *Nai* (yes) on the side of the white sack and *Ochi* (no) on that of the black.

As the elector passes down the line, he is given by the attendant at each box a lead ball, which he drops into the desired compartment. The most complete secrecy is

insured by lining the compartments with cloth to prevent the sound of the falling pellet from being heard. The voters are admitted by fives and perform their duties with rapidity, yet with few blunders. The vote by ball restricts the voter to the choice of one of the candidates who has an urn. He has not the liberty afforded by the ballot, of casting his vote for any one of his choice. The election is more like ballotage between rigidly prescribed candidates in other countries. Greece chose to pay this price, rather than to gain the secrecy of the vote by political self-restraint or legal penalties.

Greek elections are much to be admired in regard to the legislation provided for maintaining their accuracy and purity. Unfortunately a wise body of laws is not always the only protection necessary. Each candidate is entitled to a representative at the polls with full power to inspect the proceedings, put his seal on the urns, and be present at the count. Great authority is vested in the judiciary, which revises and approves the electoral lists; which presides over the voting; and which counts the votes and announces the result.

In Greece perhaps more than in other Balkan states internal political development has been stultified by the all-absorbing question of national expansion, by the disadvantage of laboring under the Hellenistic glamor. Politics, "the organized effort to improve the internal economy of the community," can not interest, so long as the existence of the state under tolerable conditions of life is not sure. The Greek thinks in terms of Albania, of Macedonia, of Crete, rather than in terms of Poor Laws, Agrarian Reform, or Elections. He has not had the success of his chief rival—next the Turk—the more sober and practical Bulgarian, in combining a stable political



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régime with a successful foreign policy. Until the advent of Venizelos, the iron statesman of Greece, the country showed little hope of coming nearer that combination. But with the partial satisfaction of her national ambitions by the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and the return of Greek emigrants saturated with the political ideas of the West, Greece has to-day more material resources and a greater opportunity than ever before for a sound constitutional régime.

II. RUMANIA

The contemporary political history of Rumania begins with the Rumanian Renaissance introduced by the Revolution of 1848 in the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. These little territories on the lower Danube have from time immemorial been the sport of barbarian invaders from Asia and Northern Europe. "The possession of the regions on the lower Danube passed from one nation to another, but none endangered the Rumanian nation as a national entity. The Roman element bent their heads while the storm passed over them, clinging to the old places until the advent of happier days, when they were able to stand up and stretch their limbs." Although for centuries the prey of the Turks, who ruled them, after 1700, through Greek governors, or hospodars, who were rich enough to buy the office, the two principalities gave up neither their desire for union nor their passion for independence. The former they achieved in 1862; the latter was granted in part by the Treaty of Paris (1856) and in full by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). Both were made inevitable by the quickened national spirit, which followed the gallant but abortive revolt

of 1848, and which was carried through all the capitals of Europe by an ardent propaganda.

During the critical, formative period, as at other points in her history, Rumania owed much to France. Bonds of tradition linked her with the romance countries, of which France was the chief. Michelet and other French intellectuals lent valuable aid to the Rumanian propaganda, which had been inspired by the French revolt against Louis Philippe. The movement for unity and independence appealed with force to Napoleon III's sympathy for nationalism, and made him an invaluable ally in the European concert. The Treaty of Paris provided for the calling of an assembly in each principality, elected by universal suffrage, to formulate the wishes of the Rumanians for consideration by the Congress. The Turks so manipulated the elections that the Assemblies were strongly anti-unionist; whereupon Napoleon III had the first elections quashed and another series held, in which but three of the original eighty-four members were elected. The Assemblies pronounced the union of the provinces an immediate necessity.

Gratitude for Napoleon's championship of their cause led the Rumanians to regard France not only as their savior but as their model. Men of wealth and taste went to Paris for their education, and brought French culture back with them, making Bucharest a miniature French capital. French language, French tutors, and French literature, first introduced in the days of the cultured Greek governors in the previous century, received a new impetus. The Constitution of 1866 was patterned chiefly after the constitution of Belgium, on which, as we have seen, France had exerted a considerable influence. For its courts, its code of laws, its centralized bureau-

cracy, its departments and arrondissements, its prefects and sub-prefects, the new nation drew almost without exception upon its imperial patron.

The career of Colonel Alexander Couza, the first hospodar who was elected (1859) over both Moldavia and Wallachia, was in many respects not dissimilar to that of Louis Napoleon. In his desire to carry out certain notable reforms of the Church and emancipation of the peasants, he collided with the great proprietors in the National Assembly and was forced to imitate the coup d'état of the French adventurer. He posed as the champion of the people by establishing universal suffrage, with the real intention of swamping the nobility in the peasant vote. Arbitrary control of the budget, official candidature, and the other paraphernalia of dictatorship, however, sufficed to maintain him for only two years, when he succumbed to a palace revolution of the nobility, whose hatred he had earned.

Prince Charles of the house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was elected ruler in 1866, in order to avoid the jealous broils which had entangled native hospodars. He was the father of the present king. Charles at once promulgated a constitution establishing a liberal monarchy with a responsible ministry and a Parliament of two elective chambers. One hundred and ten of the one hundred and twenty members of the Senate were elected by two colleges of electors; the upper college, which named two-thirds of the senators, included men with a revenue of more than 2,000 francs a year; the second college was composed of those whose income was between 800 and 2,000 francs. The Chamber of Deputies, 178 in number, was elected by three colleges similar to the above, except that the property qualification was lower. The third

college included all tax-payers, but unless its members had an income of three hundred francs and could read and write, they must vote, not for a deputy, but for electors in the proportion of one elector to fifty voters. Thus the illiterate peasants, who were vastly in the majority in the population of the country, were excluded from the direct election of their representatives. Their share in the government was further diminished by the fact that the two wealthier colleges elected at least three-fourths, if not more, of the deputies of each district.

The system introduced in 1866, and slightly amplified in 1878 and 1884, continues in use to the present day. The root of the suffrage problem in Rumania has been the agrarian question: the fact that six million of the seven and a quarter million inhabitants are peasants, and that sixty per cent of the population are illiterate. Illiteracy is rife among the rural classes. The peasants were originally holders of two-thirds of the land, for which they owed payment in kind and several days' labor yearly to the absentee landlords, the boyards. The enclosure movement, which in eighteenth century England gradually crowded the small farmers off their holdings in favor of large estates, had its counterpart in Rumania, where the boyards sought continually to encroach on the common land. The Rural Law of Couza (1864), although believed to be a blessing to the peasants, was actually a boon to the boyards. It abolished dues in labor and in kind, and made the peasants full proprietors, instead of tenants, of one-third of the land; but it made an outright gift of the remaining two-thirds to the landlords, and in addition compelled the peasants to pay compensation to the state for their exemption from dues.

The result of this one-sided arrangement has been ca-

lamitous for the peasantry. The supply of land has been so little sufficient that the younger generation has been driven into Rumania's infant industries, where they earn far less than the usual rate for agricultural laborers. The boyards rent out their two-thirds of the land to a new class of middlemen-farmers, who work it on a large scale, with which the peasants with their crude methods cannot compete. The land belongs to a few thousand absentee landlords, who waste their income at Jassy or Bucharest, and pay the rural laborers such starvation wages that five uprisings have occurred in twenty years.

The great landlords, who, as we have seen, control the elections to both chambers of Parliament, have been able by the complicated electoral system to prevent any radical attempt to solve the agrarian problem. "A small class of politicians, with the complicity of a large army of covetous and unscrupulous officials, live in Oriental indolence out of the sufferings of four-fifths of the Rumanian nation." Probably over two-thirds of the peasantry are illiterate, because the Chambers do not vote an adequate educational budget. The great peasant class is in politics almost wholly inarticulate. "The large majority, and by far the sanest part of the Rumanian nation, are thus fraudulently kept outside of the political and social life of the country."

The hardships cheerfully and gloriously borne by the peasant army in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 made some sort of compensation absolutely necessary. The Liberal cabinet of Bratiano, which took office in January, 1914, decided upon the almost revolutionary step of paring down all estates to 2,400 acres, and dividing the surplus land among the landless peasants. There is to be but a single electoral class, voting directly. Manhood suffrage

at the age of twenty-one will be limited only by a literacy test. Bratiano advocates the representation of minorities; Jonescu, another leading statesman, urges the adoption of proportional representation. There is strong probability that the bill will go through substantially as introduced.

The conduct of elections is regulated by the law of 1866 as amended in 1884, and has points of resemblance to both French and Belgian procedure in the preparation of the lists, the formation of the electoral bureau, and the count. Electors must identify themselves by presenting their voter's cards. The secrecy of the vote is strictly guaranteed by the use of the ballot, secret voting booths, and voting envelopes. The ballots are not official, but are prepared by the candidates or the voters outside of the polling place. Their size and color is, however, fully described.

It is, perhaps, of academic interest to discuss the safeguards for the independence of elections in a country where a ministry practically never fails to secure a majority at the polls through the activity of its highly centralized bureaucracy. Neither the King, nor Parliament, nor the electors, can without regard to the other two make or unmake a Government. The cabinet system is akin to that of Germany, where the ruler interprets the wishes of the electorate and changes his ministers according to his interpretation of these. This method has advantages in a young country with a largely untrained body of citizens, which it does not possess in a matured body politic like the German Empire. It gives stability and continuity and tempers the acute personal rivalries of politics in a Latin country. Employed as discreetly and with as much loyalty to the parliamentary spirit,

as has been shown by Charles I and the present King Ferdinand, it has for Rumania substantial advantages, even though it lacks the educative power of real democratic government.

III. SERBIA

Before 1860 Serbia was little more than the barren field for internecine strife between its two leading houses, the descendants of Kara-George and of Miloch Obrenowitch, two swine merchants who embroiled their country in their contest for supremacy toward the end of the Napoleonic era. Little remains of the heroic age of Kara-George except the epics which commemorate its leader. Miloch Obrenowitch bequeathed to later days the autocratic caprice and the readiness to spill blood, which have sullied Serbian politics even in our own century. He ruled arbitrarily, encountering but little resistance from the Narodna Skupshtina, the general assembly of the heads of families. Rather than accept a constitution which Russia and Turkey attempted in 1837 to force upon him, Miloch abdicated. The principality was for thirty years thereafter too unsettled to permit of any other than a personal government.

The Liberal regency during the minority of Prince Milan (1872-1889) undertook the task of making Serbia a parliamentary state on Western lines. The Constitution of 1869 provided a State Council on the French pattern, appointed by the prince. There was nowhere in the population the material for an upper house. Under Turkish domination the Serbs had lost their own aristocracy, and become a nation of peasants and swineherds, holding of Moslem landlords. From early days

this homogeneous population was essentially democratic. The Skupshtina in 1869 was therefore made a single chamber, elected by universal suffrage, whose only aristocratic element consisted of a certain number of deputies appointed by the prince.

Party life, so far as it was not mere personal rancor disguised under Western party names, revolved about two fundamental policies of government. The Liberals, who had introduced the Constitution of 1869, desired to open Serbia through railways, commerce, and loans, still more fully to Western influences. To strengthen the country's resources for this campaign of expansion they favored the centralization of the government, a strong army, and the reduction of the importance of the Assembly. The Radicals, who spoke for the mass of the people, desired to be bothered neither with heavy taxes nor with a meddlesome bureaucracy. They cared little for expensive, Occidental government; they wished a stronger Skupshtina as a check upon the ambitions of the dynasty. The recognition of Serbia's complete independence from the Porte by the Congress of Berlin (1878) made no difference in these questions of internal politics.

The Radical party obtained from King Milan in 1888 a constitution more democratic than that of the Liberals in 1869. The former, although abrogated for a time by King Alexander, is in force at the present day. The eight members of the Cabinet are responsible both to the King and to the Skupshtina. The State Council consists of members appointed in part by the King and in part by the Assembly. By the elimination of the members nominated by the Crown the Skupshtina was made purely elective, while at the same time its share in legislation was greatly increased. Its one hundred and sixty-

six members are elected for four years by all male, Serbian citizens, over twenty-one years of age, who pay fifteen dinars (\$3) direct taxes. The members of *zadrugas*, family groups, are entitled to vote regardless of their tax payments. All voters who are thirty years old and pay thirty dinars taxes, are eligible; but at least two of the representatives of each province must have completed a university education or have filled one of certain specified offices.

Each of the seventeen provinces constitutes an electoral district, in which the deputies are elected by *scrutin de liste*. There is the usual provision for the presentation of lists of candidates, on which a party organization arranges the order of the candidates. The secrecy of the vote is nominally required, but as each ticket has its own voting urn, it is not difficult to discover how a vote is cast.

The Constitution provides for proportional representation according to a system not unlike that proposed for France.* The electoral quotient is obtained by dividing the total number of votes cast by the number of seats to be allotted; the places falling to each party equals the number of times this quotient is contained in the party vote. If a list does not obtain a vote equal to the quotient, its vote is attributed to the ticket which stood highest at the polls. The seats remaining after the first distribution are awarded according to the number of unrepresented votes left over in each party. The persons who prepare the ticket have considerable influence over the choice of deputies, for a party's seats are assigned according to the position of each candidate on the list, and it is impossible for the voter to change that arrangement.

* See page 384.

King Milan had as little taste for constitutional limitations as had the founder of his house, and in 1889, just fifty years after the abdication of Prince Miloch Obrenowitch, Milan followed in his footsteps. His youthful successor, Alexander, at the age of seventeen, arrested his Regents and dissolved the Skupshtina (1893). His reign became a determined struggle to overwhelm the Radicals by fair means or foul. He proscribed that party wholesale and revived the Liberal constitution of 1869, which in turn was suspended (1903) until he could stamp out the Radicals entirely. By abolishing the ballot he made it possible to pack the Assembly solidly with the supporters of an autocratic government.

The Radicals were driven to the usual expedient in the Balkans—a palace revolution—to prevent their own extirpation. Alexander had destroyed his popularity by an unfortunate morganatic marriage with one of his mother's ladies-in-waiting, Draga Mashin. The lady's beauty was beyond question; a slightly questionable past, she was not, like the Empress Josephine, granted the years to live down. It was a matter of public knowledge that Queen Draga was unable to provide an heir for the throne. This circumstance, together with the King's long succession of rash and arbitrary acts, gave ample grounds for a political revolution. On the night of June 10, 1903, a band of officers broke into the palace and with sordid and revolting brutality murdered the last rulers of the house of Obrenowitch. The behavior of the army, and the complacency of the politicians who benefited by the crime, disgusted Europe, and proved that in some parts of the Balkans it is only a thin veneer of Western polish which overlies the old instincts of barbarism.

King Peter of the house of Karageorgevitch was unani-

mously elected to the throne by the National Assembly, a Skupshтина of twice the ordinary size. He restored the Constitution of 1888 and all the laws, electoral and others, connected with it. Satisfied to rule as a constitutional monarch, he has made more secure a throne acquired by bloodshed of which he was personally guiltless. Serbia has undergone, since his accession, a noteworthy renaissance, in which, however, internal political development has been subordinated to an ambitious foreign policy.

IV. BULGARIA

The principality of Bulgaria, which emerged from the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, was a Russian creation. The Tsar had gone to war to liberate the suffering Christians from the Turk, with the full expectation that their gratitude would make them amenable to Russian hegemony. During the interval until a Prince could be chosen, the government was entrusted by the Powers to a Russian Commissioner, who made himself popular by his geniality and his open-handed hospitality. The Commissioner drew up an organic law, which was ratified by an Assembly of Bulgarian Notables on April 28, 1879, and which continues to be the constitution of Bulgaria to-day.

The Bulgarian fundamental law is therefore no indigenous product. There were probably very few natives, suddenly emancipated after years of political slavery, who could have devised the elaborate machinery for a constitutional state. But even had there been a Bulgarian Abbé Siéyès, he would have had little opportunity to display his talent. Russia was determined that the constitution of the principality should bind it to Russia, and for this reason the Government was made a peculiar

mixture of absolutism and democracy, apparently the work of two opposed minds.

By the autocratic provisions of the constitution the Prince was empowered to dissolve Parliament at will and to choose his ministers entirely independently of that body. On the other hand, the single chamber of Parliament, the Sobranje, was to be elected by universal manhood suffrage for all citizens over twenty-one. All voters, thirty years old, and able to read and write, were eligible for election. Other clauses provided for equal election districts, free compulsory education, and a free press. The Sobranje and its method of election, in point of fact, did correspond to social conditions in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people was almost entirely made up of an undifferentiated peasant class, holding its land from Turkish proprietors. There was neither the material for an upper house, nor the justification for an unequal franchise. For such a nation democracy was the natural order.

But the division of power between the Crown and the legislature is somewhat curious. The former alone creates the ministry; yet it cannot long maintain a government which does not correspond to public opinion. The Ministers may manipulate elections, or engineer legislation in arbitrary style, but it will do them little good, unless on the whole they command the confidence of the Sobranje, which has little initiative but considerable weight in the government. It has been said that Bulgaria really has two kings: the King and the Sobranje. Russia intentionally created a state in which by balancing an autocratic prince against a democratic assembly, it could check either one and thus dominate Bulgarian politics.

Elections in Bulgaria to-day are managed according to

the methods in vogue in western Europe, and are, so far as legislation is concerned, on a par with Belgium and France in the use of modern electoral devices. The two hundred and forty-five members of the Sobranje are elected for four years by proportional representation. Declarations of candidates must be signed by ten electors, and presented two weeks before the election, with notification of the intended color of the candidates' ballots. This announcement is published for the guidance of ignorant voters. The secrecy of the ballot is carefully safeguarded. Ballots are printed on vari-colored paper and distributed outside the polling place by party agents. The voter receives from the chairman of the polls an official envelope, which he carries into a booth for the purpose of folding his ballot into it.

Adopted in local elections in 1909, proportional representation was in 1912 extended to all elections. In order to get the large tickets desirable for the system, each department is constituted an electoral district. The method followed is similar to that proposed in France,* in that the electoral quotient is found by dividing the total vote cast by the number of seats to be allotted plus one. Each party ticket receives a number of seats equal to its total vote divided by the electoral quotient, and the places remaining after the first distribution are awarded according to the system of the highest averages. The candidates on the party list are elected, first, in the order of the personal votes which they receive and, second, according to the position on the list assigned them by the party organization.

Like other Balkan countries, where an enlightened and democratic electoral régime was superimposed on a po-

* See page 384.

litically unenlightened and long down-trodden electorate, Bulgaria has its share of corruption and official pressure. At an election in Trnovo but two hundred voters out of a population of twelve thousand came to the polls, and yet the results were officially reported to be 3,500 for the Ministerialist candidate and 3,000 for the Opposition. An English resident remarked upon this with politely restrained surprise to the returning officer, his personal friend. "You must surely have been mistaken in your counting," responded the latter, "there really were five hundred genuine votes recorded." Elections are often annulled, if by mischance the Opposition candidate gets elected.

Elections are habitually manipulated by the party in power. Stambouloff, who, as dictator of Bulgaria, stood off from 1886 to 1894 the intrigues of Russia, was famous for the rigor of his methods in dominating the voters. The son of a wealthy peasant, he was ambitious, unscrupulous, and ruthlessly cruel, but intensely patriotic and incapable of treachery. The grim look on his features and his short, sturdy, thick-set frame were an outward indication of the resolution with which he over-rode opposition. In the election of 1886 he had all his important opponents imprisoned until after the event. Armed pickets patrolled the streets, intimidating the peasantry and discouraging anti-Stambouloff voters from coming anywhere near the polls. Eventually nine-tenths of the deputies elected were his supporters. Stambouloff was assassinated in 1895; so great was the hatred which his high-handedness had aroused, that his grave had to be guarded for two months by the soldiery. Unfortunately ruthless electioneering did not entirely pass away with its greatest exponent. It is, however, diminishing. Af-

ter the elections of 1914 the avowed Ministerialists in the Sobranje numbered only one hundred and twenty-six of the two hundred and forty-five members.

So long as official control is temperate, there is no serious objection to it on the part of the nation. After long years of tyranny under the Moslems the Bulgarians were suddenly called upon to run a government adapted only to a people trained for many generations to political self-control. There was an absolute necessity that the King and the ministry should guide the mass of the population. "The state is administered by democratic principles, tempered by autocratic practice." The majority of the Bulgarian peasantry are not much more keenly interested in politics than they were in 1878. They are anxious chiefly that their taxes shall not be increased. Parties are formed from the adherents of individual politicians, rather than the supporters of definite principles, and would by themselves attract little interest. The great mass of the voters care very little who their deputies are. Under these circumstances the Sobranje would represent only the small minority of the town-dwellers, if the elections were not taken over as part of the business of the Cabinet.

It must be added, however, that on the important points, on which the public may be said to have an opinion and a will, the King and the ministry are compelled by the spirit of Bulgarian institutions to respect that opinion, no matter though the elections express it incorrectly. No Cabinet could long pursue a policy to which the country was seriously opposed. Neither could Czar Ferdinand throw off parliamentary restraints and rule as an autocrat. The genius of the Bulgarian constitution, which enables an autocratic government to

be run on democratic lines, depends on the fact that the Bulgars are racially and socially a homogeneous people without a ruling caste. It is difficult to conceive of a policy which could be strongly condemned by the people at large, and yet be acceptable to the Sobranje and the army. Ferdinand has shown marked tact in sensing and responding to the drift of public sentiment, and has entrenched himself in the confidence of his subjects. So long as the popular will is thus assured of fulfillment in all vital regards, a more or less hand-picked assembly is as good as any other in a country, where wealth and education have not yet fitted any great number of the inhabitants for political life.

V. TURKEY

From the loss of territory after territory before 1875 the Turk learned nothing of the governance of subject peoples. There was no whit of parliamentary government, and although there had been numerous promises of reform, these were at such a rate of discount that further ones found no market. In 1875 on the eve of Abdul Hamid's reign the army and the bureaucracy were half-starved and hopelessly corrupt. The Christian provinces were in arms, while the half-insane Sultan, Abdul Aziz, dallied among parasites at the Yildiz Kiosk in the capital. As at so many other times, before and since, the Ottoman Empire in Europe seemed to be in the last stages of decomposition.

There was a group of the younger generation, led by Midhat Pasha, who were disgusted by the spectacle of their debased and bankrupt country. Midhat Pasha, the inspiration of the Young Turk movement, bears a resem-



The Young Turk Parliament in Session



blance to another great statesman who made heroic but fruitless efforts to cure a dying government. Like Turgot, Midhat Pasha had made a reputation for successful reform in the confined sphere of a province. One of the broadest and most patriotic of ministers with whom Turkey has been blessed, he was the father of the Constitution of 1876, the organic law of Turkey to-day. The Young Turks declared: "If instead of a despot Turkey possessed a wise monarch supported by a consultative chamber, composed of all races and religions, she would be saved. There is the true solution; the Turkish government is elective."

Having accepted Midhat Pasha as his Grand Vizier, and having bound himself by implication to introduce representative institutions, Abdul Hamid determined to forestall the shocked protest of the Powers at the condition of Herzegovina and Bulgaria by granting a constitution. He would make a virtue of necessity. He had, moreover, a shrewd idea that the reform might act as a boomerang against the doctrinaire Young Turks who demanded it.

The reforms of Midhat Pasha were wrecked by two men: the Russian Ambassador and the Sultan. Russia's goal for over a century had been the emancipation of the Christian peoples of the Balkans. It would have been a signal reverse for Russian policy, if a reformed and tolerant Turkey had folded them once more to her bosom. As for Abdul Hamid, he was personally jealous of his Grand Vizier's power. He never sincerely believed that western ways could succeed in the government of his Empire; they ran athwart his own ambitions of centralizing Turkey and of ruling as the successor of the Prophet, the religious head of all Islam. Before two such implac-

able enemies Midhat Pasha was forced to resign. In exile and in prison he remained the standard bearer of the Young Turks and a thorn in the side of the Sultan. At last, one day in May, 1883, a confidential messenger came to the Yildiz Kiosk in Constantinople, bearing a box marked: "Japanese Ivories; *Objets d'art* for the Sultan." It was the head of Midhat Pasha.

The first Parliament convened in March, 1877, and was composed of official and ecclesiastical dignitaries, appointed by the local councils. The electoral law promised in the constitution was not passed until 1908. Whatever chance the assembly might have had for justifying its existence was ended by the attack of the Russians on the frontier, in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Parliament was prorogued *sine die* in 1878 and was not convened again. The constitution, the Sleeping Beauty of the Porte, lay undisturbed for thirty years, until the renewed danger of foreign intervention once more brought it to life.

The situation of Turkey at the end of Abdul Hamid's reign was, if possible, worse than that at its beginning. Inefficient and irresponsible ministers and officials, backward agriculture, periodic massacres of Christian peasants, the thriftlessness and corruption of the court, had brought Turkey to a state of living death. The vultures were already gathering about the corpse. Egypt, Eastern Rumelia, Albania, Crete, and Macedonia had all slipped, or were slipping, out of the hands of the Turk. The Young Turks, heirs of the Midhat tradition, although banished to Western Europe by Abdul Hamid, were stirred to action by the prospect of intervention of the Powers in Macedonia. The occasion was similar to that in 1876; but in 1908 they could rely upon an aroused

public opinion, which was beginning to believe that the Sultan was responsible for Turkish decadence.

At the first touch of the Revolution of July 1908, the Hamidian régime collapsed like a house of cards. The Sultan revived the Constitution of 1876, and the Young Turk Committee of Union and Progress took charge of carrying it into effect. The Hall of the Ministry of Justice was opened and swept, after being closed for thirty years to all except the pigeons of St. Sophia, which flew in through the broken windows to nest in the rafters; and a Parliament of a sort was gotten together.

By the terms of the Constitution the Sultan appoints the Grand Vizier and the Ministers, who may be removed on petition of Parliament, if charges against them are proven. The Ministry alone initiates legislation. Of the two Houses of the Assembly, the Senate is nominated by the Sultan, from among those who have rendered notable service to the Empire. The deputies to the Lower House, about two hundred and seventy in number, are chosen in the proportion of one to fifty thousand inhabitants. They are elected indirectly, by *scrutin de liste* in each sandjak (virtually equal to a department in France). In the primary elections every male Ottoman subject is entitled to vote, who is twenty-five years old, has resided in his locality for a year, and possesses his civil rights. The fact that soldiers in service are allowed to vote gives the administration a powerful agency for controlling the elections.

The system of indirect election is carried out in the following manner. The country is divided into nahié, or cantons, not without considerable gerrymandering. Macedonia and the Turkish part of Thrace are ideally suited to that science because of the numerous racial

islets, which are surrounded by another nationality. The Christians complain that they are divided up and distributed piece-meal among overwhelmingly Turkish districts, where their votes are lost. Each *nahié* chooses a delegate to the electoral college for every five hundred primary electors in it. Any voter, except a domestic servant, can be a delegate also. The election of the deputies by the electoral college takes place at the chief town of the *arrondissement* some time after the primaries.

Voting takes place secretly by the use of the ballot. The election officials peregrinate from village to village taking in the vote. The voters, reminded by drums, gather together, accompanied by the village chief and the priest, who certify the identity of the voters and at the end of the poll sign the village list. In the cities absentee voters are permitted to cast their ballots by correspondence.

It was inevitable from the beginning that the Turks should dominate the elections, even where the Christians were in the majority. The first Chamber of Deputies contained 216 Moslems and 46 non-Moslems. The Greeks in Constantinople were endlessly cross-questioned and in many cases were excluded, when their qualifications were in reality satisfactory. Many elections were claimed to have been annulled because of a Christian victory. In some places the crafty Greeks out-witted the followers of the Prophet. In the Macedonian district of Langanza a true son of Odysseus spread the news abroad that the successful candidate would receive a pension of £T 10 for life. The Turks immediately voted each man for himself; while the Greeks saw through the ruse and voted solid.

Because it did not in 1909 understand the real char-

acter of the Young Turk Revolution, Western Europe was disheartened by these manifestations of ruthlessness in a party, from whose liberality it had hoped so much. In the light of what has happened since then, the Revolution appears in its true shape as a revival, more or less chauvinistic, of Pan-Islamism. Theoretically, no doubt, many of the Young Turks sincerely meant to extend fair treatment to the Christians in the Balkans. Practically, they found that the more intelligent Greeks and Armenians could swamp the votes of the ignorant and apathetic Turks. A freely elected Parliament would have been a Christian Parliament, which would have brought down upon the reformers all the vials of wrath of the very large Conservative element, which was only watching its time to strike back. Although there have been three Parliaments since 1908, they have all been the creatures of the Committee of Union and Progress. Martial law in Constantinople has not been relaxed since the Revolution. The most prolific legislative period is that when Parliament is not sitting, when "provisional" laws are enacted on the responsibility of the executive. The reforms of the Committee have endured longer than their prototype, those of Midhat Pasha; but while the fate of Turkey hangs in the balances of war, no one may prophesy what will be the future of constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER XXXIII

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA

No single chapter could suffice to give an adequate or accurate characterization of elections in all the countries of South America. But in the following pages we shall attempt to describe briefly the systems that have been organized in the three most important republics, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, and to suggest a general idea of those which obtain in the smaller states. Electoral habits, although they vary to some extent in the different countries, are much of a type and the laws upon which the voting systems are based are, in general, similar.

With the exception of Chile, the nations of South America have permitted their governmental institutions to be dominated by the executive. The Parliaments are dignified and the elected deputies are not lacking in the sense of importance and the love of its display which characterize officials in Latin and particularly Latin-American countries. Real power, however, rests with the President, and the influence of the executive both in the Parliaments and in the elections in which the deputies are chosen is usually supreme. As a South American critic has pointed out, "official influence is the main factor in practically all South American countries."

This fact results in part from the instability of political conditions, which until recently was the chief characteristic of South American history. Freedom came suddenly

to the Spanish colonies, and their peoples, with a large admixture of native blood, were politically unprepared for it. They remembered the Hapsburg tyranny vividly and at first were filled with a distrust of all rulers and governments. Civil disorders were inevitable and in many instances degenerated into anarchy. Such conditions formed the happy hunting-ground of the military adventurers, who had been brought to the front by the wars of independence and who, under the guise of the word "liberation," were able often to establish an autocracy quite as absolute as that of the Spanish viceroys. They retained the forms of democracy which had been the necessary concomitant of the revolution, and which in most cases had been copied from North America, but they so adjusted and utilized them as to keep the entirety of power for themselves.

The military presidents used elections and voting systems to throw a veil of legality over their coups d'état, but their control rested not so much upon the consent or the votes of the people, as upon their popularity with the army, the fear which they could throw into the soldiers and their officers, and the amount of money which was at their disposal. The elected Congresses were merely academic adjuncts. The supreme influence of the executive was strengthened and ensured by the abstention of the middle classes from politics, which left the field free to the professional politicians, who were generally in the pay of the executive, and who used all the well-worn methods of trickery, direct and indirect, which serve to bring pressure or illicit persuasion upon the electors.

Such conditions were common during the greater part of the nineteenth century and it is probably not unfair to say that elections were usually a pure sham. But

the generous impulse which had first prompted the movement towards independence never died. Since 1900, with the growth in material prosperity and the knitting of closer relations with European countries, partly perhaps because of immigration from Europe, the civic capacity of the South Americans has been developed and the desire for ordered liberty has become more serious and more intense. The people, as the middle class expanded, have come to take more interest in education and in politics. The day of the comic opera republic in South America has, for the most part, passed; and we may hope that in the near future South American democracy in elections will be established upon as firm a basis as on the northern continent.

A typical example of the development of the South American countries from the condition of tyrannically governed colonies of the Spanish Crown through dictatorships and revolutions to a state of political stability and comparatively wide freedom, is to be found in the case of Argentina. The form of government of this state, which is almost identical with that of the United States, is determined by the constitution of September 25, 1860. But it was not drawn up without the agony of half a century of constitutional experiments, often punctuated by civil war. The Spanish yoke had been thrown off in 1810, when, on May 25, the first revolutionary junta was organized in the city of Buenos Aires. The revolutionary forces immediately deprived the Spanish viceroy of his powers and soon gained complete control. In 1814 they successfully terminated the war of freedom from Spain, and two years later, on July 9, 1816, formally declared the independence of the Argentine Republic.

During the following fifty years constant efforts were

made to arrive at a stable form of government, but they were invariably nullified by the rivalry of the two chief factions, the federalists and the unitarians or centralists. For a period of more than twenty years, from 1829 until 1851, the country was practically under the dictatorship of Rosas, who was nominally a federalist, but who was not unwilling to sacrifice the local rights of the provinces in order to ensure his own lease of power. He succeeded in putting down numerous revolutions, but finally in 1851, largely because of the defection of his chief general to the side of the centralists, Rosas was defeated and forced to flee the country. There followed nine years of struggle between Buenos Aires, where the centralists were in control, and the other thirteen provinces, which in 1859 culminated in civil war. Buenos Aires was defeated and compelled to become a federal province, and in 1860 a constitutional convention gave to Argentina, in the constitution of that year, the federal form of government which still persists.

Executive powers are lodged in the hands of a president, who, as in the United States, is chosen by an electoral college which is named by the direct vote of the people of each province. He must be a native citizen of Argentina, a Roman Catholic, and at least thirty years of age, and must be possessed of an annual income of at least two thousand dollars. His term is for six years and he is not immediately eligible for a second term. The vice-president, chosen in the same manner, is named upon a different ticket. As in this country the cabinet is appointed by the president, is responsible to him, and any member of it may be removed by him at any time.

Legislative powers are vested in a Congress of two chambers. The upper House or Senate consists of thirty

members—two from each province and two from the capital. Members of the Senate are elected by the provincial legislatures and by a special body of electors in the capital, for a term of nine years. The lower House, the Chamber of Deputies, consists of one hundred and twenty members. Deputies are allotted in the ratio of one for every 33,000 of the population, and are elected every four years by direct vote of the people.

Very wide autonomy of local government is guaranteed by the constitution of 1860, although the political power of the executive frequently makes of such guarantees mere scraps of paper. The governors of each province are elected by the people for a term of three years. Each province has its own legislature, chosen by direct vote of the inhabitants. In Buenos Aires the municipal government is exercised by a mayor, who is appointed by the federal government with the approval of the Senate. The mayor is assisted by a deliberative council elected by the taxpaying inhabitants of the various parishes. The other municipalities have constitutions of a similar nature.

Presidential elections are carried on in much the same fashion as in the United States. The franchise is one of extreme democracy, the electoral law granting the vote to all adult male citizens who are seventeen years of age and registered on the electoral lists. The process of election is begun by the choice of an electoral college by each province and the capital. Voting is direct and secret. Presidential electors must have the same qualifications as candidates for the chamber of deputies and are chosen in the same way. Each province is entitled to twice as many electors as it possesses senators and deputies. Five months before the expiration of the presi-

dential term, the various electoral colleges are convened, that of Buenos Aires in the capital, and the provincial colleges in the capitals of their respective provinces. There they express on one ballot their choice for president, and on another ballot their choice for vice-president. Two lists are made of all the persons named for president and all those named for vice-president. These lists, signed by the electors and sealed are sent, the one to the president of the provincial legislature, the other to the president of the Senate.

When the president of the Senate has received all the lists from the various provincial capitals, he opens them in the presence of both Houses of Congress assembled. Four members, selected by lot, together with the secretaries of the Congress, immediately proceed to count and announce the votes. If any candidate for the position of president or vice-president has received an absolute majority of all the votes, their election is at once proclaimed. In case the vote is divided and no candidate receives an absolute majority, Congress proceeds to elect one of the two candidates who have received the greatest number of votes. In case of a tie in this vote, the president of the Senate has the power of decision.

Elections of members of the Chamber of Deputies are direct and the successful candidate is determined by a simple plurality. For this purpose the capital and the various provinces are regarded as the electoral constituencies of a unitary state. The original article of the constitution allotted one deputy to every 20,000 of the population; this was amended in March, 1898, to grant one deputy to every 33,000 of population or to any fraction thereof not less than 16,500. After the taking of each census, Congress, using this as a basis, fixes the ratio of

representation; it may increase but may not diminish the number of inhabitants required for the allotment of each deputy. Each House of Congress is the judge of the elections of its own members and decides all questions relating to their validity.

As in the United States, the presidential election is almost invariably determined by the choice of the electors, not by the subsequent voting of these electors for the presidential candidates, which is usually a matter of form only, although in the election of 1916 much doubt prevailed as to the opinions of certain electors. Official influence has great power; in general it is supreme, and the appearance of democratic freedom is largely deceptive. In the capital the Government of the day generally finds little difficulty in determining the choice of desirable electors. In the provinces it is the provincial Government which really decides. When, as in 1886, a combination of provincial governors is formed with the purpose of concentrating upon a single presidential candidate, his election is almost certain. An element of great, but entirely extra-constitutional importance in elections, is formed of the resident aliens. They make up nearly half of the population and dispose of enormous economic interests. They have, of course, no vote, but they can control the votes of thousands of native electors. Their assistance in electoral contests is eagerly sought and frequently is sufficient to determine the issue.

According to Professor Matienzo, the general rule in Argentine elections is that a magistrate names the candidate who is to succeed him. Thus the president is named by his immediate predecessor, while the governor of a province is replaced by his own nominee. Without taking the learned critic too literally, it is true that the provin-

cial governors exercise exclusive sway in provincial elections and the provincial deputies are almost invariably their creatures. As regards federal elections, the provincial governors look upon them as affairs in which they have primary interest but where they are willing to permit the president to participate more or less directly according to political circumstances of the moment. If the governor has need of presidential influence in other matters, he will grant him power of nomination in the federal election of his province. Matienzo cites the case of a governor who, before indicating his favorite candidate in an election, sent three names to the president, for him to design the lucky man who was to be, and was, elected. Deputies, naturally, are not selected because of their political distinction or capacity so much as because they are friends or clients of the magistrates. One of the strongest governors of Buenos Aires did not hesitate to have elected to Congress a friend who had utterly lost the power of speech.

In the presidential campaign the outgoing president has, since 1880, enjoyed peculiar influence, for he is governor of the capital and there exercises practical omnipotence. If he finds that a majority of the provincial governors are ill-disposed towards his candidate, he can threaten to make trouble and actually has been known to bring about their impeachment and the election of better inclined governors. Such strong-arm methods, however, are rarely used, and a compromise between the president and the governors is generally secured. Both president and governors find a most useful instrument in the control of elections ready to hand, in the person of the cacique or local boss who, like his prototype in Spain and Portugal, wields vast influence.

There are in the Argentine no political parties, in the American sense of the word. There are at election time three outstanding groups—the friends of the president in the capital and of the governors in the provinces; the opposition, made up of those fighting official influence; and the neutrals, who take little interest either in politics or elections and who are apt to form the chief portion of the population. It is only at election time that any form of homogeneity is to be found in the politically active groups and they break up as soon as the electoral contest is over. Contest is, perhaps, hardly the word, for often those opposed to the official candidate abstain from any part in the campaign apart from the publication of articles in the press. Recently, however, campaigns are assuming a more real character. This is largely the result of a new law which makes it a punishable offense not to vote. There has been, accordingly, a large increase in the number of those who join the party of opposition at election time. In the elections of 1916, according to a speech of the president, out of 1,189,282 voters enrolled upon the electoral lists, 745,825 came to the polls.

Chile, although in area it does not rank among the larger of the South American republics, deserves particular study, not merely because of its material strength, but because of the character of its politics which have developed along quite different lines from those of the other states of the continent. Here alone, in South America, is to be found the cabinet system of government; in fact, parliamentary government exists in its extreme form, for the executive is not given the power of dissolving the popular chamber. Furthermore, the existence of a distinct aristocracy of birth and wealth, chiefly

composed of landholders, men of culture and education, who have interested themselves in government, has imparted to the politics of Chile a tone not unlike that of eighteenth century England.

Chile escaped from the rule of Spain in company with its sister republics during Napoleonic days, the revolutionary movement starting in 1810. It is true that the provisional constitution of 1812 accepted Ferdinand VII as king, requiring that he recognize the constitution; but as a matter of fact the country was wholly independent. A succession of constitutional experiments followed, which finally culminated in civil war. It was not until 1833 that a permanent constitution was organized which, with numerous amendments, forms the basis of Chile's government to-day. The development of political liberty under this constitution has been progressive. Until 1861 the government was republican in name only, for the executive exercised all the powers of a dictator. And despite the amendments to the constitution which came frequently and were all in a liberal sense, until 1891 the power of the executive was strongly entrenched, and the government was based on a firm conservative foundation. It was an era of narrow oligarchical government, which, however, because of the political capacity of the statesmen in control, was one productive of great material benefit to the country. A struggle between the president and the Parliament led to the defeat of the former and the establishment of the present régime, in which the executive is strictly controlled by the legislative.

The president is elected for a term of five years and is ineligible for immediate reëlection. The latter clause was inserted at a time when protests against presidential

dictatorship were becoming strident. The method of election, as in the United States and Argentina, is indirect. An electoral college is chosen in the various departments in the same manner in which deputies are elected. The election is held on June 25 of the last year of the presidential term. The electors cast their votes on July 25, and the counting takes place in a joint session of the two Chambers of Congress on August 30. If no candidate receives an absolute majority Congress decides between the two who have polled the largest number of votes. The final installation of the president comes on September 18, the anniversary of the declaration of national independence. The president must be native born, at least thirty years of age, and eligible for election to the lower Chamber. He exercises his executive functions through a cabinet of six ministers, who are responsible to the Chamber of Deputies and whose tenure of office is not always agreeable in view of the extent of control wielded by the deputies.

Legislative functions are in the hands of a National Congress. Of this the upper Chamber, or Senate, is composed of thirty-seven members. They are chosen by the direct cumulative vote of the electors of each department and hold office for six years, one-third of their number being renewed triennially. Formerly the senatorial elections were indirect, the voters choosing senatorial electors, three times as numerous as the deputies for a department, who must fulfill the qualifications of candidates. These electors met in the capitals of their respective provinces to vote, each casting as many ballots as there were senators to be elected. The abolition of this system in favor of direct elections formed one of

the most notable steps in the development of liberalism in Chile.

The lower House, or Chamber of Deputies, is composed of one hundred and eighteen members, allotted in the ratio of one deputy to every 30,000 or fraction thereof above 15,000 of departmental population. The deputies are elected by the direct cumulative vote of the departmental electors and hold office for three years.

The suffrage is granted to males who are over twenty-five years of age, if unmarried, and to married men of more than twenty-one years; voters, however, must have fulfilled certain special conditions. They must prove their capacity to read and write and show the possession of real property, or of capital invested in business or industry, or a salary or income equal to the income that might be derived from the above-mentioned property or capital. Before voting, electors must display a card proving that they have registered at least three months before the polling. The usual disqualifications are enforced and the following may not vote: persons in domestic service, debtors to the state, those condemned to an "infamous" punishment or convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy, those who have accepted office or employment under a foreign government without the permission of Congress, or who have resided abroad for ten years without the special permission of the president. Electoral rehabilitation may be enacted by the Senate.

In Chile, as in England, the deputies, elected directly by the people, control the government, for since 1892 the parliamentary form of government is firmly established. The executive is responsible to the majority in Congress, and there is a special committee of Congress which has as its chief function the protection of the con-

stitution from executive interference. This is known as the *Commissi6n Conservadore* and representing the majority in Congress, it forms a permanent check on the executive. It may convene Congress in an extraordinary session without reference to the president, and in the event of the president retaining a ministry not representative of the Congressional majority, it can force a crisis. This right was first exercised in March, 1901, when Congress was convoked to oust a coalition cabinet and to replace it with a Liberal.

The great change in the electoral régime of Chile came in 1891 with the so-called Balmaceda revolution. Balmaceda was an able and popular president, but the spirit of the day was rising against the power of the executive. He represented the old order which stood for close control of all elections; he governed with a Congress which he had himself nominated, and he owed his own election to the interference of his predecessor. Determined to control the suffrage of the people and to maintain the power of the executive he entered into a struggle with the ring of governing families in Congress, a struggle in which he was defeated. The president immediately committed suicide.

Henceforth, the principle of the liberty of elections was established, and it was announced that the electorate should freely express its choice. And, in fact, administrative intrigue in the campaigns was largely done away with, at least in its more blatant and obnoxious form. But the control over the electorate, formerly held by the president, was in many instances seized upon by the plutocracy. Chile thus has not achieved complete freedom of vote, and almost all writers are agreed upon the prevalence of bribery in electoral contests. The average

cost of a senatorship is said to be one hundred thousand pesos, and that of a seat in the Chamber of Deputies, ten thousand pesos. In the convention of the Liberal party, held in 1907, open discussion of the corrupt practices prevailing in elections took place. But nothing has been done beyond the suggestion of a law to limit the amount that may be spent in electoral contests.

All states with a democratic electorate must face the danger and vice of bribery. But in Chile the danger is particularly virulent; for the electorate is largely made up of masses of people who lack political education and who are peculiarly susceptible to the exercise of corrupt methods. Over them the circle of governing families exert a control which is almost supreme.

The system of uninominal districts in Chile has had the same results as in other countries, namely, to make the deputies narrow in their interests and ready to sacrifice national to parochial concerns. But the system fits the plans of the politicians. The system of cumulative voting in force, which was introduced in order to enable true minority parties to gain some representation, has not worked well; for it operates to break up parties which ought to act in harmony and with cohesion. It favors the creation of smaller groups within a party, who put up candidates in the hope of gaining representation for certain local interests. This is unfortunate in a country where political groups are numerous in any event, and compels government by coalition with all its attendant evils.

A notable fault in the Chilean system of elections, which suggests the British eighteenth century system, has been the power of the two Houses to settle contested elections. In any community such a system is apt to lead

to a struggle between political interest and justice, and takes the reality of choice away from the voters and gives it to the deputies. In the Senate of Chile a group of conservative members have frequently secured complete control of the decision of electoral cases and have exercised their power in such a way as to bring grave discredit upon their motives. There has been a strong movement favoring the creation of an independent tribunal to decide contested elections and to investigate corruption, similar to that established in Great Britain.

Another complaint has been directed against the change which, after the Balmaceda revolution, gave to the municipal governments control of the electoral machinery. This was designed to render impossible any interference of the central administration in national elections. But it tended to encourage corruption and enabled parties and politicians to use the electoral machinery for their own private benefit. The reform of 1914, however, took from the municipalities all electoral power.

Whatever criticisms are passed upon the electoral system of Chile, the fact remains that the tone of politics here has reached a higher level than elsewhere in South America. It is significant that in this country alone, of the South American republics, no revolution has occurred within the memory of any living man. It is important, also, that here politics hold the interest of the educated upper classes, who are by no means inspired by purely materialistic motives. Lord Bryce has commented upon this: "The material development of the country by railways, the opening of mines, and the extension of agriculture, important as they are, do not absorb men's thoughts here so much as they do in Argentina and

indeed in most new countries. Politics hold the field just as politics held it all through the nineteenth century in England and in Hungary, perhaps the most intensely political countries of the Old World."

Brazil differs from most of the South American republics, not merely in its racial character, which is mainly Portuguese and not Spanish, but also in the character of its constitutional history, for it retained monarchical institutions until 1889 and thereby escaped the multitude of revolutions so characteristic of the history of most of the other states. Previous to the nineteenth century, Brazil formed a colony of the Portuguese Crown, for in the famous division of the colonial world between Spain and Portugal decreed by Pope Alexander VI, it fell to the east of the dividing line, which lay one hundred leagues to the west of the Azores. When the Napoleonic armies entered Portugal in 1807 the royal Braganzas fled to Brazil, which in 1815 ceased to be a colony and became an integral part of the kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarves.

King John VI returned to Portugal in 1821, leaving his son, Dom Pedro, as regent in Brazil. When the demand for the separation of Brazil from Portugal became intense, Dom Pedro espoused the cause of independence and accepted a constitution in 1824, according to which he became constitutional emperor. Independence was recognized by Portugal in the following year. Despite the name of empire, the constitution of Brazil was hardly less democratic in reality than those of the so-called republics of South America. There was a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies and while the emperor had the legal right to name senators from a list of eligibles drawn up by the voters, this gave him no wider control than

was actually exercised by the president-dictators of the other states. The popular Chamber was elected by the voters and the suffrage was not illiberal, being based upon an age qualification of twenty-five years and an income of two hundred pesos.

Despite the popularity of Dom Pedro II the movement for the establishment of a republic gained strength. Finally, in 1889, a revolution which, though mainly military in character, remained bloodless, led to the exile of the imperial Braganzas and the proclamation of the Brazilian republic.

The constitution of the new state, which was adopted February 24, 1891, was, like that of Argentina, closely modeled upon that of the United States. It provided for a federal republic known as the United States of Brazil, comprising twenty states and one federal district; the latter was made from the municipality of Rio di Janeiro and was controlled by the federal government and a municipal council. Each of the old provinces of the empire forms an autonomous state, which is administered without interference from the federal government and may legislate on all matters which are not specially reserved for the Union. The powers of the separate states are far wider than those belonging to the states of the North American Union. They have the right to incorporate one with the other, or to subdivide into new states, with the consent of their respective legislatures and that of the national federal Congress.

Federal authority is exercised by the president and the National Congress. The former is elected directly by the voters, the election taking place on March 1, in the last year of the presidential term. He must be a native of Brazil and at least twenty-five years of age. His term

is four years and he is not eligible for immediate reëlection. He appoints the ministers of state, who may not be members of the Congress nor appear in its deliberations, and who are not responsible to it.

As in Argentina and Chile the counting of the votes in the presidential election is carried out in a Congressional conference. It is enacted that Congress must count the votes in its first meeting after the election, no matter how many of its members are present. If an absolute majority is not secured, Congress proceeds to choose by majority vote one of the two persons who have received the greatest number of votes. In case of a tie, the candidate of greatest age is to be considered elected.

Legislative authority is in the hands of the National Congress, which consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The former is composed of sixty-three members, three from each of the twenty states and from the federal district. Senators serve a term of nine years, and one-third of the body is elected triennially. The Chamber of Deputies consists of two hundred and twelve members, who are elected for a term of three years in a proportion not greater than one deputy to every 70,000 of the population. No state, however, is to have less than four representatives.

Elections for both senators and deputies are direct and secret, and provision is made for the representation of minorities. Elections are held on the same day as that for the president, March 1, although generally in different years. The franchise has been extended from that of imperial days so as to give the vote to every male Brazilian citizen of twenty-one years, who is duly enrolled, and who is not a beggar, "illiterate," a soldier in

service, a monk, or a member of any religious order which restricts his individual liberty.

Elections in Brazil have not yet assumed the position of real importance in politics which rightfully belongs to them in a true democratic system. A large percentage of the population is unable to read and write and, therefore, excluded from the vote, while the number of educated persons who take a strong interest in political affairs is small. Of more than eighteen millions, only about six hundred thousand persons are qualified to vote; and the number of votes cast in a presidential election has never exceeded four hundred thousand.

The result is that the professional politicians plan and carry out the electoral campaign and manufacture whatever public opinion exists; the voting is apt to be merely a formality. In every state there is a small clique who rule the politics of the locality; when a presidential candidate is announced, the representatives of the cliques confer, decide upon the attitude which seems advisable, and their announcement is generally taken as the choice of the state. Their control is assisted by the lack of political traditions as well as by the large number of negroes, illiterates, and immigrants. The working classes in the south, where socialistic organization might be expected, are largely of foreign origin, with neither cohesion nor discipline; they feel themselves too indefinitely settled in the country to take an active interest in politics. But while the political power of the cliques is thus supreme and elections are usually perfunctory occasions which must be gone through for the sake of form, the professional politicians have often used their power wisely and in some instances have displayed real statesmanship. Bra-

zil, however, is yet far from having attained her political maturity.

In his impressions of South America Lord Bryce divides the republics of that continent into three classes. In the first are included those which are true democratic republics in the European sense, and in which the constitutional theory is a reality and not a sham. Others are petty despotisms, created and maintained by military force. In the fairly large category which lies between these two groups are included the states in which the constitutional machinery operates indeed, but more or less irregularly and improperly.

We have thus far considered briefly the electoral régime in the chief states of the first group. In the second are naturally classed such states as Ecuador, Venezuela, and Paraguay, where revolution is almost a settled condition of affairs. In the third group we should place republics like Bolivia and Peru, where progress toward settled government is being made, but in which the operation of political factors is uncertain and irregularities not infrequent. In neither of the two latter categories are elections of vital importance in the life of the state. It is possible for the executive to control them completely, provided that he controls the military power, which is essential to his induction into office. Once in power a party or a clique is so firmly entrenched that it can generally be dislodged by nothing less than a revolution. The control of government is so complete that it is practically impossible for a peaceable political combination in opposition even to attempt to secure a majority at the polls.

Oligarchical rule is facilitated by the large proportion of native blood in the population, for the Indians care little for politics as yet, and except when matters of land

tenure form the issue, they leave electoral contests to the whites. Despite the nominally liberal suffrage that everywhere prevails, only a small proportion of the population are enrolled as voters, and only a small percentage of the voters come to the polls. Thus in the Peruvian election of 1910, the Lima correspondent of the London *Times* reported that of the 10,000 electors of Lima only 500 voted.

However much of a farce elections may have been in the less-developed countries of South America, we should at least state the main characteristics of their electoral régimes; as these countries develop, in the political sense, the appearance of popular rights in elections may some day be transformed into the reality.

In all the states of South America the government is republican in form; in some it is of a centralized, in others of a federative character. The executive is invariably in the hands of a president; recently, in Uruguay, a collegiate form of government was suggested, but the reform was not carried through. In most of the republics which we are now considering, particularly Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, the fear of executive despotism or executive encroachments has led to the provision that the president is not eligible for two succeeding terms. In all of these states, with the exception of Uruguay and Venezuela, the president is elected directly by the voters; in those two, however, he is chosen by the National Congress. In Colombia, while the presidential election is direct, the elected candidate must receive the predominating vote in the majority of the states. In Colombia the National Congress elects the first and second vice-president (*designado*).

Legislative power is everywhere in the hands of a

National Congress, which is invariably bi-cameral, for none of the South American states have followed the lead of Costa Rica and Honduras in Central America in establishing a single-chamber legislative body. The upper House of Congress is invariably called the Senate, and, except in Uruguay and Colombia, is chosen directly by the voters. In Uruguay the Senate is elected by a college which is chosen by the voters. In Colombia senatorial elections pass through three stages; for the voters choose their departmental assemblies, which in turn choose an electoral college, by which the senators are selected. The election of the members of the Chamber of Deputies in all the countries is direct. The principle of the secrecy of voting is established, at least in theory, in all the states.

The suffrage in all cases is one of extreme democracy on paper. In fact, in all of South America Chile is the only country which has a property qualification. Adult male suffrage is the rule. In Paraguay all male citizens over eighteen years of age have the right to vote; but the ordinary age qualification is twenty-one. Certain conditions are sometimes annexed to the voting qualification other than age and manhood. Thus in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Ecuador, voters must prove their capacity to read and write. In Peru the suffrage law enfranchises every adult male citizen who is either married, a master employer, an owner of real property, a tax-payer, or able to read and write. In none of the South American states is the suffrage granted to women.

A superficial consideration of the workings of democracy in the South American states has led to many hasty and inconsidered judgments, which have bred unwarranted contempt for the condition of politics in our sister republics. It is certainly discouraging to review the

numerous revolutions which have marked the history of most of the smaller states during the past few decades; it is plain that they suffer from lack of education and in several instances from the large admixture of natives who, thus far, have not shown their capacity for democracy in the European or the North American sense. And yet while the experiment of democratic elections thus has not succeeded except in the larger states, and while even in some of these the success is not wholly manifest, it is too early to say that it has failed or that it must fail. As Bryce remarks, the examples of Chile and Argentina show that there is nothing in the South American air or the Spanish blood to prevent the free working of republican institutions.

CHAPTER XXXIV

ELECTIONS IN JAPAN

THE story of the miraculous transformation of Japan since the political revolution or "restoration" of 1867 forms one of the most startling chapters in recent world history. It is less than seventy years ago that Commodore Perry found the island empire completely isolated from the rest of the world: foreigners were forbidden to enter the country under pain of death; the Japanese were not allowed to leave it. One single trading station, conceded to the Dutch on the peninsula of Deshina, formed Japan's only link with the rest of the world.

Political and social life was equally removed from the conditions of the West. The Emperor, or Mikado, was, in theory, absolute ruler; in fact, he lived apart from political affairs, a sort of sacred ecclesiastical figure. Real power lay in the hands of the Shogun, who occupied somewhat the position of a Frankish Mayor of the Palace in Merovingian days, and who transmitted supreme authority to his heirs. Government and society were essentially feudal in character, the Shogun depending upon the great titled landlords, the Daimos, who were possessed of vast landed estates; they, like the feudal barons of medieval France, held the allegiance of a noble fighting class, who in Japan were called the Samurai. Other classes, town-folk and countrypeople, merchants and peasant farmers, did not count, either politically or socially.

From this isolation and political medievalism, which, to tell the truth, was accompanied by much prosperity and social content, Japan was roused by the demands of an American sailor. Perry insisted that the ships of the United States should be allowed to put into Japanese ports, in order to dispose of their cargoes and to obtain supplies, and that protection should be accorded to American citizens. The request was ultimately granted by the Japanese government, but the new attitude taken by the Shogun and his advisers led not merely to a revolution in the foreign relations of the country but also to the most serious domestic complications. The Shogun was pressed by the foreign Powers from without and by anti-foreign fanatics from within. Forces of political and social revolution, which, though latent, had begun to develop, now manifested themselves openly. Finally the Shogun, in 1867, was compelled to resign his position; the Shogunate was abolished; and the Mikado, in the person of the fifteen-year-old Mutsuhito, emerged from his holy retirement and was restored to a rôle of actual governing power.

Japan was fortunate in her emperor, who seems to have realized that his restoration was in one sense a revolution, and unlike Louis XVI of France, that it was better to have the force of progress on his side rather than opposed to him. Thus he both desired and proved able to guide the revolutionary movement; for this reason, as well as because of the national character of the Japanese, the political transformation of Japan, while it was rapid, has always been essentially conservative in character. The Daimos relinquished their feudal rights in 1871 and the warrior Samurai sacrificed their special privileges in 1876. The equality of all citizens before the law was proclaimed. But the movement for constitutional liberalism never es-

caped the control of the Mikado and his advisers. In 1881 he promised that within ten years Japan should have a constitution, and this promise, with the good faith characteristic of Japanese politics, whether domestic or foreign, he redeemed in 1889. He sent to Europe a commission, led by Count Ito, which studied the political systems of the West. On February 11, 1889, he promulgated the constitution based upon the report drafted by the commission.

We must remember that neither the Japanese people nor her political leaders were ever intoxicated by the first fumes of democratic liberalism, as has happened in other countries. The people were not inclined to ask for nor the government to grant over-much political freedom. The Japanese constitution was drawn up and elaborated in what we should term almost a reactionary atmosphere. It was, to a large extent, the work of Count Ito. That statesman, during his European travels, had been greatly interested in the study of the Prussian system of government, which during the eighties attracted the admiration of the order-loving Japanese, while its vices were not so plainly visible as in more recent times; Ito, moreover, was fascinated by the personality of Prince Bismarck. The result was to be found in the Japanese constitution which, in certain respects, is characterized by the "constitutional autocracy" of Prussia.

The Mikado is traditionally absolute and the constitution merely reaffirms what has always been in the minds of the Japanese. Article VI of the constitution states that "the Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in himself all the powers of the State." He possesses untrammelled executive power, with the advice and the assistance of the cabinet ministers, who are appointed by,

and responsible to, him. He can declare war, conclude peace, negotiate treaties, and proclaim martial law. He also holds, in theory, and to some extent in practice, control of the judicial system. According to Ito (*Commentaries*, 101), he is "the fountain of justice, and all judicial authorities are a form of the manifestation of the sovereign power." He has wide powers in the matter of legislation, for although every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet, the Emperor is held to "exercise the legislative power with the assent of the Imperial Diet." He convokes the Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives. When the Diet is not in session he may issue ordinances in lieu of laws.

The Diet is bi-cameral and divided into the House of Peers and the House of Representatives. The former is made up of three hundred and seventy-four members who sit by virtue of birth, nomination by the Emperor, and election by restricted classes. The hereditary peers are Princes of the blood, Princes, and Marquises, who form about a sixth of the chamber. About a third of the chamber are nominated by the Emperor. Rather more numerous are the representatives of the Viscounts, Counts, and Barons, who are elected by their respective orders. A fourth category is formed of representatives of the highest tax-payers, one to each prefecture, who are elected by the class which they represent. The non-titled members of the House of Peers are not to exceed in numbers the aggregate strength of the titled Peers.

The House of Representatives, which has the precedence over the House of Peers only in the discussion of financial matters, is composed of three hundred and eighty-one members of whom two hundred are elected from rural districts and the remainder from the urban

constituencies. Every male Japanese subject who has attained the age of thirty is eligible, with the exception of priests, students, teachers in elementary schools, government contractors, and officials of elections or of the imperial household. The members receive a salary, as do the nominated and elected Peers, traveling expenses, and railroad passes. The Representatives are elected for a term of four years.

The system according to which members of the Japanese House of Representatives are elected, is based upon a law promulgated in 1889. It was drawn up by the framers of the Constitution, but fortunately was issued as a statute and not as a part of the Constitution itself, which is extremely difficult to amend and cannot be amended without the initiative of the Emperor. The electoral law, being a simple statute, was thus sufficiently elastic to undergo the test of experience and after its more striking faults were made obvious, has been revised. It is the revised law, of 1902, which determines the existing method of elections.

The original law granted the franchise to every male Japanese subject who was twenty-five years of age, who had resided for more than a year in the administrative district in which he claimed to vote, and who had paid in direct national taxes for the year previous to the date of making up the electoral list, at least fifteen yen (about \$7.50). Certain classes were specially excluded from the right to vote, as in other countries; such classes included lunatics, idiots, convicted criminals, undischarged bankrupts, military men in active service. In addition, the electoral law disqualified from candidature all Shinto or Buddhist priests, Christian clergymen, and all teachers of religion; evidently the framers of the statute feared

that spiritual influence might not always prove an ally of the temporal interests of the politicians. Otherwise, the qualifications of a candidate were those of the elector, except that the former must be thirty years of age.

The number of representatives was first fixed at 300, and they were chosen in 257 electoral districts. Each city or prefecture was divided into several constituencies; of these the majority were single-member districts, each returning one representative. Some of the larger districts, however, proved difficult to divide because of geographical or industrial reasons, and were given two seats apiece. In the latter the representatives were chosen on the system of the *scrutin de liste*. Each year in October the local governments of the districts drew up a list of voters qualified to exercise the franchise at the next general election. When the voters appeared at the polls, they must show that their names were on the list of the district. The voter, in casting his ballot, was required to sign it publicly in the presence of the election officials. Secrecy of the ballot, considered one of the great safeguards of modern democratic electoral systems, was thus prohibited in the early system.

The tax-paying qualification of fifteen yen, while it does not seem high to American eyes, proved, in fact, to be one that disfranchised all but a small per cent of the population. Combined with the stipulation that to be an elector a man must reside for at least a year in the same place it opened the suffrage to only about eleven persons in every thousand. Thus a paltry one per cent of the population took part in the choice of national representatives. It was not rare to find in Japan men of intelligence and refinement who were materially in impoverished circumstances. Many of the Samurai, the for-

mer fighting class, amongst whom was great latent political ability, were completely shut out from participation in political life; under the feudal régime they had lived on annual hereditary pensions given them by their lords; few of them owned land. With the abolition of feudalism, they were often thrown into complete poverty and were compelled frequently to change their residence. They could neither stand for a seat in the House, nor could they even vote.

The tax qualification proved unfortunate in another respect. About two-thirds of the national taxes, in 1889, consisted of land taxes. The great majority of voters, thus consisted of the agrarian class; in districts of a combined urban and rural character, the rural voters being the majority of the tax-payers, almost invariably could defeat the candidate of the urban interests. The result was that the House of Representatives was controlled by agricultural interests and the mercantile and manufacturing classes were almost entirely unrepresented. The Chief Secretary of the House stated in 1900 that of the three hundred members only seventeen really represented the interests of the urban population.

The framers of the original law had apparently taken small pains to discover what would be the practical operation of their scheme. They had followed the main lines of the conventional electoral systems of western countries, and failed to realize the importance of carefully working out details; they arrived at the amount of the tax-paying qualification quite mechanically, without regard to the consequences which we have mentioned. In the same mechanical manner they marked out their electoral districts, allotting to each a single representative when the district contained between 100,000 and 200,-

000 inhabitants, and two representatives when the district contained between 200,000 and 300,000 inhabitants. But they forgot to study local variations and differences in the status of the people in the different districts, which would certainly affect the proportion of voters in each district. The result was that in some districts returning a member there would be as many as 4,300 voters; but in others, equally represented, there were only 52 or 53 voters.

Because of this unfair distribution of electors in the various districts it might easily happen that the minority of the voters could obtain the majority of seats. Thus in 1890 in one prefecture, one party secured three seats with 1,160 votes, while the other party, with 1,241 votes, secured only one seat. In another prefecture, one party secured five seats with 3,260 votes, and the other secured only two seats, although they had the majority of votes (3,542). Sometimes the party which polled practically half the number of votes failed to secure any representation whatever. Thus in the fourth general election the Progressives in the prefecture of Saga elected four members, polling 6,978 votes; but the Liberals, with 6,963, failed to elect a single deputy. Criticism was also made of the system of two-member constituencies, since it led to the choice of inefficient representatives; for persons of no political worth were frequently elected simply because their names appeared upon the same voting paper with those of popular and capable candidates.

The latter vice, as well as some others of the original electoral system, was not one confined to Japan. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with the system was such that as early as 1895, or six years after the promulgation of the first electoral law, a Reform Bill was presented to the

House of Representatives by private members. The chief characteristic of the proposed reform was the reduction of the age required of electors from twenty-five years to twenty, and a lowering of the tax-paying qualification for electors from fifteen yen to five yen in the case of direct national taxes, and to three yen in the case of income tax. The reform, had it been carried, would in all probability, have quadrupled the number of voters. The bill, although opposed by the ministry in power, passed the House of Representatives with a large majority. It was, however, rejected by the House of Peers, on the ground that a change involving such important effects ought not to be passed except after long deliberation. The debate, however, showed that the real reason of the Peers was their natural objection to the extension of democratic principles.

The Government which thus used the House of Peers for the destruction of a bill which it could not kill in the lower House, was headed by the Marquis Ito, who was apparently totally opposed to any further extension of the franchise, having been himself one of the chief persons responsible for the introduction of the original electoral system. But much to the surprise of all but the initiated, Ito himself, in 1898, introduced a new Reform Bill, which proposed to remodel radically certain portions of the system which he had himself devised. His volte-face was in part dictated by the realization that the healthy growth of constitutional government in Japan, to which he was devoted, would be impossible so long as the suffrage was so narrowly restricted as under the system of 1889. He was also impressed by the anomaly existent in the Japanese political régime which resulted from the continuous strife between the Govern-

ment and the House of Representatives. He seems to have believed that by fostering a measure which appealed so strongly to the majority of the House he might soften the antagonism of the latter and go far towards winning its coöperation.

At any rate, the Reform Bill of 1898 was in all essential portions quite as radical as that which Ito himself had opposed three years before. It was designed to meet the chief criticisms of the existing system which we have already mentioned. It lowered the franchise by half and would thus have increased the number of voters from less than half a million to at least two million; and it adopted the principle of large electoral districts. Furthermore, it created an independent electorate in municipalities which had a population of more than half a million. The bill passed the House of Representatives, but a sudden dissolution ended the life of the Diet before it reached the Peers.

It was obvious that the question of electoral reform had permanently entered the sphere of practical politics, for the next session witnessed the introduction of a third bill, which like the second was fathered by the Government in power. The new Prime Minister, Yamagata, was no lover of democracy and had never shown any great sympathy with the movement for extending the electoral power of the people. But he needed the support of the Liberals and to gain it offered them certain concessions, among which was the reform of the system of elections. The bill, as first presented, closely resembled its predecessor, but was amended by the agrarian interests in the House of Representatives so that the number of new seats allotted to the new municipal districts was lessened and the property qualification for voters slight-

ly raised, in so far as it applied to taxes other than the land tax. To these amendments the Peers, who seem to have been actuated by motives of high statesmanship, objected, with the result that a quarrel of the two Houses took place, which could not be settled by the conference called to arrange the dispute. In default of any agreement the bill was allowed to perish of inanition through the method of postponement *sine die*.

In 1902 the question of electoral reform was once more raised and this time settled. The Government's bill was roughly handled by the House of Peers, who amended it so as to increase the proposed property qualification from five yen of direct national taxes to ten yen, a change which would lessen the number of new voters by about half. It is a matter of some surprise that the Liberals in the lower House should have been willing to accept such a vital amendment, but they seem to have decided that half a loaf was better than no bread and that another prolonged struggle with the Peers was undesirable. The Government was naturally not ill-pleased by the character of the change in the bill. And public opinion was apparently perfectly indifferent; few of the people, outside of the House seemed to care about the suffrage, and practically none of them realized how the Peers' amendment would affect their part in political matters.

The Reform Bill of 1902 was none the less a noteworthy advance in the extension of a democratic electoral system. The Bill lowered the qualification from fifteen to ten yen, so that at present in order to vote in Japan, a man must be twenty-five years of age and pay a direct tax of at least ten yen; if the tax is a land tax it must be for at least a year, and if other than a land tax or combined with a land tax it must be for two years.

In order to qualify, the claimant must be a permanent and actual resident in his electoral district for not less than a year. The bill also changed the arrangement of districts, creating an independent electoral district for each municipality with a population of more than 30,000. The whole country was divided into 108 constituencies, of which forty-seven were rural and sixty-one urban. To each of the former were allotted from four to twelve seats, according to their population; to each of the latter were given from one to two seats, with the exception of Tokyo, Osaka, and Kioto, which were allotted eleven, six, and three seats respectively. The bill further met the criticisms raised against the old system by doing away with the property qualification for candidates and thus widening the circle from which representatives might be chosen, and by the substitution of the secret ballot for the old method of open voting.

The reform of 1902 obviously benefited Japanese democracy by securing a fairer representation for the different classes of the people, and also by increasing the sum total of the electorate; the number of voters jumped at once from about 450,000 to nearly a million. The ratio of electors to population which had been as low as eleven per thousand was increased to about twenty-one per thousand. Another increase in the number of electors resulted in 1908 from the extension of the franchise to new urban districts, which raised the number of voters to more than a million and a half and the ratio of electors to population to thirty-three per thousand. The franchise can hardly be termed democratic, inasmuch as even now all but a small modicum of the population is excluded from voting rights; but the advance made during the generation that has followed the first granting of

constitutional forms in Japan is noteworthy. It does not seem unsafe to predict that when the masses are ready and anxious for the voting privilege they will secure it without insurmountable difficulty.

The details of electoral procedure in Japan approximate closely to those of western countries. When the House of Representatives has been dissolved or has reached the end of its four-year term, and a new House is to be elected, the date for the general election is set by imperial ordinance. All elections throughout the country are held on the same day. The polls are open from seven in the morning until six in the evening, and voting is by secret ballot. The Governor of the Prefecture superintends the machinery of the election in his own administrative district, while the mayors of the cities and the chief magistrates of the villages and smaller towns act as returning officers in the urban and rural constituencies.

In Japan there are no such things as primaries nor complicated ceremonies or machinery of nomination to be passed through. If a man desires to stand as candidate for a seat, a group of his friends or political supporters simply announce, generally through newspaper columns, that they recommend him for election. The whole process of electioneering is more informal and less carefully organized than in the West. The candidate is almost invariably a local man; each district is apt to have its favorite son who naturally appears as candidate, and the habit, so common in England, of importing a candidate from another constituency because of his national fame, is extremely rare in Japan. The management of the election as well as the choice of the candidate is usually left to the local political organiza-

tion, if one exists; and the control of the central headquarters of the party is far less direct than in England or even in the United States.

Electioneering propaganda is less uproarious than in the West, and there is far less street rhetoric and red-fire. Election speeches, except on certain rather solemn occasions, have, until recently, formed a rather unimportant factor in the electoral campaigns of the candidates, partly because the election addresses of the first campaigns were poor, frothy, and flamboyant, partly because soap-box oratory offends the taste of the Japanese. In the last elections, however, leading statesmen have taken the stump, as in America, and both the quality of the speeches and the effectiveness of this sort of campaigning has been greatly improved. In the general election of 1915 Count Okuma, the Prime Minister, traveled all over the country making speeches. To the districts which he could not himself visit personally he sent gramophone records of his addresses. Bands, torches, flags, and transparencies are forbidden by law in an election. The absence of such paraphernalia taken in conjunction with the apathetic attitude of the Japanese electors, has often made an election rather a gray affair, although this has not been the invariable rule, and in recent years more color has been introduced into the campaign. The long lines of motor cars and vehicles of all kinds, so characteristic of an English election, are conspicuously absent in Japan, for the election law prohibits the loaning or hiring of carriages for the conveyance of electors to or from the polls.

Canvassing, rather than speech-making, forms the most effective method of winning votes, for the Japanese are sentimental and can be won by the touch of personality

where electoral logic would leave them cold. The comparatively small number of voters makes it possible for the candidate to meet practically all of his constituency, and successful candidates have been known to make as many as four or five personal visits on the electors during a campaign. It is a genial and informal sort of canvassing with far less of the cold-blooded organization that has been developed in England. Political rings and bosses are not as yet well developed, although they have made their appearance in rather primitive form; in some districts there are already types of professional politicians who make a trade of getting the "right men" elected and who control their knot of trusty voters. Such men are looked upon with suspicion and, as in this country, the word politician is in bad odor.

Such politicians have found their opportunity in the electoral apathy of the Japanese voter. Remembering the small proportion of Japanese who possess the suffrage, about one in thirty of the population, the number of qualified electors who do not vote is surprising; furthermore, the per cent of abstentions has been increasing. In the election of 1898, 11.72 per cent of the electorate did not come to the polls; in 1903 the per cent of abstentions was 13.79; in 1904 it was 13.94; and in 1908 it was no less than 28.56. It would seem as if the Japanese elector, until recently, did not greatly care who was elected; many of them doubtless did not bring themselves to take elections to the Diet very seriously, for it was obvious that although the relative power of the House of Representatives has been increasing, its share in the government of the nation was largely academic; the bureaucratic statesmen really controlled the government and were not responsible either to the Diet or to the people.

Under these circumstances many thoughtful and intelligent Japanese did not interest themselves greatly in electoral politics. They left the field in many constituencies open to the new professional politicians. In these constituencies elections have been characterized by much wire-pulling and some corruption.

It is inevitable that corruption of one kind or another should develop in the present stage of democracy in any country and it is particularly apt to appear in that part of the democratic mechanism which is concerned with the choice of popular representatives. The extent of such corruption in Japan it is difficult to evaluate; but Japanese authorities are willing to admit that it has been widespread, is not being checked, and is probably more general than in Anglo-Saxon countries, certainly than in Great Britain. The vote, as we have seen, is regarded with little respect by the Japanese because of the small modicum of practical political influence which it commands. For this reason, the Japanese elector is easily persuaded to cast it for one side or the other, or to sell it when tempting opportunity offers. This fact, rather than the brevity of Japanese parliamentary history and the political inexperience of the Japanese electorate, seems to be the real explanation of dishonesty in electoral contests. It is, indeed, a significant fact that corruption has increased rather than diminished as the people have become accustomed to the existence of a parliament and to the experience of elections.

During the first years of the constitutional régime there does not seem to have been any general attempt to corrupt the voters. It was the Government itself which first borrowed the obnoxious habits of the West, when in 1898 it was desirous of passing a bill for the increase

of taxation, and, in the fear that it would not control the necessary majority in the House, introduced flagrant methods of buying or influencing the voters. Since then both intimidation and bribery have been practised, in certain constituencies, with freedom. Interference on the part of the Government has not been so frequent during the past three elections, for officials have learned that it is easier to buy the representatives than the voters, and parliamentary corruption, of a kind which has led to serious scandals, has generally been substituted for the exercise of ministerial influence at the polls.

But corruption by the leading political parties is still flagrant and, according to Uyehara, who wrote in 1908, the vote was then as marketable in Japan as in Great Britain during the eighteenth century. The price generally paid for a vote, which ranged from three to four yen (\$1.50 to \$2.00) indicates that bribery was not looked upon as a very serious offense. During the general election of 1908 no less than 2,457 persons were charged with unlawful intimidation, threats, violence, or bribery. In 1915 the scandals resulting from the corruption of electoral methods were so great as to cause a serious ministerial crisis. The defeated Opposition brought forward charges of the most flagrant bribery. No less than twenty members of the House of Representatives were committed for public trial on this charge. And the Minister for Home Affairs himself was declared guilty, a disgrace which led to the resignation of the cabinet.

Efforts made to prevent dishonesty in electoral campaigns have not been particularly serious nor successful. In 1899 a Corrupt Practices Bill was introduced but the House of Representatives refused to accept it. Two

years later, in 1901, another bill with a similar purpose was passed. Because of its failure, various amendments have been suggested, one of which seems curiously reactionary to western eyes. It was urged that secret voting by ballot be abolished and the *viva voce* system be introduced. The belief was that under the open voting system the elector could not accept bribes from several different persons and that bribery would be thereby diminished. That such an argument could be advanced throws significant light upon the extent of the purchase of votes which must prevail in Japan.

It is curious to note that with all the apathy of Japanese electors, which is so greatly emphasized by all writers and which is obvious in an ordinary campaign, there are records of certain contests where the violence exhibited around the polls would have satisfied even the election bullies of eighteenth century Great Britain. Thus in 1892, during one of the early elections, governmental interference led to scenes of great turbulence, in which no less than twenty-five persons were killed and three hundred and eighty-eight were wounded. Two years later, in 1894, although the Government did not interfere directly, as it had done in the previous election, rioting occurred in several prefectures. In the Tochigi prefecture alone, one man was killed and one hundred and seventeen persons were wounded during the election. It must not, however, be surmised that such disturbances are a matter of common occurrence.

An election in Japan, which may cost the successful candidate three thousand yen, is an expensive matter if we consider only the political value of the seat in the House of Representatives. Unlike membership in the British House of Commons, it does not offer much op-

portunity for the acquisition of influence in the direction of public affairs, for the Diet is not the controlling power in government. In some ways it is of less importance than a seat in the German Reichstag, which is an excellent debating society; for in the Japanese House discussion is discouraged so far as possible by the Government. Nor does the Japanese Representative, like the American Congressman, enjoy a certain tenure of office, for the chamber may be dissolved at any moment and he himself sent back to the electors.

And yet membership in the House of Representatives brings with it a social position which is highly appreciated by the Japanese and makes the outlay of election expenses seem worth while, for service in any department of the government entitles a man to the highest respect. "A member of the House is Honorable; he enjoys a social distinction equal to that of high state officials. . . . At social functions he is admitted into the circle of high officials, which is shut to the people. It is indeed this social distinction that constitutes one of the greatest forces drawing men to the House and so, in spite of its weak political power, we are fortunate in having in the House of Representatives men of comparatively good standing." (Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan*, 273).

It is certain that Japan has not yet reached its political maturity and he is a bold man who would dare foretell the developments of the next few decades. The political, as well as the industrial, transformation of the past fifty years has not been accompanied by a commensurate inner spiritual transformation. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, for the Westerner to see into the heart of the Japanese, and without such vision it

may be wholly vain to guess how far the political growth of Japan will correspond to political developments in western countries.

But if we may judge from the concrete crust of events, without seeking to penetrate the inner spirit of the nation, it seems likely that democracy, in some fashion akin to that of western Europe, will more and more completely pervade Japanese politics. The demand for a responsible ministry must sooner or later be satisfied and the supremacy of the elected Chamber in Parliament acknowledged. With such a transformation must come the extension of the suffrage and the development of a system of elections far more democratic, both in form and substance, than that now in force, and one through which the people will actually rule.

The following table shows the growth of the Japanese House of Representatives and the electorate.

	Number of Seats	Electors	Ratio of electors to population, per 1,000
1890.....	300	553,474	11.50
1899.....	300	467,887	11.42
1903.....	376	951,860	20.96
1904.....	379	757,788	25.77
1908.....	379	1,582,676	32.93
1912.....	381	1,501,343	29.06
1915.....	381	1,544,725	28.82

CHAPTER XXXV

CONCLUSION

FROM the preceding pages it will have been gathered that universal suffrage is the goal, both in theory and in practice, of government to-day. The powers which still tend to restrain the franchise are ever loosening their grip, and the war has dealt almost irresistible blows against the chief citadels of autocracy. It is both futile and foolish to strive to retard the progress of democracy in elections, for there is no tenable argument wherefore any part of society, with the exception of criminals and the mentally deficient, should be entirely segregated from political life, and, further than that, the classes hitherto excluded are well aware of that fact.

There are, no doubt, valid reasons for depriving certain inhabitants of the state of the right to vote. No one questions the exclusion of minors and the insane. Certain states seek to prevent clerical or military domination by disfranchising members of the clergy, or of the army on active service. It was once an accepted theorem that paupers and bankrupts might not vote, because they contributed nothing to the financial strength of the state, but were rather liabilities. But the socialist criticism of this distinction has at last found practical application in the Soviet Republic of Russia, which allows all the proletariat to vote and disfranchises only the bourgeoisie. With the progress of education the justification for a

literacy test is vanishing, as it is recognized that disfranchisement for that reason often means the perpetuation of illiteracy, as is the case in Hungary. The unmistakable tendency of the present age towards complete universal suffrage is evidenced by the statement of that principle in the constitutions of most of the new states founded during the present war.

The largest groups still widely disfranchised are aliens and women. The limitation of the suffrage to citizens is a relic of an idea as old as Greece and Rome, which gained a new lease of life through the accentuation of nationalism in the nineteenth century. Given the world order of international jealousy, of recriminatory tariffs and peaceful permeation, the extension of the suffrage to temporary residents from other nationalities will probably find small support. The dangers from foreign "colonization" during the election period are certainly great. But if a League of Nations is to become a reality, removing trade barriers between countries, diminishing the likelihood of war, and promoting a common intercourse of things material and intellectual, there can be no reason for delimiting elections upon the lines of dead frontiers. An international franchise, limited, no doubt, to elections of general interest, is a possibility of the future.

As for woman suffrage, no such doubts as to its practicability or its justice can be raised. The day is past when the *right* of women to vote with men can be questioned. The opposition of the anti-suffragists, so far as it is serious, has shifted to the ground of state expediency. Here there was once something to be said; but the increasing invasion by women of economic fields hitherto exclusively masculine, is rapidly breaking down the

wall of political division. The services of women in the present crisis will sweep away the few remaining barriers, just as the Civil War set forward the cause of woman suffrage in the United States. Many European states have already granted the franchise to women. In America the question is rather the mode of grant than its refusal. England is in the process of extending the suffrage to all members of both sexes. When, as to-day, woman suffrage finds a strong following even in Prussia and Hungary, the day of its universal acceptance is not far off.

But once a vote has been allowed to every member of society, the question arises whether all votes shall have the same value. No one assumes that the loafer and the laborer, the illiterate and the man on whose training years of university or technical school education and hundreds of dollars have been spent, whether the individuals be rich or poor, are of the same value to society. Even assuming a socialistic basis of free education for all citizens of the state, there would still be the widest differences in individual attainments. This is the ground for the not uncommon differentiation, either of the effect, or the number, of votes, a differentiation in two regards: as to the votes of individuals and as to the votes of groups or classes.

A weighted vote for some individuals, and not for others, is at the bottom of the plural vote as it is employed in Belgium, and as it was formerly used in Scandinavia and in other parts of the Continent. The reason ordinarily adduced for giving an individual two or more votes is the fact that he pays a larger share of the taxes or holds more property than his neighbor. Herein the plural vote is a survival of the medieval idea that the suffrage is a vested privilege dependent upon wealth, and

lacks solid grounds for justification. In Belgium extra votes are given on the more valid grounds of age, headship of a family, higher education, or public service.

The weighted vote may be extended to a whole class because of the economic interest of that class or because of its greater services to the state. Best known of the former type is the case of Prussia, where the three-class system, based upon tax payments, sharply divides society into very unequal strata. Austria before the reform of 1907 attained the same result by a division into *curiae* representing agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests. Many political scientists have advocated the representation of interests. It is at least as ancient as the Estates of the Middle Ages, which endured well into the last century. It is to be found frequently in the composition of upper houses, as in England in the House of Lords with its nobles, its ecclesiastics and its lay lords, in Spain, in Rumania, Japan, Italy, Finland, and elsewhere.

The representation of interests rests sometimes on another than an economic basis. Three fundamental distinctions which are made in the electorate are those of the clergy, of state officials, and of the intelligentsia. Spain, Italy, Belgium, Austria, all give a special voice in one or the other House of Parliament to these classes. They are very commonly mingled in the Upper House with the nobility or with appointees of the Crown; this is the case in Austria, Rumania, Prussia, Sweden, Württemberg, and other states. The Senate, or House of Lords, is quite generally representative of the three aristocracies of the Church, the State Service, and the Universities, sometimes in conjunction with special representation of wealth also, but often without the latter.

There is a school of political scientists who would change the old representation of classes to one of professional interests. In Parliament agriculture, manufacture, the liberal arts, labor, the public administration, would each have its deputies, competent to speak on matters which concerned their constituents. Whatever might be the advantages of such a scheme, especially for the handling of technical legislation, its practical complications, and the difficulty of conceiving how such an assemblage could agree to any measure, relegate the idea to the limbo of untried political fantasies.

However and wherever applied, the special representation of either individuals or classes is liable to become a bulwark of conservatism, and in current legislation we often see it proposed for that express reason. Theoretically it is desirable that the intelligent and morally sound portion of the nation should have a greater voice in government than the ignorant and the improvident. To a certain extent the system is justified by its results, witness the model government of German cities, where the class system of voting prevails. Those results are accomplished by shifting the balance of power to the competent few, while every citizen retains some influence on government, but considering the manner in which such a system can be captured for the benefit of a very narrow economic caste, is it not preferable to obtain the same result by a more strenuous effort towards mass education, an undifferentiated suffrage, and the election of a small and competent administrative group, held rigorously accountable to public opinion? This is the present American ideal, as surely as the growth of commission government may be considered significant; this is the tendency of the most recent legislation on the Continent.

It calls for greater self-restraint, better education, and a quicker public conscience than the United States or any other country can now boast. It is none the less an inspiring and uplifting ideal.

If we grant, then, the principle of the broadest universal suffrage, it remains to provide both machinery adequate to register the public will, as expressed by great populations, and guarantees of the accuracy of that expression. To the former category belong the ballot, the connecting of a deputy closely both to his constituency and to his country, and the curbing of fraudulent practices. Of the same sort is the compulsory vote, which requires a voter to express his opinion even against his own inclination.

Time has led us to regard as hypocritical the plea that the masses can not be trusted to cast an honest ballot in secret. Except for a few belated stragglers, such as Prussia, Hungary, and Serbia, most countries have adopted the secret ballot in forms varying from the bizarre system of boxes and balls in Greece to the huge American blanket ballot. The principle of the secret ballot is no longer called in question. The problem is rather to obtain a ballot which will not be beyond the competence of the average voter to prepare, and in no country is this problem more urgent than in the United States. It is further necessary that the ballot shall be official, and that no chance be offered in the process of voting to allow it to be marked for identification as a bought and delivered vote.

The controversy over single member districts as against election by ticket is generally fought out upon party lines. The latter system exists in Austria, Italy, Belgium; it is in partial operation in Japan, and generally where pro-

portional representation is in vogue; the uni-nominal system is employed in France, Germany, Greece, and in England and the United States in parliamentary or congressional elections. The chief arguments in favor of election by ticket are the following. It erases purely local lines of cleavage and makes the legislature a national body, whose members are not fettered by too intimate connections with a small, specific constituency. Fraud is more difficult because the elections are carried out on a larger scale, involving more names, more watchers, and other safeguards for honesty. Party interests are better served by this mode of voting, for the elector votes for ideas and programs, rather than for individuals. For single-member districts it can be said that they prevent the overwhelming of the country by the city vote. This system breaks up representation and in a measure provides an expression for minority opinion, which the ticket system would stifle. It has the further advantage that its single candidate is better known to his constituency than a dozen nominees can possibly be. It thus avoids a sort of indirect election in the framing of the lists by a limited party group. Except, however, that *scrutin de liste* is almost a necessity for proportional representation, the balance between the two systems is so even that each country is warranted in choosing for itself between them.

Among the means of guaranteeing the accuracy of the expression of the whole of public opinion at the polls we may mention the compulsory vote, direct voting, districting according to population, and proportional representation. The compulsory vote brings every citizen to the polls for the purpose of registering his will, and of compelling him to take sides, in case he lacks interest of his own volition. Direct voting insures that his wishes

will be transmitted into action without being refracted through the medium of another body. Indirect election is only a survival of antiquated institutions, such as the Presidential Electoral College in this country, or the electoral colleges for the Prussian Landtag.

One of the most efficient ways of falsifying the voice of the electorate is through an unjust districting, the last resort of minority rule against the weight of numbers. The injustice of gerrymandering is openly acknowledged, the practice is continued notwithstanding. It reaches its heights in a country of diverse nationalities, such as Austria Hungary or Russia, or of conflicting economic regions, such as Germany. In Spain and Portugal the system of districting is the sport of parties and is liable to change without notice. In countries where there is no ulterior motive for unnatural distribution of seats, the rule is generally that deputies be allotted simply according to population, without regard to geographical, racial, or economical interests. Whether the number of electors for each representative is large or small is relatively of small concern, so long as it is the same for all districts.

The problem of representation of minorities in a democracy is vitally related to a fundamental principle of democratic government. "No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it," wrote John Stuart Mill. "Nothing is more certain than that the virtual blotting out of the minority is no necessary consequence of freedom, but instead is diametrically opposed to the first principle of democracy: representation in proportion to numbers." Parliament should be composed of the same elements as the nation; but everyday experience goes to show that under the simple rule of numbers a considerable minority, if broken up among

different districts, can be wholly blocked from access to the legislature. If it obtains any seats, they are stray, chance ones, not those to which it is entitled. To quote again from Mill: "A majority of the electors should always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors should always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they should be as fully represented as the majority, and unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and privilege,—contrary to all just government, but above all contrary to the principle of democracy which professes equality as its very root and foundation."

The chief schemes devised to give representation to minorities are four in number. First, there is the incomplete vote, which is practicable only in districts where there are several deputies to be chosen. Supposing that there are three names on the ticket, each elector may vote for two only, rendering it possible for the minority party by concentration to elect one representative. This system is in vogue in parliamentary elections in Spain and Portugal. It has the disadvantage that it is merely limited, without being proportional, and therefore does not necessarily correspond to the division of the electorate. It also provides only for two parties.

The second system is the cumulative vote. The voter may cast as many votes as there are names on the ticket, and may distribute them as he pleases. Members of a minority can cast all their ballots for one or two names and run up a total sufficient to place their candidate beside those of the majority. Even a small minority can usually win at least one seat. This is the system employed in Cape Colony, and Chile. In practical experi-

ence the result is sometimes upsetting, for two popular candidates of a minority may win to one of a majority, because of the wastage of votes by the latter. The majority must therefore fall back upon strong party government, and the system leads to an accentuation of "organization" rule.

Third, we have the preferential system, known from its inventor as the Hare system. Each voter votes for his first, second, and third choices, etc. The total number of votes cast is divided by the number of seats to find the minimum number which a candidate must receive in order to be elected. The first choices are counted first, and those who have received a number of these equal to the electoral quotient are declared elected. The first choices remaining to the winners are then counted for the other candidates in the order of preference indicated, and as the latter are brought up to the necessary quota they are awarded places, until the seats have been filled. The system has been put into practice only on a small scale and in limited areas; and its complexity will probably debar it from adoption in large electoral districts. It furnishes nevertheless an accurate index of the wishes of the voters.

Fourthly, the list system, more generally known as the d'Hondt system, furnishes the most practical scheme of proportional representation yet devised. The main features of the system have already been described as they have been applied in Belgium.* It is in use also in Cuba, Sweden, Denmark, certain of the Swiss cantons, Württemberg, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Holland, and is gaining headway among the western states in the United States. The chief advantages of the list system are its simplicity,

* See page 199.


its compatibility with the party system of government and with large constituencies, and the accuracy with which it reflects shades of opinion in the electorate.

It is argued against proportional representation that it will lead to class distinctions and legislation, if small groups are encouraged to form with the certainty that they can acquire a footing in the legislature. Majority rule is open to abuse, but in most countries it has not been abused to such an extent that it is necessary to throw over the idea of a legislature of breadth and unity for one of a legislature tuned, or perhaps untuned, to a great variety of discordant notes. Esmein declares that proportional representation will organize disorder, make cabinets unstable, and vitiate party life. It will produce legislatures constitutionally unable to agree upon any constructive program. These objections in theory have not been entirely realized in the countries where the system has been employed; and it is probable that the steady progress of the last two decades in the introduction of minority representation will continue.

The advance of universal enfranchisement goes on apace. Time discredits the prophecies of alarmists who saw in the extension of the suffrage to the masses an assault on the foundations of the state. In the rear of the democratic advance come somewhat more laggingly the safeguards for the newly won privileges. So far as these are mere machinery for preserving the integrity and the accuracy of elections, they may perhaps wait upon the special exigencies of time and place. But there is one palliative for the so-called evil effects of universal suffrage which ought rather to precede than to follow the system. If the state gives the vote to the ignorant, they will fall

into anarchy to-day and into despotism to-morrow. John Stuart Mill never spoke more truly than when he said that universal teaching must come before universal enfranchisement.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE



CHAPTER I. GENERAL

THE student will find that, while there is an ample number of books in English on general political theory, electoral systems can not be adequately examined without going to the many French and German works on the subject. England gave Europe a system of parliamentary government, but English scholars have left to others on the Continent the working out of the problem of the franchise.

For purposes of limited study, the following works are fundamental: H. Sidgwick, *Elements of Politics*; J. S. Mill, *Representative Government*; W. A. Dunning, *History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval*; H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe*. The most useful handbooks of present political systems are A. L. Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, which has unfortunately not been brought down to the present; and F. A. Ogg, *The Governments of Europe*, more detailed and less readable than Lowell, but brought down to 1912. F. W. Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy* contains useful selections from political theorists from the Greeks to the present day. J. W. Garner, *Introduction to Political Science*, is as valuable a condensed study of the subject as is available.

The electoral question is treated as a whole in *La crise de l'état moderne: de l'organisation du suffrage universel*, by C. Benoist, an eminent French authority. R. de la Grasserie combines a similar study with a collation of the

systems in vogue in various countries, in *Systèmes électoraux des différents peuples*. Descriptive books on present day systems are: Lefèvre Pontalis, *Les élections en Europe à la fin du XIX siècle*; and O. Pyfferoen, *L'électorat politique et administratif en Europe*.

Seignobos, *Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine* will be found invaluable for the developments of the last century. It may be had in a somewhat abridged English translation. The more recent electoral changes can be found in the volumes of the *Annual Register*. Constitutions, with their electoral provisions, are best gotten from Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*.

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CHAPTER II. MEDIEVAL ELECTIONS

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For medieval Italian towns see Pasquale Villari, *Medieval Italy from Charlemagne to Henry VII*. H. D. Sedgwick, *Italy in the Thirteenth Century*, covers well a comparatively late period. J. Luchaire, *Les Démocraties Italiennes*, is useful, as is A. M. Wolfson, *The Ballot and Other Forms of Voting in the Italian Communes*, in *American Historical Review* V, p. 1.

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G. von Below, *Das ältere deutsche Städtewesen und Bürgertum*, is a convenient and interesting monograph on German towns. See also J. M. Vincent, *Municipal Reform in Medieval Switzerland*, in *American Historical Association Reports*, 1902, I, p. 213.

J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, gives the chief details of imperial elections. Material on papal elections is difficult to secure in English. The reader must go to unreadable German treatises such as Zoepfl, *Papstwahlen von 11 bis zur 14 Jahrhundert*; Souchon, *Papstwahlen von Bonifaz VIII bis Urban V*; or Hinschius, *Kirchenrecht*, I, 239-294; if detailed information is sought.

CHAPTERS III-VIII. GREAT BRITAIN

Of the numerous general works dealing with the constitution of Great Britain, probably the clearest, as well as the most authoritative, is the brief survey by George Burton Adams, *The Growth of the British Constitution*. It provides an admirable introduction to the study of British elections, especially if taken in conjunction with Sir Courtnay Ilbert's *Parliament, Its History, Constitution, and Practice* (Home University Library). Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson's *The Development of Parliament* is particularly valuable for its lucid demonstration of the relation between democratic growth and electoral and Parliamentary reform.

For the electoral system of Great Britain under the régime previous to the Reform Act of 1832 the standard authority is *The Unreformed House of Commons*, by Edward and Annie G. Porritt. It is scholarly and comprehensive. It should preferably be supplemented by Joseph Grego's *A History of Parliamentary Elections and Electioneering in the Old Days*. The latter contains a voluminous collection of human material dealing with old-style elections and electioneering. It is profusely illustrated with cuts of election cartoons of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and has numerous election squibs and rimes. To both of these books the authors are indebted for much of the material incorporated in the chapters on the British system of elections and electioneering before 1832.

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(which has an admirable survey of unreformed conditions); and J. R. M. Butler, *The Passing of the Great Reform Bill*. The extension of democracy in elections by means of the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1885 and the gradual elimination of unjust and corrupt electioneering is traced in Charles Seymour's *Electoral Reform in England and Wales*. Useful but dry are J. R. Heaton *The Three Reforms of Parliament*; and Homersham Cox *The Reform Bills of 1866 and 1867*.

When we come to the period since 1885 certain chapters of A. L. Lowell's *The Government of England* are invaluable. The chief barriers to democracy remaining in the electoral system after the third Reform Act are discussed in Joseph King's *Electoral Reform*, which is inspired by the enthusiasm of a reformer, rather than the critical impartiality of the scholar; but it serves as an excellent introduction to an understanding of the Reform Act of 1918. Equally important for a comprehension of the final success of woman suffrage is Emmeline Pankhurst's *My Own Story*. Reference may also be made in this connection to W. L. Blease, *The Emancipation of English Women*.

For an appreciation of the conditions under which recent British elections have been contested there is no better guide than *The Liberal Magazine*, which publishes not merely abstracts of Parliamentary debates but also summaries of the evidence delivered at election trials and selected newspaper comment. The full minutes of such evidence, together with reports of all electoral committees or commissions, as well as the text of all proposed bills dealing with elections are printed in the official Blue Books (*Parliamentary Papers*). The text of the debates is published in Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates* and in

the London *Times*. For a brief summary of the Reform Act of 1918, reference may be made to the *Weekly Edition of the London Times*.

CHAPTER IX. THE BRITISH COLONIES

Descriptions of the electoral organization of the British Colonies must be sought in the more general works of history and politics. For securing a background the reader should consult the survey of the British Empire overseas in Sir Charles Lucas, *The British Empire*. The best exposition of the system of colonial governments is probably to be found in Sir H. Jenkyns, *British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas*. Alpheus Todd, *Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies* is somewhat antiquated, but for years was regarded as the standard work; it still contains material of great value, and is readable. For Canada consult Bourinot's works (*How Canada Is Governed, Etc.*); particularly useful is C. Hawkins (ed.), *The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs* (1901 sqq.). Works of value on Australia and South Africa are H. G. Turner, *The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth: a Chronicle of Contemporary Politics, 1901-1910*; and R. H. Brand, *The Union of South Africa*. There is an excellent brief summary of electoral organization in the Colonies in Joseph King, *Electoral Reform*.

CHAPTERS X-XIV. THE UNITED STATES

Osgood, *History of the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, throws much light upon the political

features of the colonial period. Colonial elections have been the object of special research in two volumes, which are so burdened with detail as to deter any casual reader from benefiting by their really tremendous fund of information. C. F. Bishop, *History of Elections in the American Colonies*, and A. E. McKinley, *The Suffrage Franchise in the Thirteen English Colonies in America*. Most readable, although unfortunately brief on the subject of elections, is C. M. Andrews, *Colonial Self Government*.

The broadening of the franchise is interestingly traced in J. B. McMaster, *The Acquisition of the Social and Political Rights of Man in America*. An interesting contemporary sidelight on the earlier period is given by Isaac Hillard, *The Rights of Suffrage* (1804). Of the countless books and pamphlets on woman suffrage, E. C. Stanton, *Woman Suffrage*, is the only one we shall mention here. For negro suffrage see A. B. Hart, *The Realities of Negro Suffrage*, in *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, 1905, p. 149; and J. C. Rose, *Negro Suffrage*, in the *Political Science Review*, I, 17.

The question of the ballot is an object of zealous attention on the part of a great many writers and associations. Philip L. Allen, *Ballot Laws and Their Workings*, sums up the forms of ballot in use to-day. Another and briefer review is afforded by A. Ludington, *The Present State of the Ballot Laws*, in *American Political Science Review*, May, 1909. E. C. Evans, *History of the Australian Ballot System in the United States*, is the best short history of the introduction of the system. R. S. Childs, *Short Ballot Principles*, pleads the case for ballot reform. For matters of electoral procedure see D. A. McKnight, *The Electoral System*; C. L. Jones, *Readings on Parties and Elections*,

an exceedingly useful handbook; or A. C. McLaughlin and A. B. Hart, *Cyclopedia of American Government*, under the name of the institution in question. A. B. Hart, *Essays on Government*, will also be found helpful.

Lord Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, has caught sight of the varieties and the inner significance of American elections far better than would be possible for most natives. Neither does his narration at all lessen the interest of this side of electoral questions. R. C. Brooks, *Corruption in American Politics and Life*, is able and readable. Books largely concerned with descriptions of the actual forms which corruption takes are: J. W. Jenks, *Money in Practical Politics*; S. G. Lowrie, *Corrupt Practices at Elections*; and lastly, G. L. Fox, *Corrupt Practices and Election Laws in the United States Since 1890*, in *Proceedings of the American Political Science Association*, 1905, page 171.

In studies of the party system we again have a foreigner who has written most ably on American institutions: M. Ostrogorski. His *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*; *Democracy and the Party System in the United States*; and *The Rise and Fall of the Nominating Caucus, Legislative and National* in the *American Historical Review*, V, 253, are indispensable. G. D. Luetscher, *Early Political Machinery in the United States*, gives information on this, as well as the preceding, topic. F. W. Dallinger, *Nominations for Elective Office*, is a standard authority. Other valuable works are: J. Macy, *Party Organization and Machinery*; C. E. Merriam, *Primary Elections*; E. C. Meyer, *Nominating Systems: Direct Primaries vs. Conventions in the United States*; and J. A. Woodburn, *Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States*.

In the field of national and state elections, J. H. Dougherty, *The Electoral System of the United States*, is an exhaustive study of presidential elections by a student deeply interested in reform. Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, is of use, as is H. C. Gauss, *The American Government*. G. H. Haynes, *The Election of Senators*, must be mentioned. For the relation between national and state elections, see B. A. Hinsdale, *American Government, National and State*. For State elections G. H. Haynes, *Representation in State Legislatures*, in *American Academy of Political Science*, No. 284, 1900, gives a good collation of the various systems in vogue.

CHAPTERS XV-XVIII. FRANCE

For a general understanding of the political side of the French Revolution A. Aulard, *The French Revolution: A Political History*, is absolutely indispensable. The volumes of J. Jaurès, *Histoire Socialiste*, dealing with events from 1789 to 1848 also contain material which can be found in no other general work, but the reader is handicapped by their length and by the absence of an index. F. M. Anderson, *Constitutions and Other Documents Illustrating the History of France 1789-1907*, contains only the chief charters and laws. It may be supplemented by Dodd, *Modern Constitutions*, or better by L. Duguit and H. Monnier, *Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789*. M. Block, *Dictionnaire général de la politique*, is of use for ascertaining the content of legal phrases and political institutions of the past century in France. Two very useful and condensed studies on the electoral problem are G. D. Weil, *Les élec-*

tions législatives depuis 1789; and P. Meuriot, *Population et lois électorales en France de 1789 à nos jours*, a statistical study.

The development of the taxpayers' suffrage under the Restoration can be traced only in French works. P. Duvergier de Hauranne, *Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France 1814-1848*, is a standard but rather antiquated work, the antithesis of Aulard in method and readability. A. T. Vaulabelle, *Histoire de deux Restaurations*, is likewise almost exclusively parliamentary. G. Weill, *Histoire du parti républicain en France de 1814 à 1870*, traces the history of republican movements. Louis Blanc, *Histoire de Dix Ans (1830-1840)*, gives an excellent account of the Orleanist régime. Most useful for electoral history of the Restoration is J. Crauffon, *La Chambre des Députés sous la Restauration*.

For the Second Republic see P. de la Gorce, *Histoire de la Deuxième République*. Also useful are G. Weill, *Histoire du parti républicain en France*; and H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe*. P. de la Gorce, *Histoire du Deuxième Empire*, is an admirably arranged and eminently readable story of the rule of Napoleon III, with a rather favorable bias. It has excellent sections on the politics of the Empire. Albert Thomas, *Le Second Empire*, in *Histoire Socialiste*, has material not given in de la Gorce.

The best work on the history of politics and government in France under the Third Republic is G. Hanotaux, *Contemporary France* in four volumes. R. Saleilles, *The Present Constitution of France*, in *Annals of the American Academy of Science*, July, 1895, is another valuable interpretation. Of the numerous books and articles on the electoral question, which has called forth such a store

of polemics, we shall mention only G. LaChapelle and H. Poincaré, *La représentation proportionnelle en France et Belgique*, which gives both history and discussion of the reform agitation in France; R. Saleilles, *La représentation proportionnelle*, in *Révue du Droit Public*, 1898; J. L. Chardon, *La réforme électorale en France*, containing discussion of recent schemes and of public opinion on reform; and LaChesnais, *La représentation proportionnelle et les partis politiques*. J. S. Schapiro, *The Drift in French Politics*, in *American Political Science Review*, August, 1913, is an able interpretation of present party development. *De la sophistication du suffrage universel*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, XXIV, 445 ff., and XXV, 344 ff. is a thorough dissection of the forms and causes of electoral corruption in France.

CHAPTERS XIX-XX. GERMANY

For the history of German development in the early nineteenth century, use A. W. Ward and S. Wilkinson, *Germany 1815-1871*, which is now somewhat old-fashioned; H. von Sybel, *The Founding of the German Empire*; J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia*, the most thorough and readable of all brief treatises. E. F. Henderson, *A Short History of Germany*, treats this period in an enlivened manner, though as a part in a larger whole.

The best descriptions of Prussian elections are in articles in French journals, such as: Lefèvre Pontalis, *Les élections prussiennes*, in *Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, CLI, 186; A. Lebon, *Les institutions prussiennes*, in *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*,

V, 70. Other works on the subject are L. Arons, *Les élections au Landtag prussien*; and von Gerlach, *L'histoire du droit électoral prussien*.

The general history of Germany since 1871 on its political side is amply interpreted by Prinz von Bülow, *Imperial Germany*, most interesting for its attitude toward the Social Democrats; B. E. Howard, *The German Empire*; W. von Schierbrand, *Germany*; and H. Lichtenberger, *Germany and Its Evolution in Modern Times*. P. Matter, *D'un Reichstag à l'autre*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, XXVI, 529, and XXVII, 185, discusses the Imperial electoral system.

Electoral reform in Prussia and the other states is traced in various magazine articles, including: H. Nézard, *L'évolution du suffrage universel en Prusse et dans l'empire allemand*, in *Révue du Droit Public* XXI, 734; P. Matter, *La réforme électorale en Prusse*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, XXV, 625; G. Isambert, *Le parti du Centre en Allemagne et les élections de janvier-fevrier, 1907*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, XXII, 200. Recent changes are described in the *Annual Register*, and in D. P. Frary, *Elections and Democracy in Prussia*, *Review of Reviews*, October, 1917. F. Naumann, the famous author of the Mitteleuropa concept, writes interestingly of party history in *Die Politische Parteien*.

CHAPTERS XXI-XXIII. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

For a clear and detailed treatment of Austro-Hungarian history in the early nineteenth century the chapters in the *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XI, are excellent. Additional information may be gleaned from A. Springer,

Geschichte Oesterreichs seit dem Wiener Frieden 1809. G. Drage, *Austria-Hungary*; and Sidney Whitman, *The Realm of the Hapsburgs*; also treat of the subject in broad outlines. B. Auerbach, *Les Races et Nationalités en Autriche Hongrie*, furnishes material on the racial complex. By far the best work on the Ausgleich is L. Eisenmann, *Le Compromis Austro-Hongroise de 1867*. J. Mailath, *Political Relations between Austria and Hungary*, *Contemporary Review*, XCIV, 318, treats of history since 1867.

Magazine articles are the chief sources of information on the electoral history of Austria since 1867. Among the best of these are E. Zweig, *La réforme électorale en Autriche*, in *Révue du Droit Public*, XXIV, 321, and 510, giving a description of successive laws from 1848 to 1907; W. Beaumont, *Le suffrage universel en Autriche, la loi du 26 Janvier 1907*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*; H. Gaidoz, *Le conflit Germano-Tchèque*, in *Annales de l'école libre des Sciences Politiques* XIV, 110; G. P. Gooch, *Elections in Austria 1900*, *Westminster Review*, CLIV, 619; and V. H. Walsh, *Through the Austrian General Election*, *Fortnightly Review*, LXXXVII, 977. P. Scapinelli, *Das allgemeine, gleiche, direkte Wahlrecht*, gives a supplement containing texts of the various laws.

Two volumes by A. de Bertha, *La Hongrie moderne de 1849 à 1901*, and *La Constitution Hongroise*, are excellent for a historical background in Hungarian elections. Scotus Viator (R. Seton Watson), *Corruption and Reform in Hungary*, gives a graphic account of the author's experiences in violent campaigns. P. Matter, *La Constitution Hongroise*, *Annales de l'école des Sciences Politiques*, IV, 515, and V, 241, give a thorough-going history of the Hungarian constitution down to 1889. Also help-

ful are G. Louis Jaray, *Le suffrage universel en Hongrie*, in *Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales*, February 16, 1909; S. Aberdam, *Les récentes crises politiques en Hongrie*, in *Révue des Sciences Politiques*, May-August, 1912; and J. Mailath, *La Hongrie rurale, sociale, et politique*, which has chapters on electoral reform.

CHAPTERS XXIV-XXV. ITALY

For a general background of Italian politics of to-day the student should read W. R. Thayer, *Life and Times of Cavour*; no book is more essential to a comprehension of the various and complicated factors which enter into the electoral contests of Italy. Two books are especially valuable for recent history and politics: F. M. Underwood, *United Italy*; and *Italy To-day* by Bolton King and Thomas Okey. The latter has excellent chapters on parties and electioneering, and from it has been incorporated much contained in the chapters on Italy in the present book. Other works of value are Garlanda, *The New Italy*, and Zacher, *Italien von heute*. For general descriptions of the electoral systems and parties, written in English, reference may be made to F. A. Ogg, *The Governments of Europe*; and A. L. Lowell, *Government and Parties in Continental Europe*. More detailed are two works in German: Brusa, *Das Staatsrecht des Königreichs Italien*; and Franz Schmidt, *Italien: Verfassung, Verwaltung, Volkswirtschaft*. Of particular importance on the question of electoral reform is Leone Caetani's *La Réforme elettorale*. Several articles in periodicals should be noted: Villari, *Present-day Problems in Italy*, in the *Living Age*, series 7, volume 6, pp. 410-423; Gidel, *Les*

élections générales italiennes, in *Annales des sciences politiques*, volume 20, pp. 97-113; and *Italian Catholics and the Political Elections*, in the *Catholic Mind*, December 8, 1904.

CHAPTERS XXVI-XXVII. RUSSIA

The most useful general authority for Russian history is Alfred Rambaud, *History of Russia*. It is comprehensive and scholarly and gives an excellent survey of the development of the Empire of the Tsars from its origins. Two books which deal in greater detail with problems of recent history in Russia are Alinsky, *Modern Russia*; and Kornilov, *Modern Russian History*. For the study of political conditions Kovalevsky, *Russian Political Institutions*, is of particular importance.

Bernard Pares, *Russia and Reform*, gives in popular style a vivid impression of Russian local institutions which is of great value both from the human and the political point of view. The reader should also consult Veselitsky, *Russia and Democracy*. Apart from a single small book there is no satisfactory study in English of the system of elections to the Imperial Duma from 1905 to 1912; but that book, S. N. Harper, *The New Electoral Law for the Russian Duma*, is invaluable. It sketches the first electoral laws planned by reactionary ministers and the law actually put into operation in 1906, with a full discussion of its effects and the interpretations of the Imperial Council. It then describes in detail the law according to which the third and fourth Dumas were elected. For the politics of the period extending from 1907 to 1917 the *Annual Register* will be found of use.

CHAPTER XXVIII. SCANDINAVIA

There is a great scarcity of material in English on the Scandinavian states. The chapters on Scandinavia in the *Cambridge Modern History*, Vols. XI and XII, by W. F. Reddaway and L. Stavenow, are excellent. Seignobos, *Political History of Europe since 1814*, is also useful. For Swedish affairs P. Fahlbeck, *La constitution suédoise et la parlementarisme moderne*, gives as much information on politics as can be found in any single book. The trend of recent changes in electoral laws can best be followed in the files of the *Annual Register*.

CHAPTER XXIX. BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

A sketch of Belgian and Dutch history since 1830 can be found either in Seignobos, *Political History of Europe since 1814*; or in the *Cambridge Modern History*, Vols. XI and XII. Belgian elections have been the subject of exhaustive study, and for a limited study the reader should discriminate in order to avoid repetition. L. Dupriez, *L'organisation du suffrage universel en Belgique*, discusses the plural vote, the obligatory vote, and proportional representation, as well as the electoral system in general. Among the many works on Belgian proportional representation the following are recommended: C. Barriety, *La représentation proportionnelle en Belgique*, a thesis treating of the history of the reform and a discussion of its merits; G. LaChapelle and H. Poincaré, *La représentation proportionnelle en France et en Belgique*; J. R. Commons, *Proportional Representation*, pp. 122-

131; and especially F. Goblet d'alviella, *La représentation proportionnelle en Belgique*, a book by an eminent statesman and an authority on the subject. J. H. Humphreys, *Proportional Representation in Belgium*, in the *Contemporary Review*, October, 1908, gives a clear exposition of the practical working of the system. Belgian parties in their relation to proportional representation are treated in L. Dupriez, *L'évolution des partis politiques en Belgique et les élections de Mai, 1906*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, Sept., 1906; and in E. van der Smissen, *L'état actuel des partis politiques en Belgique* in *Annales de l'école libre des sciences politiques*, Sept., 1898.

For Holland see Seignobos, and the recent files of the *Annual Register*.

CHAPTER XXX. SWITZERLAND

A standard history of Switzerland in English is W. D. McCrackan, *The Rise of the Swiss Republic*, which gives both historical and constitutional development. Boyd Winchester, formerly United States minister to Berne, has written a good descriptive account of the country, *The Swiss Republic*. B. Moses, *The Federal Government of Switzerland* is informative on the topic indicated in its title. H. D. Lloyd, *A Sovereign People: A Study of Swiss Democracy*, is the work of a very careful observer, who devoted some years to a study of the Swiss government. Deploige, *The Referendum in Switzerland*, should be noted. The best brief study in English of the Swiss political system is J. M. Vincent, *Government in Switzerland*; the book moreover contains an excellent critical bibliography which will supply the reader with further titles.

CHAPTER XXXI. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a thorough and yet readable history of nineteenth century Spain. Perhaps as good as any for the general aspects is M. A. Hume, *Modern Spain*. The electoral question in Spain has, however, received considerable attention from French scholars, who have produced numerous useful theses on that subject. Of these are recommended P. Perissé, *Les états législatives en Espagne*; and J. Lagailarde, *La Constitution Espagnole et le régime parlementaire en Espagne*. Two magazine articles may be mentioned: J. G. Marin, *Les élections législatives en Espagne*, in *Revue du Droit Public*, XXIV, p. 543; and A. Marvaud, *Les élections espagnoles de Mai, 1907*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, XXII, p. 437. The historical background of the political situation can be found in J. L. M. Curry, *Constitutional Government in Spain*.

No really satisfactory history of Portugal for the present purpose exists in English. H. M. Stephens, *Portugal*, pp. 409-432, brings his history from 1812 down to 1880; Seignobos is also suggested. Descriptions of the republican régime must be gathered from magazine articles, such as: W. Archer, *The Portuguese Republic*, in the *Fortnightly Review*, Feb., 1911; E. J. Dillon, *Republican Portugal*, in *Contemporary Review*, Nov., 1910; and A. Marvaud, *La crise en Portugal et les élections d'avril, 1908*, in *Annales des Sciences Politiques*, July, 1908. The last named article gives a sketch of party politics.

CHAPTER XXXII. THE BALKANS AND TURKEY

An exceedingly useful handbook on Balkan history has recently appeared in N. Forbes, A. J. Toynbee, D. Mit-rany, D. G. Hogarth, *The Balkans*. It gives in condensed yet very readable form both past and present history. Works on particular countries are mostly of a general nature, and the details of electoral systems are better found in general handbooks like Lefèvre Pontalis, *Les élections en Europe à la fin du XIX siècle*. Among the general works to be examined are: J. A. R. Marriott, *The Eastern Question*; Sir Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, a survey of the last thirty or forty years by a leading authority, who also gives the best account of the Revolution of 1908; G. F. Abbott, *Turkey in Transition*; R. G. D. Laffan, *The Serbs-Guardians of the Gate*; Alfred Stead edit., *Servia by the Servians*, a very useful handbook; H. W. V. Temperley, *History of Serbia*, able and readable; Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, *The Servian People*; *La Roumanie*, an official handbook, edited by Prof. I. Popa-Burca; and articles on Greek elections in *Révue du Droit Public*, XXV, 149, and XXIX, 567.

CHAPTER XXXIII. ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AMERICA

Excellent summaries of South American history and politics are to be found in W. R. Shepherd, *Latin America* (Home University Library); and F. G. Caldoni, *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress*. There is no satisfactory general description of the governmental institutions of the South American States, but all the necessary facts are

contained in J. I. Rodriguez, *American Constitutions: a Compilation of the Political Constitutions of the Independent Nations of the New World, with short historical notes and various appendices*. For a description of the electoral habits of the different states, reference must be made to separate histories and political works. Among the most useful are Pierre Denis, *Brazil*; G. F. S. Elliott, *Chile*; E. S. Zeballos, *The Rise and Growth of the Argentine Constitution*; J. N. Matienzo, *Le gouvernement représentatif fédéral dans la République Argentine*. Numerous pamphlets, written in Spanish and Portuguese, which deal with recent electoral changes, will be found in the Congressional Library and the New York Public Library.

CHAPTER XXXIV. ELECTIONS IN JAPAN

The best and most recent general survey of the history of Japan is to be found in *A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Era*, by F. Brinkley and Baron Kikuchi. In addition to such a general background the reader should study Prince Ito, *Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*. Ito was, more than any one other, responsible for the character of the Japanese constitution and his book forms what might be termed the official interpretation of the constitution. See also, E. W. Clement, *Constitutional Government in Japan*; P. S. Reinsch, *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East*; and Théophile Gollier, *Essai sur les institutions politiques du Japon*. The best description of the electoral system and its defects, and of electioneering, is to be found in G. E. Uyehara, *The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909*.

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
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